If the marginal cost of gardener is $500 no matter how many are employed. The marginal benefits pergardener varies for five residents according to the following table:Marginal Benefit for EachGardenerVoter14A575550525500B275200125C1251007512510075E10075ResultA) If each voter is assigned to pay the same tax share of $100 per gardener, what is the political equilibriumunder majority rule?B) Show that the Lindahl equilibrium will differ from the political equilibrium under majority rule?

The greatest amount a buyer will pay for an additional commodity or service is known as marginal…

A) If each voter is assigned to pay the same tax share of $100 per gardener, what is the political equilibrium under majority rule? B) Show that the Lindahl equilibrium will differ from the political equilibrium under majority rule?

A) If each voter is assigned to pay the same tax share of $100 per gardener, what is the political equilibrium under majority rule? B) Show that the Lindahl equilibrium will differ from the political equilibrium under majority rule?

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section22.2: Political Economy

Problem 2QQ

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