The Condorcet paradox illustrates Arrow’simpossibility theorem by showing that pairwisemajority votinga. is inconsistent with the principle of unanimity.b. leads to social preferences that are not transitive.c. violates the independence of irrelevantalternatives.d. makes one person in effect a dictator.

The Condorcet paradox illustrates Arrow’simpossibility theorem by showing that pairwisemajority votinga. is inconsistent with the principle of unanimity.b. leads to social preferences that are not transitive.c. violates the independence of irrelevantalternatives.d. makes one person in effect a dictator.

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4CQQ

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