Consider a marriage market with three men and three women, all of whom prefer any match to being unmatched. Preferences over matches are as follows: m₁w₁ W2 > W3 m₂2: W₁ W2 > W3 m3 w2w3 > W₁ (a) Find a stable matching. w₁m₁ m2 > m3 W₂ m₂ > m1 > m3 W3 m1 m2 > m3

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter18: Asymmetric Information
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 18.10P
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Consider a marriage market with three men and three women, all of whom prefer any match
to being unmatched. Preferences over matches are as follows:
m₁w₁ W2 > W3
m₂ W₁
wW2 W3
m3 w2 W3 W1
(a) Find a stable matching.
w₁m₁ m₂ m3
W2 m₂ > m₁ > M3
W3 m1 m2 > m3
(b) Is there a matching that is Pareto efficient but not stable?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a marriage market with three men and three women, all of whom prefer any match to being unmatched. Preferences over matches are as follows: m₁w₁ W2 > W3 m₂ W₁ wW2 W3 m3 w2 W3 W1 (a) Find a stable matching. w₁m₁ m₂ m3 W2 m₂ > m₁ > M3 W3 m1 m2 > m3 (b) Is there a matching that is Pareto efficient but not stable?
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