45 How are conflicts between the shareholders and the management created? Which of thefollowing is most accurate? * AD They have either different political or religious beliefs.O None of the choices are correct.The management would want to undertake higher risk projects in anticipation of higher returns becauseO management compensation and bonuses are partiy tied to financial performance, while shareholders may wantto limit risks and invest instead in projects with lower risk.They have different views on how to manage people. The shareholders want a more liberal approach while themanagement wants micromanaging.

Management group might be more ready to take on more significant levels of chance, while…

Answered: How are conflicts between the…

Principles of Accounting Volume 2

19th Edition

ISBN:9781947172609

Author:OpenStax

Publisher:OpenStax

Chapter13: Sustainability Reporting

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11MC: Which of the following statements is most often the case? A. Socially responsible businesses tend to...

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How are conflicts between the shareholders and the management created? Which of the following is most accurate? a. They have either different political or religious beliefs. b. They have different views on how to manage people. The shareholders want a more liberal approach while the management wants micromanaging. c. The management would want to undertake higher risk projects in anticipation of higher returns because management compensation and bonuses are partly tied to financial performance, while shareholders may want to limit risks and invest instead in projects with lower risk. d. None of the choices are correct.
All things equal, managerial risk aversion will have the following effect: Question options: a) CEOs will pass on NPV < 0 projects, which is an indirect agency cost b) Less diversified executives will place a lower value on riskier forms of compensation c) CEOs will prefer debt over equity financing for new projects d) CEOs will be less willing to accept underpricing at an initial public offering
It is an axiom that may be characterized by managers making decisions that conflict with the best interest of the shareholders. a. the risk-return trade-off b. the agency problems c. the curse of competitive markets d. stockholders versus managers
If corporate managers are risk averse, does this mean that they will not take risks? If you were a corporate financial manager (NOT an individual person), would you prefer a low-risk, low-return project or a high-risk, high-return project, and why?
Which of the following is an example of the agency problem? a. Managers always invest in projects that have appropriate returns and that will increase shareholder wealth. b. Managers resign when they believe they have not always acted in the best interests of shareholders. c. Managers conduct an acquisition program purely to increase the size of an organisation. d. Managers look for new projects as they want to avoid business risk. Clear my choice
2 (a)There is a conflict of interest between stockholders and managers. In theory, stockholders are expected to exercise control over managers through the annual meeting or the board of directors. In practice, why might these disciplinary mechanisms not work? (b)There are some corporate strategists who have suggested that firms focus on maximizing market share rather than market prices. When might this strategy work, and when might it fail? (c)It is often argued that managers, when asked to maximize stock price, have to choose between being socially responsible and carrying out their fiduciary duty. Do you agree? Can you provide an example where social responsibility and firm value maximization go hand in hand?
What does it mean to say that managers should maximize shareholders' wealth "subject to ethical constraints"? What ethical considerations might factor into decisions that result in lower cash flow and stock price effects than they might have otherwise been valued?
Which of the following statements is FALSE? In the shareholder/debtor relationship, the: a. Debtor is the principal, because they have delegated authority to management b. Shareholder and debtor interests are increasingly aligned as the company takes on more debt. c. Interests of the firm’s management tend to be aligned more closely with those of the firm’s shareholders d. Shareholders have an incentive to take on risky projects because they get to keep residual earnings of the firm a. Interests of the firm’s management tend to be aligned more closely with those of the firm’s shareholders b. Shareholders have an incentive to take on risky projects because they get to keep residual earnings of the firm c. Debtor is the principal, because they have delegated authority to management d. Shareholder and debtor interests are increasingly aligned as the company takes on more debt.
Explain several dimensions of the shareholder-principal conflict with manager agents known as the principle-agent problem. To mitigate agency problems between senior executives and shareholders, should the board's compensation committee devote more to executive salary and bonus (cash compensation) or more to long-term incentives? Why? What role does each type of pay in motivating managers?
Which of the following methods would be most likely to decrease the agency problems by helping motivate managers to act in the best interests of shareholders? 1. Increase the proportion of executive compensation that comes from stock options and reduce the proportion that is paid as cash salaries. 2. Eliminate a requirement that members of the board of directors have a substantial investment in the firm's stock. 3. Decrease the use of restrictive covenants in bond agreements. 4. Take actions that reduce the possibility of a hostile takeover. 5. Elect a board of directors that allows managers greater freedom of action.
CEO compensation design is effective in controlling the behavior in their decision making. How a compensation package could possibly work in adjusting a CEO’s risk taking behavior (in investments) and in balancing long-term vs. short term interests of a company?
The tension between the interests of the CEO and the interests of long-term stakeholders helps to explain why: Group of answer choices A. Conflicts of interest can easily happen. D. Both A & B B. Boards of directors need to maintain their independence from executives. C. Absence of agency risk is apparent.

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