Consider a repeated game with two players and two rounds. The stage game is shown below. Assume the players have a common discount factor & e (0, 1). Which of the following is NOT TRUE?

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter7: Uncertainty
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 7.10P
icon
Related questions
Question

Q2

Consider a repeated game with two players and two rounds.
The stage game is shown below. Assume the players have a
common discount factor & e (0, 1). Which of the following is
NOT TRUE?
L
M
H
3, 3
2, 1
12, 0
1, 2
|6, 6
|0,0
0, 12
0, 0
|10, 10
O There doesn't exist any discount factor such that (H,H) will be
played in the first period since the game is finite.
If payoff for (L,L) is (0,0), then there is no way to sustain (H,H) in
the first period.
There is a SPNE where the two firms play (L, L) in the first period
and (M,M) in the second period.
O If the stage game is repeated for 3 times instead of 2, then the
minimum $\delta$ such that there is a SPNE where (H,H) is
played in the fırst round is smaller.
There are 2 pure strategy NE and 1 mixed strategy NE for the
stage game.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a repeated game with two players and two rounds. The stage game is shown below. Assume the players have a common discount factor & e (0, 1). Which of the following is NOT TRUE? L M H 3, 3 2, 1 12, 0 1, 2 |6, 6 |0,0 0, 12 0, 0 |10, 10 O There doesn't exist any discount factor such that (H,H) will be played in the first period since the game is finite. If payoff for (L,L) is (0,0), then there is no way to sustain (H,H) in the first period. There is a SPNE where the two firms play (L, L) in the first period and (M,M) in the second period. O If the stage game is repeated for 3 times instead of 2, then the minimum $\delta$ such that there is a SPNE where (H,H) is played in the fırst round is smaller. There are 2 pure strategy NE and 1 mixed strategy NE for the stage game.
Expert Solution
Step 1

There are two players : Player 1 & 2 

Strategy set of both the players : { L , M , H }

Discount factor : δ [ 0, 1]

trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 2 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Comparative Advantage
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage