The princple-agent model xan explain non profit maximization in firms. Which of the following describves this model well? a. Managers, the agents, act irrationally or with bounded rationality. b. Shareholders, then principals act irrationally or with bounded rationality. c. There is asymmetric information between the shareholders (principals) and managers (agends) in terms of the managers' actions. d. Principles, interested in revenue maximization, force managers, their agents, to maximize revenue and growth. e. None of the above.

The princple-agent model xan explain non profit maximization in firms. Which of the following describves this model well? a. Managers, the agents, act irrationally or with bounded rationality. b. Shareholders, then principals act irrationally or with bounded rationality. c. There is asymmetric information between the shareholders (principals) and managers (agends) in terms of the managers' actions. d. Principles, interested in revenue maximization, force managers, their agents, to maximize revenue and growth. e. None of the above.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter1: Introduction And Goals Of The Firm

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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