Quadrennial Defense Review

The Secretary of Defense outlined three strategic pillars in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): defending the homeland; building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. All three

The general capabilities required by the Joint Force in 2025 will be a global surveillance and strike (GSS) network, increased naval and air investments and ensuring cyber technology outpaces adversaries. Based on the current U.S. strategic direction and global security environment these capabilities are necessary. Satellites and cyber technology will be part of the design of the GSS system. The U.S. military will be able to strike quickly and remain engaged for increased periods while additional

engineering and integration.” The idea is to distribute the capability geographically to assist U.S. forces with a quick strike capability anywhere in the world. The capability should have much less reliance on bases and be less vulnerable to enemy air defense systems. All parts of the US military would benefit

redefine their outlook for the future; “based on new technologies, new centers of power, and a world that is growing more volatile, more unpredictable, and in some instances more threatening to the United States.” In March of 2014 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) revised the DOD strategy to align with current threats and budgetary constraints. The QDR started by listing the three pillars of strategic focus. The first pillar is protecting the homeland. The need to concentrate on homeland protection

and the individual services’ doctrine. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report uses the term “irregular” only once in its one hundred and five pages and only in terms of a focus on building the joint force’s capability and capacity to deal with irregular warfare while maintaining a clear conventional and nuclear global superiority. Currently, the definition is ambiguous and results in conflict or duplication of efforts across Department of Defense stakeholders. For the purposes of this paper, the

defeat capabilities critical to our National Strategic Objectives. To support this position, this paper first articulates the emerging threats to U.S. National Interests and compares them to the key strategic direction of published Department of Defense (DoD) strategy and strategic concepts. Secondly, this proposal provides broad capabilities that the Joint Force must aggregate from the services of the DoD, and the general capabilities of each service. Finally, this paper highlights and mitigates

The implications of implementing the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), or Air-Sea Battle, presents opportunities and challenges which must be addressed to realize its full potential. This is especially true in the context of the rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. As described in Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges, Air-Sea Battle is a vital part of dealing with anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)

1. Describe the four instruments of US national power and give two examples of each instrument. [20 points] The four instruments of US national power are Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. Diplomatic is the process of building relationships with other countries and foreign elements in order to facilitate the advancement of US values. The diplomatic element of US National Power, can be one of the most powerful tools that the US will use. These interests include the recognition

Introduction Central and South America both hold strategic importance to the United States. However, organized crime is rampant, corruption is prominent, and universal networks involved in illicit drug trafficking and human smuggling operate regularly with limited intervention. This activity transpires on a causeway that heads directly towards the United States. By that rational, in order to counter transnational organized crime (CTOC), instill regional stability, and to improve partner nation capacity

The Defense Strategic Guidance states that in this current fiscal environment the armed forces will no longer be sized to conduct prolonged stability operations. While this document says that the forces will be sized based on the requirements of missions listed