In the final key agreement protocol detailed in the textbook, if Alice specifies her minimum acceptable prime p is 4 bits what is the smallest p she will accept from Bob. Ignore Alice's prime test for p, just determine what's the smallest integer p that passes Alice's size test. (It goes without saying, but such a small p offers no security; I am using a small number to make the math easy.)

In the final key agreement protocol detailed in the textbook, if Alice specifies her minimum acceptable prime p is 4 bits what is the smallest p she will accept from Bob. Ignore Alice's prime test for p, just determine what's the smallest integer p that passes Alice's size test. (It goes without saying, but such a small p offers no security; I am using a small number to make the math easy.)

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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In the final key agreement protocol detailed in the textbook, if Alice specifies her minimum acceptable prime p is 4 bits what is the largest p she will accept from Bob. Ignore Alice's prime test for p, just determine what's the largest integer p that passes Alice's size test. (It goes without saying, but such a small p offers no security; I am using a small number to make the math easy.)
By using 3 prime numbers, we can also define RSA cryptostem where N = pqr. Again we must have gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1 and d is the multiplicative inverse of e in modulo ϕ(N). (a) Give an example RSA encryption with prime numbers 41, 43, 47. Choose an encryption key, determine its corresponding decryption key. Send me a message. (b) Why this 3-prime RSA is not preferred? Kindly give an explanation. Thank you
Need help with a Which description about the Diffie-Hellman Protocol is NOT correct? A. Diffie-Hellman Protocol is used to negotiate a key over a public channel. B. The base g and modulus p are publicly known . C. Diffie-Hellman Protocol authenticates each party. D. Diffie-Hellman Protocol is vulnerable to the Man-In-The-Middle Attack.
Consider the final key agreement protocol detailed in the textbook. If Alice and Bob are both honest, and any adversaries are passive, which of the following components could be removed and the resulting protocol would still be well-defined and secure? Check all that apply. Group of answer choices (1). sa (2). Na (3). (p,q,g) (4). gx (5). AuthB (6). gy (7). AuthA
For Diffie Hellman Key exchange protocol, following are given:Generator g=11Prime p=23Alice chooses a random number, a = last digit of your roll number(If Roll Number: ch.en.u4cys20095, then a=5) Use a=8 Bob chooses a random number, b = 7Find the key shared by Alice (KSA) and Bob (KSB).Also verify the final key calculated by Alice and Bob are same.
Given the following table describing the procedure for Alice to send a signed message with DSA signature to Bob, calculate the unknown entities and verify that Bob has received the correct message sent by Alice. Here, for simplicity we assume that the hash of a message m, h(m) is already computed and given to you. Alice Bob Choose p=19, q=7, α=2, d=6 Compute β= αd mod p = Public key: kpub = (p,q,α,β) = Private key: kpriv = (d) Send public key to Bob: (p,q,α,β)= Hash of message m , h(m) = 7 (given) Receive Alice’ public key (p,q,α,β)= Ephemeral key, kE = 5 Compute kE-1 mod q = Compute r= (αkE mod p) mod q Compute s= (h(m) + d*r)* kE-1 mod q = DSA Signature (r,s) = Send message (m, (r,s)) to Bob Receive message (m, (r,s)) from Alice; here we assume h(m)=7 as known Compute w = s-1 mod q = Compute u1 = w*h(m) mod q = Compute u2 = w*r mod q = Compute…
We consider ElGamal cryptosystem with public prime p = 53 and generator g = 2. Let h = 16 be Bob’s public-key (his private key x is unknown, h = g^x ). Alice encrypted message m with Bob’s public key and sent the corresponding ciphertext to Bob: (C1 ,C2 ) = (15, 50). You intercepted this ciphertext. Can you break the encryption and recover the original message m? Hint: Both g and h are very small numbers, can you deduce private key x?
For the Zhou-Gollman non-repudiation protocol discussed in the lecture on “Non-Repudiationand Anonymity Protocols”, which one of the following statements is false:a) At time point 4, both A and B can produce evidence to prove that they received Kb) At time point 2, both A and B can produce evidence to prove that they received a signedmessage from the other partyc) At time point 0, S cannot prove anythingd) At time point 3, B cannot produce evidence to prove that A has access to key Ke) At time point 1, A can prove that B is alivef) At time point 4, S can prove that A is aliveg) At time point 3, S can produce evidence that that A has access to key Kh) At time point 0, A is not alivei) At time point 2, A can produce evidence to prove that B is alivej) At time point 4, the protocol terminates
Pretend you are Alice and have agreed with Bob to carry out Diffie-Hellman key exchange with parameters p = 23 and g = 5. You may use a calculator to answer the following, but write down and label all the quantities you use. Assume you choose the secret random value x = 19. Compute the value gx (mod p) that you will send to Bob. In the protocol, you receive the value gy = 18 from Bob. Compute your shared secret value. Now pretend you are an eavesdropping adversary. From g, p and gy, find Bob’s secret y (it’s possible!) Describe how you found the value in part (c), and comment on how this reflects the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In the Diffie-Hellman Protocol, each participant selects a secret number x and sends the other participant αx mod q for some public number α. What would happen if the participants sent each other αx for some public number αinstead? Give at least one method Alice and Bob could use for agreeing on a key. Can Eve break your system without finding the secret numbers? Can Eve find the secret numbers? In TLS, why is there a separate Change Cipher Spec Protocol, rather than including a change_cipher_spec message in the Handshake Protocol?
In the final key agreement protocol detailed in the textbook, let's assume that p is about 2048 bits long. Approximately how many bits of entropy are in gxymod p? a)2048 b)512 c)256 d)128
Note: The notation from this problem is from Understanding Cryptography by Paar and Pelzl. Consider the LFSR represented by the polynomial x4+x2+1x4+x2+1. What are the tap bits of the LFSR? Please enter your answer as unspaced binary digits (e.g. 010101 to represent p5=0,p4=1,p3=0,p2=1,p1=0,p0=1p5=0,p4=1,p3=0,p2=1,p1=0,p0=1).