Two farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in litres). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output) a. Suppose that both farmers decide to form a cartel, determine profits for each farmer under the cartel
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Two farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes
a. Suppose that both farmers decide to form a cartel, determine profits for each farmer under the cartel
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- Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. The average and marginal cost is €6 for each firm. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P = 30 – Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Suppose the two firms combine together and form a cartel. The output produced by each firm in the cartel is (assuming that they split the cartel output equally between them) A. 6 B. 12 C. 8 D. 4 Two identical firms compete in a market to sell a homogenous good with the following inverse demand function: P = 600 – 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of €300 and there are no fixed costs. The price that each firm in the Cournot equilibrium will charge is A. 400 B. 500 C. 300 D. 450Suppose that four firms have agreed to operate as a cartel in order to maximize joint profit. The cartel will operate with the following inverse demand function and total cost function where Q is the market output and P is the market price in dollars. P = 4,000 – 2Q Inverse Demand Function TC = 800Q Total Cost Function Determine the market price and the market output set by the cartel. Determine the profit earned by each firm if they share the market equally.A two-firm cartel producing industrial diamonds faces the following demand function: Q=120-10P The total cost function of each firm is TC1 = 4Q1 + 0.1Q12 and TC2 = 2Q2 + 0.1Q22 a, Find the output and profit of each firm and total profit of cartel that maximize total profits b, Find the output and profit of each firm and total profit of cartel that maximize total revenues
- Two farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in litres). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output) a. Calculate the profit if farmer 2 decides to break the cartel agreementImagine there are two companies, East Wafer and West Wafer, which produce silicon wafers, the base component in the microchips which constitute the brains of our computers. Below is the daily demand for silicon wafers Suppose, for simplicity, East Wafer and West Wafer have the same constant cost structure, so maximizing total revenue maximizes profit. If East Wafer and West Wafer are able to form a cartel and collude without cheating on each other, what will be the price of a silicon wafer? $40 $50 $60 $70Assume the management of two large firms selling canned vegetables hold a secret meeting to create a collusive cartel. Which will most likely be the outcome of that meeting, assuming both companies engage in the collusion? soda output will fall and market prices will fall market price will remain unchanged and total output will fall soda output will fall and market prices will rise soda output will rise and market prices will fall soda output will rise and market prices will rise
- Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P= 200-Qa-Qb where QAQA and QBQB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TCa=1,500+55Qa+Qa2 TCb=1,200+20Qb+2Qb2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In such a case, Company A will produce units and sell at $ . Similarly, Company B will produce units and sell at $ . At the optimum output levels, Company A earns total profits of $ and the marginal cost of Company B earns total profits of $ . Therefore, the total industry profits are $ . At the optimum output levels, the marginal cost of Company A is $ and the marginal…Two farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in litres). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output) a. Determine the reaction function of each farmer. b. Find the cournot-Nash equilibrium. c. Calculate profit for each farmer d. Suppose that both farmers decide to form a cartel, determine profits for each farmer under the cartel. e. What output should farmer 1 produce if he/she expects their rival to produce 20 units? f. Calculate the profits if farmer 2 decides to break the cartel agreement h. What if farmer 1 is a leader and farmer 2 a follower, determine the price, quantity and profits made by these two farmers - please answer question fTwo farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in litres). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output) a. Determine the reaction function of each farmer. b. Find the cournot-Nash equilibrium. c. Calculate profit for each farmer d. Suppose that both farmers decide to form a cartel, determine profits for each farmer under the cartel. e. What output should farmer 1 produce if he/she expects their rival to produce 20 units?h. What if farmer 1 is a leader and farmer 2 a follower, determine the price, quantity and profits made by these two farmers - please answers questions e, f and h
- Consider an industry with 4 firms with the same total cost function TC(q) = 20q. The demand function is p= 260 − 2Q. (a) Solve for Cournot equilibrium: how much each firm produces in equilibrium? What is an equilibrium price and profits? (b) What will be the profit of each firm if all the firms join the cartel? (c) If one of the firms wants to deviate from the cartel agreement, what output should it set? Calculate the profit of the cheating firm.Consider a Bertrand duopoly. Both firms produce an identical good at the same constant marginal cost of $0.80. Demand is given by Q=100−P. If the two firms charge the same price, they share market demand equally. The firms are located in Singapore, where the smallest currency denomination is $0.05. The firms thus can only choose prices in increments of $0.05. a) Suppose that both firms choose the same price, P. What is the profit of a firm as a function of P? b) Now suppose that one firm unilaterally deviates from the arrangement in (a) by charging a price $0.05 lower than P. What is that firm’s profit as a function of P? c) A Nash equilibrium occurs when no firm has an incentive to deviate by lowering its price. Using your answers in (a) and (b), set up an inequality that characterizes the Nash equilibrium. Then solve for the Nash equilibria in this game. (Hint: there are three equilibria)Producers in three countries have formed a cartel to sell a highly-priced product. Suppose the world demand for the product is consistent with the equation: P=80-0.005QT NB: QT is the total cartel sales. The producers have managed to maximise profit at a price of R70 per unit. Suppose the members have the following total cost functions; Member 1: TC=7382 + 10Q + 0.05Q2 Member 2: TC= 9374 + 20Q + 0.02Q2 Member 3: TC=7432 + 30Q + 0.03Q2 : Derive: a) Marginal revenue b) Output of member 1,2 and 3 c) Total cartel output.