Three risk averse agents each face the risky situation: ($69, $12; 1-0.54, 0.54).The first risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) - a($X - $Min)^0.5, where a > 0 is an individual-specificparameter.The second risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) = b($x- $Min)^0.25, where b> 0 is an individual-specific parameter.%3DThe third risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) = c($X - $Min)^0.125, where c > 0 is an individual-specific parameter.%3DWhat is the total sum of the three agents' combined insurance premiums for a "statistically fair full insurance policy"?Please compute and state your answer up to two decimal places A risk averse farmer anticipates the future crop price to be ($485.$111: 1-0.84,0.84).Suppose the farmer's utility function has the form U($X) - a($X - $Min)^0.5, where a > O is an individual-specificparameter.What is the lowest price this farmer will sell their crop to a counter-party (such as Cargill) to avoid the risky situation?Please compute and state your answer up to two decimal places

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Three risk averse agents each face the risky situation: ($69, $12; 1-0.54, 0.54).
The first risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) - a($X - $Min)^0.5, where a > 0 is an individual-specific
parameter.
The second risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) = b($x- $Min)^0.25, where b> 0 is an individual-
specific parameter.
%3D
The third risk averse agent's utility function has the form U($X) = c($X - $Min)^0.125, where c > 0 is an individual-
specific parameter.
%3D
What is the total sum of the three agents' combined insurance premiums for a "statistically fair full insurance policy"?
Please compute and state your answer up to two decimal places

A risk averse farmer anticipates the future crop price to be ($485.$111: 1-0.84,0.84).
Suppose the farmer's utility function has the form U($X) - a($X - $Min)^0.5, where a > O is an individual-specific
parameter.
What is the lowest price this farmer will sell their crop to a counter-party (such as Cargill) to avoid the risky situation?
Please compute and state your answer up to two decimal places

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