Bargaining Questions 1. Discuss the Nash bargaining solution. 2. Provide a solution to he Alternating Offers Bargaining Problem. 3. Show that the Nash bargaining solution is Pareto efficient. 4. Use a diagram to show that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. 5. Use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to show that an individual's share increase with his power, but deceases with the power of his rival. 6. Use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to show that an individual's share increases with his threat point and decreases with his rival's threat point. 7. Use the alternating offers bargaining game to show that an individual's shares increase with his discount factor. 8. Use the alternating offers bargaining game to demonstrate the first mover advantage. 9. Show that, at the limit, when the time between of- fers goes to zero, the solution in the alternating offers model converges to the solution in the generalized Nash bargaining model, with zero threat points and with the two parties' powers being given by the re- spective discount rates.
Bargaining Questions 1. Discuss the Nash bargaining solution. 2. Provide a solution to he Alternating Offers Bargaining Problem. 3. Show that the Nash bargaining solution is Pareto efficient. 4. Use a diagram to show that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. 5. Use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to show that an individual's share increase with his power, but deceases with the power of his rival. 6. Use the generalized Nash bargaining solution to show that an individual's share increases with his threat point and decreases with his rival's threat point. 7. Use the alternating offers bargaining game to show that an individual's shares increase with his discount factor. 8. Use the alternating offers bargaining game to demonstrate the first mover advantage. 9. Show that, at the limit, when the time between of- fers goes to zero, the solution in the alternating offers model converges to the solution in the generalized Nash bargaining model, with zero threat points and with the two parties' powers being given by the re- spective discount rates.
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.9P
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