Correct and detailed answer will be Upvoted else downvoted. Thank you! Penalty kicks in soccer.Let's consider a situation where a football player has to faceoff the goalkeeper in a penalty kickoff.Standing infront of the goalpost, the Kicker (player 1) has several angle which he could kick the ball to the goalpost. Let's say he could kick theball in the Left corner of the goalpost, Right corner of the goalpost or shoot straight through the Center. And, same as the player, thegoalkeeper (player 2) also has three options to predict which direction the player would kick the ball and try to stop it.This game can be represented using the following 3 x 3 matrix:LeftCenterRight6040946937Left100 100100 100)100 100100100 1009591Center100 100100 100Right919(100 100946100 1006337100 100In the above matrix, the payoff of the kicker is the probability that he scores and the payoff of the goalkeeper is the probability that the kickerdoesn't score. We know that the total probability of an event is 1, therefore, all the payoffs sum up to 1.1. Find a mixed strategy o1 =(P1, P2, (1– P1 – P2)) for Player 1 that will make Player 2 indifferent about playing Le ft, Center orRight.2. Find a mixed strategy o2 = (q1, q2, (1-q1- 92)) for Player 2 that will make Player 1 indifferent about playing Le ft, Center orRight.3. What is the probability that the Kicker(player 1) scored a goal, or in other words what is the expected utility for player 1.ActivateGo to SetIf you are using decimal numbers instead of fractions, use at least six digits after decimal point.

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Let's consider a situation where a football player has to faceoff the goalkeeper in a penalty kickoff. Standing infront of the goalpost, the Kicker (player 1) has several angle which he could kick the ball to the goalpost. Let's say he could kick the ball in the Left corner of the goalpost, Right corner of the goalpost or shoot straight through the Center. And, same as the player, the goalkeeper (player 2) also has three options to predict which direction the player would kick the ball and try to stop it.

Let's consider a situation where a football player has to faceoff the goalkeeper in a penalty kickoff. Standing infront of the goalpost, the Kicker (player 1) has several angle which he could kick the ball to the goalpost. Let's say he could kick the ball in the Left corner of the goalpost, Right corner of the goalpost or shoot straight through the Center. And, same as the player, the goalkeeper (player 2) also has three options to predict which direction the player would kick the ball and try to stop it.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter3: Interdependence And The Gains From Trade

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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