As presented in the text, SMTP involves the exchange of several small messages. In most cases, the server responses do not affect what the client sends subsequently. The client might thus implement command pipelining: sending multiple commands in a single message. (a) For what SMTP commands does the client need to pay attention to the server's responses? (b) Assume the server reads each client message with gets() or the equivalent, which reads in a string up to a . What would it have to do even to detect that a client had used command pipelining? (c) Pipelining is nonetheless known to break with some servers; find out how a client can negotiate its use.

As presented in the text, SMTP involves the exchange of several small messages. In most cases, the server responses do not affect what the client sends subsequently. The client might thus implement command pipelining: sending multiple commands in a single message. (a) For what SMTP commands does the client need to pay attention to the server's responses? (b) Assume the server reads each client message with gets() or the equivalent, which reads in a string up to a . What would it have to do even to detect that a client had used command pipelining? (c) Pipelining is nonetheless known to break with some servers; find out how a client can negotiate its use.

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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