Assume there are only two jobs and that both jobs use the skill set possessed by both Preferred (P) workers and Non-Preferred (NP) workers. Job 1 has only P workers; job 2 has Pand NP workers. Based on the Employee (Co-Worker) Taste Discrimination Model, if job 1 pays $18/hour and job 2 pays $24/hour, ceteris paribus: job 2 will employ more NP workers than P workers. a P worker with a dew 0.20 will choose job 1. O a P worker with a dew" 0.20 will choose job 2. O a P worker with a dew 0.20 will be indifferent between job 1 and job 2.

Assume there are only two jobs and that both jobs use the skill set possessed by both Preferred (P) workers and Non-Preferred (NP) workers. Job 1 has only P workers; job 2 has Pand NP workers. Based on the Employee (Co-Worker) Taste Discrimination Model, if job 1 pays $18/hour and job 2 pays $24/hour, ceteris paribus: job 2 will employ more NP workers than P workers. a P worker with a dew 0.20 will choose job 1. O a P worker with a dew" 0.20 will choose job 2. O a P worker with a dew 0.20 will be indifferent between job 1 and job 2.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter11: Profit Maximization

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11.8P

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