Suppose your preferences can characterized by the simple utility function U = √C, where C is consumption. You enjoy rock climbing, where you have a 10% chance of get- ting injured and losing $50,000. Your income (and therefore consumption) in the uninjured state is $90,000. What is the most you are willing to pay for an insurance policy? What is the fee for a fair insurance?

Suppose your preferences can characterized by the simple utility function U = √C, where C is consumption. You enjoy rock climbing, where you have a 10% chance of get- ting injured and losing $50,000. Your income (and therefore consumption) in the uninjured state is $90,000. What is the most you are willing to pay for an insurance policy? What is the fee for a fair insurance?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.12P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain.
Consider two individuals whose utility function over wealth I is ?(?) = √?. Both people face a 10 percent chance of getting sick, and foreach the total cost of illness equals $50,000. Suppose person A has a total net worth of $100,000, and person B has a total net worth of $1,000,000. Both people have the option to buy an actuarially fair insurance contract that would fully insure them against the cost of the illness. a. Using expected utility calculations, show that person A would certainly buy full, actuarially fair insurance. b. Suppose an insurance company wants to maximize profits and wants to charge each customer the maximum price they are willing to pay. How much should the insurance company charge each client so that both buy the contract? c. What is surprising about your result in part b? What does this tell you about how insurance companies may be pricing health insurance contracts in the real world?
Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) = square root x . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain
. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) = square root x. There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain. b) What would be the highest price (premium) that she would be willing to pay for an insurance policy that fully insures her against the flooding damage?
Consider two treatments. Treatment 1 saves one year of life at a cost of $10,000. Treatment 2 saves ten years of life at a cost of $1,000,000. Which treatment is more cost-effective? Why? Consider two treatments. Treatment 1 saves six years of quality adjusted life at a cost of $90,000. Treatment 2 saves three years of quality adjusted life at a cost of $60,000. Which treatment is preferred from a cost utility analysis perspective? Suppose Jay has been experiencing back pain and that there are two options for back pain: Treatment Regimen Total Cost Pain Reduction Do nothing $0 0 units Cortisone injections $600 30 units Calculate the ICER between cortisone injections and doing nothing. Jay says he is willing to pay $10 for a per unit of pain reduction. Should he choose cortisone injections? Another treatment is discovered. It costs $700 and reduces pain by 25 units. Should he choose the new treatment?
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function ( sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Calculate Lex’s and Tess' expected utilities without insurance. (each one separated) Round to two decimal places for both
1- A consumer who starts (i.e. has an endowment) at point B, and has preferences shown by IC1, will want to borrow. Select one: True False 2-Assuming a mix of present and future consumption is preferred, ANY consumer who starts (i.e. has an endowment) at point A will gain utility from a rise in interest rates. Select one: True False 3-A consumer who starts at point B will want to borrow, but as little as possible in order to minimise the cost of interest. Select one: True False 4-If a consumer starts at point A, and then receives extra income in the present, this would appear as an outward shift of the budget constraint. Select one: True False
Loss aversion refers to the idea that people ________. generally tend to avoid risky activities are more prone to making losses than gains in day-to-day transactions psychologically weight a loss more heavily than they psychologically weight a gain are unwilling to undertake expenditures that reduce the probability of future losses
In the field of financial management, it has been observed that there is a trade-off between the rate of return that one earns on investments and the amount of risk that one must bear to earn that return. a) Draw a set of indifference curves between risk and return for a person that is risk-averse (a person that does not like risk).
Draw a utility function (with income on the horizontal axis) for an individual who is risk-loving at low levels of income, risk-neutral at moderate levels of income, and risk-averse at high levels of income (with each of these three regions clearly labeled). How would someone who looked at this graph (and had no other information about the individual) be able to figure out the individual’s attitude toward risk (averse/loving/neutral) in each region?
Suppose that left-handed people are more prone to injury than right-handed people. Lefties have an 80 percent chance of suffering an injury leading to a $1,000 loss (in terms of medical expenses and the monetary equivalent of pain and suffering) but righties have only a 20 percent chance of suffering such an injury. The population contains equal numbers of lefties and righties. Individuals all have logarithmic utility-of-wealth functions and initial wealth of $10,000. Assume perfectly competitive insurance market and find (i) the first best and (ii) the second-best contracts.
Suppose a company offers a standard insurance contract with a premium (r) of $2,000 and a payout (q) of $10,000. Suppose that Adelia earns a healthy state income of $70,000, a sick state income of $50,000, and has a 20% chance of becoming ill. For Adelia, this insurance contract would be: A. actuarially fair and partial B. actuarially fair and full C. actuarially unfair and full D. actuarially unfair and partial