A risk-neutral individual has the utility function u(w) = aw, where w is her wealth, and a>0 a parameter. Her initial wealth is equal to W. There might be a fire which would destroy the dollar amount L of this wealth. The fire occurs with probability p. The individual can buy insurance to cover the amount K, with KE[0,L]. The insurance premium is given by g, so that if she buys insurance to cover an amount K, she must pay the insurance company the amount gK. Solve the expected utility maximization problem of this individual to determine how much insurance she would buy. From the first-order condition you obtain, determine how much insurance she will buy in each of the following cases: a) The insurance market is competitive. b) The insurance market is characterized by imperfect competition, so that insurance companies have market power. c) The insurance market is competitive, but the government subsidizes insurance companies, so that when a firm sells insurance for a coverage of K, it receives from the government the amount sK.

Algebra & Trigonometry with Analytic Geometry
13th Edition
ISBN:9781133382119
Author:Swokowski
Publisher:Swokowski
Chapter5: Inverse, Exponential, And Logarithmic Functions
Section5.6: Exponential And Logarithmic Equations
Problem 64E
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A risk-neutral individual has the utility function u(w) = aw, where w is her wealth, and a>0 a parameter.
Her initial wealth is equal to W. There might be a fire which would destroy the dollar amount L of this
wealth. The fire occurs with probability p. The individual can buy insurance to cover the amount K, with
KE[0,L]. The insurance premium is given by g, so that if she buys insurance to cover an amount K, she
must pay the insurance company the amount gK.
Solve the expected utility maximization problem of this individual to determine how much insurance she
would buy. From the first-order condition you obtain, determine how much insurance she will buy in each
of the following cases:
a) The insurance market is competitive.
b) The insurance market is characterized by imperfect competition, so that insurance companies have
market power.
c) The insurance market is competitive, but the government subsidizes insurance companies, so that when
a firm sells insurance for a coverage of K, it receives from the government the amount sK.
Transcribed Image Text:A risk-neutral individual has the utility function u(w) = aw, where w is her wealth, and a>0 a parameter. Her initial wealth is equal to W. There might be a fire which would destroy the dollar amount L of this wealth. The fire occurs with probability p. The individual can buy insurance to cover the amount K, with KE[0,L]. The insurance premium is given by g, so that if she buys insurance to cover an amount K, she must pay the insurance company the amount gK. Solve the expected utility maximization problem of this individual to determine how much insurance she would buy. From the first-order condition you obtain, determine how much insurance she will buy in each of the following cases: a) The insurance market is competitive. b) The insurance market is characterized by imperfect competition, so that insurance companies have market power. c) The insurance market is competitive, but the government subsidizes insurance companies, so that when a firm sells insurance for a coverage of K, it receives from the government the amount sK.
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