As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inverse demand is P = 40 − 2Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 8Q. a. Determine the monopoly price and output. b. Determine the socially efficient price and output. c. What is the maximum amount your firm should be willing to spend on lobbying efforts to prevent the price from being regulated at the socially optimal level?

As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inverse demand is P = 40 − 2Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 8Q. a. Determine the monopoly price and output. b. Determine the socially efficient price and output. c. What is the maximum amount your firm should be willing to spend on lobbying efforts to prevent the price from being regulated at the socially optimal level?

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter9: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QFR

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inverse demand is P = 25 − 2Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 5Q. a. Determine the monopoly price and output. Monopoly price: $ Monopoly output: units b. Determine the socially efficient price and output. Socially efficient price: $ Socially efficient output: units c. What is the maximum amount your firm should be willing to spend on lobbying efforts to prevent the price from being regulated at the socially optimal level? $
As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inverse demand is P = 50 - 1Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 18Q.a. Determine the monopoly price and output.Monopoly price: $___ Monopoly output units____b. Determine the socially efficient price and output.Socially efficient price: $____ Socially efficient output Units___c. What is the maximum amount your firm should be willing to spend on lobbying efforts to prevent the price from being regulated at the socially optimal level?$____
The graph depicts market conditions for an unregulated, profit-maximizing monopolist that is unable to price discriminate. Assuming the market demand function is equivalent to marginal benefit, the socially efficient level of output in this market is 1000 units of output; deadweight loss is approximiately equal to $________ (since the MC function is not a straight line and deadweight loss is measured as the area of a triangle, it is an appoximation).
A small monopoly manufacturer of widgets has a constant marginal cost of $10. The demand for this firm's widgets is Q=120−1P. Given the above information, compute the social cost of this firm's monopoly power
The demand and total cost functions for a monopoly firm are: Q(P) = 39.5 – 0.5P TC(Q) = 60 – Q + 0.5 Q² What would be the socially optimal Q* and P* (round to 1 decimal place if needed
At a monopolist’s profit-maximizing level of output, what is the Total Revenue? At a monopolist’s profit-maximizing level of output, what is the Total Profit? At the socially optimal level of output, what is the Total Revenue? At the socially optimal level of output, what is the Total Profit?
As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inversedemand is P = 40 − 2Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 8Q. b. Determine the socially efficient price and output.
As the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inverse demand is P=40-2Q and your costs are C (Q) =8Q. Determine the socially efficient price and output.
A monopolist knows there are two customers with different demand curves for two differently sized bags of potato chips. Customer S would only buy the small bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=160-2q (where P denotes the price and q denotes the quantity). Customer L would buy the large bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=200-q. The monopolist does not know who is customer S and who is customer L. Marginal cost of production is zero. BEFORE second degree price discrimination, how large are the bags?
A monopolist knows there are two customers with different demand curves for two differently sized bags of potato chips. Customer S would only buy the small bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=160-2q (where P denotes the price and q denotes the quantity). Customer L would buy the large bag and has a willingness-to-pay given by P=200-q. The monopolist does not know who is customer S and who is customer L. Marginal cost of production is zero. BEFORE second degree price discrimination, and if the monopolist perfectly price discriminated the small bag, what is the price of the small bag?
A monopolist faces a market demand curve given by: Q = 80 - pAssume that the monopolist has a cost structure where total costs are described by: C(Q) = 0.25Q2 - 5Q + 1000.Question a: What output level would be socially optimal? What is the price at this output level, if all units are sold at the same price? What is the profit? Question b: If government regulation forces the firm to set its price equal to its average cost of production, what will the output level be? What is the price at this output level, if all units are sold at the same price? What is the profit? What would the social welfare gain or loss be from this output level compared to the outcomes in (a)?
Assuming that the firm is the only producer in a market, the social cost of the output decision of a profit-maximizing monopoly firm. Can you discuss the assumption that the government wants to set a price ceiling that maximizes the monopolist's output? What price should the government set? Thank you!