The market for fidgets has only three firms, (A, B, and C), that compete in quantities. The market shares of the firms are sA = 60%, sB = 30%, and sC = 10% respectively. The demand in the market is P = 1 − Q. The marginal cost of firm A is zero. (a) Calculate the HHI in this market (in the year of your data). (b) Suppose that firm B buys firm C. (i) What type of merger would this be? (ii) According to EU rules (on HHI level and change), would this merger be concerning? (iii) According to US rules (on HHI level and change), would this merger be concerning? (c) Call the merged firm BC. Suppose that, after the merger, A and BC compete a la Cournot again and the market shares of the firms are in equilibrium sA = 60% and sBC = 40%. What must be the marginal cost firm BC? Comment on your answer

The market for fidgets has only three firms, (A, B, and C), that compete in quantities. The market shares of the firms are sA = 60%, sB = 30%, and sC = 10% respectively. The demand in the market is P = 1 − Q. The marginal cost of firm A is zero. (a) Calculate the HHI in this market (in the year of your data). (b) Suppose that firm B buys firm C. (i) What type of merger would this be? (ii) According to EU rules (on HHI level and change), would this merger be concerning? (iii) According to US rules (on HHI level and change), would this merger be concerning? (c) Call the merged firm BC. Suppose that, after the merger, A and BC compete a la Cournot again and the market shares of the firms are in equilibrium sA = 60% and sBC = 40%. What must be the marginal cost firm BC? Comment on your answer

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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