If the firms in a Cournot duopoly merge forming a monopoly, the effect on price, profit, and other variables depends on the trade-off between efficiency and market power. The firms produce identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $1, and Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $2. The market demand isQ=45-p.The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q₁ equals 15 and q2 equals 14. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $\.Firm 1 receives profit of $ 225 and Firm 2 receives profit of $196Consumer surplus equals $If the firms merge and produce at the lower marginal cost, then the new equilibrium occurs where market output (Q) isThe new equilibrium price is $The merged firm's profit is $Consumer surplus is now $

A monopoly is a market structure characterized by a single seller, selling a unique product in the…

If the firms in a Courot duopoly merge forming a monopoly, the effect on price, profit, and other variables depends on the trade-off between efficiency and market power. The firms produce identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $1, and Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $2. The market demandi Q=45-p. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals 15 and ₂ equals 14. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $ Firm 1 receives profit of $ 225 and Firm 2 receives profit of $ 196. Consumer surplus equals $ If the firms merge and produce at the lower marginal cost, then the new equilibrium occurs where market output (Q) is. The new equilibrium price is $. The merged firm's profit is $. Consumer surplus is now $

If the firms in a Courot duopoly merge forming a monopoly, the effect on price, profit, and other variables depends on the trade-off between efficiency and market power. The firms produce identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $1, and Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $2. The market demandi Q=45-p. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals 15 and ₂ equals 14. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $ Firm 1 receives profit of $ 225 and Firm 2 receives profit of $ 196. Consumer surplus equals $ If the firms merge and produce at the lower marginal cost, then the new equilibrium occurs where market output (Q) is. The new equilibrium price is $. The merged firm's profit is $. Consumer surplus is now $

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.5P

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If the firms in a Cournot duopoly merge forming a monopoly, the effect on price, profit, and other variables depends on the trade-off between efficiency and market power. The firms produce identical products. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $1, and Firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $2. The market demand is Q=15-p. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q₁ equals Furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $. Firm 1 receives profit of $ and Firm 2 receives profit of $ and q₂ equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) Consumer surplus equals $ If the firms merge and produce at the lower marginal cost, then the new equilibrium occurs where market output (Q) is The new equilibrium price is $ The merged firm's profit is $ Consumer surplus is now $
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