6. If Podunk's airport allows night takeoffs and landings, the 40 houses nearby each have a market value $3000 less than when no night takeoffs and landings are permitted. Suppose the residents have a property right to prevent night-time noise. The outcome of bargaining between the residents and the airport authority will be: a) Night flights unless each resident pays as much as $3000 b) No night flights unless the airport pays $120,000 in compensation. c) Night flights if the PDV of these flights exceeds $120,000. d) a) and c) e) b) and c)

6. If Podunk's airport allows night takeoffs and landings, the 40 houses nearby each have a market value $3000 less than when no night takeoffs and landings are permitted. Suppose the residents have a property right to prevent night-time noise. The outcome of bargaining between the residents and the airport authority will be: a) Night flights unless each resident pays as much as $3000 b) No night flights unless the airport pays $120,000 in compensation. c) Night flights if the PDV of these flights exceeds $120,000. d) a) and c) e) b) and c)

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter10: Externalities

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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Figure 8.1 shows the marginal pollution control costs per ton for a firm that would pollute at Qmax without any regulation. Suppose a pollution tax of T1 per ton were implemented but the firm did not reduce its pollution from Qmax. What area(s) would represent(s) the tax paid by the firm? Group of answer choices B C+D A+B+C+D B+C B+C+D
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