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A Functional State With A Brain State

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Putnam argued that “the psychological properties are functional, not physical” (Putnam, 1967, p81), this is, according to Putnam, those functional properties must be “abstract properties” (Putnam, 1967, p.299) , nonetheless, Putnam claimed that depends upon physical and chemical properties of the brain, therefore, by applying the completeness of physics, those functional properties must be physical, and this physical view of functional states is defended by Lewis: “these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristic of experience, they must be the experiences.” (Lewis, 1970, p. 17), however, this lead to the question, how identify a functional state with a brain state, avoiding the constraints of the identity theory? A plausible answer is tried to identify a functional state with a brain state via multiple realizability, but contrary to Putnam, keeping functional states as physical states; for instance Lewis give us a point of departure: Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R (by definition of M). Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R (by the psychological theory). ∴ Mental state M = neural state N (by transitivity of =) (Lewis, 1972/2002, p.88) On this view, as was pointed out, Lewis introduces another ingredient in the identity theory, this is the causal role, but how this causal role lets to think about a mental state like a
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