In the no-shirking model, the expected payoff of the worker who shirks is (1 t)w + tjB + t(1 − j)(w – u) Explain what each of the following component in the formula represents: (1-t) is... w is... t is ... j is.. B is... (1-j) is... (w - u) is... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... ✓ Choose... the probability of finding another identical job if fired. the probability that shirking is not detected by the employer. the payoff of a worker who shirks and is not detected. the value of a job in equilibrium. ( " 4 « the probability of remaining unemployed if fired. the unemployment benefit. the probability that a shirking worker is detected by the employer and fired.

In the no-shirking model, the expected payoff of the worker who shirks is (1 t)w + tjB + t(1 − j)(w – u) Explain what each of the following component in the formula represents: (1-t) is... w is... t is ... j is.. B is... (1-j) is... (w - u) is... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... Choose... ✓ Choose... the probability of finding another identical job if fired. the probability that shirking is not detected by the employer. the payoff of a worker who shirks and is not detected. the value of a job in equilibrium. ( " 4 « the probability of remaining unemployed if fired. the unemployment benefit. the probability that a shirking worker is detected by the employer and fired.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.10P

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