Question 1 QUESTION 1Consider a game in which simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x in [0,6], and player 2 selects a number y in [0,6]. The payoffs are given by16x(x,y) =x2y + 2and16уu2(x,y) =- y2%3D|x +2Find the unique NE of the game. Give each player's strategy as a number to 2 decimal places. Format it as follows: e.g. (5.5,7.4)QUESTION 2Two geographically distant firms, firm 1 and firm 2, compete in setting prices, selling the same good.Suppose the consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], and each will buy either one unit or nothing.Firm 1 is located at 0 and firm 2 at 1. Firms cannot change their locations, only select prices. Firms simultaneously choose prices, firm 1 choosesp, and2 chooses P2.Both firms produce at zero cost and must set prices between 0 and 6.Consumers care about the distance they have to travel to buy the good, but also the price. They get a benefit of 6 from the good if purchased, but als paof 2 times the distance traveled to make the purchase. If a consumer is located at x in [0.1] and they purchase from firm 1, their payoff is6-2x -P1Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all answers.

PLEASE NOTE IN ORDER TO REACH TO NE WE NEED TO CALCULATED IT INTO 2 PARTS

QUESTION 1 Consider a game in which simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x in [0,6], and player 2 selects a number y in [0,6]. The payoffs are given by 16x u(x.y): - x2 у +2 %3D and 16y uzx.y) = - y? x + 2 Find the unique NE of the game. Give each player's strategy as a number to 2 decimal places. Format it as follows: e.g. (5.5,7.4)

QUESTION 1 Consider a game in which simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x in [0,6], and player 2 selects a number y in [0,6]. The payoffs are given by 16x u(x.y): - x2 у +2 %3D and 16y uzx.y) = - y? x + 2 Find the unique NE of the game. Give each player's strategy as a number to 2 decimal places. Format it as follows: e.g. (5.5,7.4)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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