Nothing Bundts Cake' sells two different Bundt flavors in a market with two different consumers. One of the Flavors is Prettiest Princess (good X) and the other one is Best Dad 'Around (good Y). Mr. Grumpy has a reservation price of $ 15 for good X and $ 85 for good Y. Rapunzel has a reservation price of $ 75 for good X and $ 25 for good Y. EACH good X and Y cost $ 20 to produce. Find the TOTAL profits under selling separately. $160 $ 150 $120 $85

Nothing Bundts Cake' sells two different Bundt flavors in a market with two different consumers. One of the Flavors is Prettiest Princess (good X) and the other one is Best Dad 'Around (good Y). Mr. Grumpy has a reservation price of $ 15 for good X and $ 85 for good Y. Rapunzel has a reservation price of $ 75 for good X and $ 25 for good Y. EACH good X and Y cost $ 20 to produce. Find the TOTAL profits under selling separately. $160 $ 150 $120 $85

Microeconomics: Principles & Policy

14th Edition

ISBN:9781337794992

Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Publisher:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Chapter11: The Case For Free Markets: The Price System

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2DQ

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