A Functional State With A Brain State

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Putnam claims that what makes up a psychological state can vary between different species (Putnam, 1975). He then attempted to undermine the validity of identity theory with the examples of octopi and aliens. Octopi and aliens have brains that are made up of totally different material, yet they can still function the same. Hence he came to the conclusion that we shouldn’t look at what our mental states are made up of, but rather their function, which is that they cause particular behaviours. By saying mental states are functional states, and not brain states, you are accepting the possibility of brainless systems having mental states (Block, 1978). One type of

In his paper “Mind and Body Problem”, Jerome Shaffer examines the much discussed view of the relation between mental and physical events. According to this view consideration is given to whether or not mental events can occur in the same place the corresponding physical events occur. In the course of his examination of this view, Shaffer considers one difficulty which arises in connection with it, and concludes that it is insurmountable. Unfortunately, his treatment of what he takes to be the central difficulty with the view in question is seriously defected and my purpose in this paper is to indicate wherein its defects lie.

As the tool of scientific investigation increase, the relationship between the mind and the brain has never been more intimate. Chemical changes in our brain could lead to heightened euphoria or it can lead to the most profound depression. Damages to the brain can lead to changes that can eliminate the some abilities of the brain, such as smell, vision, or even the ability to recognized faces. Therefore, this is at that vary lease a powerful correlation between the state of the mind and state of the brain. But this is not enough for the Identity theories, so they go above and beyond this to explain this profound view.

The goal of the following paper is to convince that soul theory is directly linked to one’s personal identity. This paper will also point out an objection raised to the theory, and to finish will prove how that objection is incorrect, leaving soul theory as the only answer to what makes someone who they are.

Churchland breaks it down to this: if mental states are identical all to brain states then when you observe you mental states you are also observing the brain state which is identical. Churchland states, “ I may not describe my mental state as a brain state but whether I do depends on what information I have about the brain, not upon whether the mental state really is identical to some brain state . The identity can be a fact about the world independently of my knowledge that is a fact about the world” (Churchland, 2).She gives the following example “ Jones swallows an aspirin, he thereby swallows acetylsalicylic acid, whether or not he thought” in other words “identities may obtain even when we have not discovered that they do”(Churchland, 2).

To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

In Harman’s paper, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” he defends the concept of functionalism, which is the theory that mental states are identified by what they do as opposed to what they are made of. Harman defends functionalism by stating the three familiar arguments against functionalism and then refutes those arguments. Out of the three oppositions to functionalism, the inverted spectrum argument is the best.

In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument against identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

unexplainable being that he called the mind. Sober sums up, that the Identity Theory is a

This theory I believe supports the Functionalism Theory, because he is comparing two different subjects and both of them are in pain but both describe their pain in different ways because of the difference in mental state change from one subject to the other. The first subject in pain is experiencing what Lewis called to be a “mad pain”, and he is the human subject, but whenever he starts experiencing pain his mind would drastically change making him unable to prevent that the pain occurs. The second subject is referred to have ‘Martian pain”.

The identity theory is not concerned to find neural correlations for mental states for brain states are everything that is meant by mental states. When I complain of a pain, then, whether or not I