Model-Based Approach The model-based fault detection approach employs a mathematical model of the system under observation, by assuming that a fault in the system will lead to deterministic changes in the model parameters. The model-based approach relies on comparing the model outputs with the actual system outputs to generate a residual signal, and based upon the properties of the generated residual signal, potential fault conditions are identified and useful information is extracted (Ding 2008). The basic concept of a typical model-based fault detection approach is illustrated in Fig. As indicated in Fig., there are two main stages in this approach, the first of which generates the residual which is then passed to the residual evaluation stage. Throughout the fault-free operation, the magnitude of the residual signal should be approximately zero, indicating that the proposed model is accurately describing the current behavior of the system. If, however, the value of the residual signal diverges from zero, appropriate processing and analysis techniques are applied to it in …show more content…
In such models since they are usually derived from first principles, using ordinary differential equations, different elements of the model are related to actual physical properties. Therefore, the main advantage of model-based techniques is the capability of detecting unanticipated faults as well as the replacement of hardware redundancy by analytical redundancy (Vachtsevanos et al. 2006). However, in many real world applications it is almost impractical to apply model-based diagnostic approaches, since many physical processes are too complex to develop accurate model. This will cause mismatch between the process and model outputs which, in turn, lead to large error signals usually giving rise to false alarms (Ding
Models provide the physical testing and proof of a hypothesis by exploring the extent to which the two factors relate within the given hypothesis. It puts a theory into action, to see if the theory is corrected causes and effects.
subsystems and then tested because the interactions between the subsystems are critical for the system
FMECA is a methodology to identify and analyse predicted failure modes of various parts within the assembly or system. It is a technique to resolve potential problems in a system before they occur. It is most widely used reliability analysis technique performed between the conceptual and initial stage of the detailed design phase of the system in order to assure that all the potential failures have been considered and the proper provisions have been made to eliminate these failures. [1] (Ref. system reliability theory,2nd edition, Marvin Rausand) this technique can assist in selecting alternative concept for the same system and also provide
Alarms: The SCADA systems have the capability to alert the operator of fault conditions and undesirable operating conditions in order of their criticality and severity.
This can include the ability to troubleshoot issues, fixing equipment and testing equipment. Troubleshooting is the process of isolating the cause of a specific problem when something is not working as intended. This could be testing all components in the set-up to find the specific piece of faulty equipment and quickly and efficiently making repairs. These repairs could include replacing fraying cables and fixing or replacing faulty equipment. It is also the engineers responsibility to conduct general maintenance such as cleaning and replacing worn parts.
A high level of interconnectedness between system components, reliance on indirect information sources, an unpredictable environment, or incomprehensibility of a system to its operators indicates complexity within a system (Perrow, 1999). Since systems are designed, run and built by humans, they cannot be perfect. Every part of the system is subject to failure; the design can be faulty, as can the equipment, the procedures, the operators, the supplies, and the environment. Since nothing is perfect, humans build in safeguards, such as redundancies, buffers, and alarms that tell operators to take corrective action. But occasionally two or more failures can interact in ways that could not be anticipated. These unexpected interactions of failures can defeat the safeguards, and if the system is also “tightly coupled” thus allowing failures to cascade, it can bring down a part or all of system. The vulnerability to unexpected interactions that defeat safety systems is an inherent part of highly complex systems; they cannot avoid this (Perrow, 1984).
Interruption identification frameworks (IDS) take either system or host based methodology for perceiving and redirecting assaults. In either case, these items search for assault marks (particular examples) that for the most part demonstrate malignant or suspicious goal. At the point when an IDS searches for these examples in system activity then it is system based (figure 1). At the point when an IDS searches for assault marks in log records, then it is host based.
To analyse the strength of the model, we consider the effect of a small change to the system. If the model is robust, it should exhibit similar behaviour despite this
Reporting If any faults occur they should be reported, which will let the employees which maintain the system to have a brief idea what to look for to help resolve the fault. The reporting method will allow the maintenance team to be provided with in-depth information, such as what is the fault and the date and time it occurred e.g. which increases the efficiency and effectivity of the system and computers. Overall, with smart and effective reporting the majority of faults will be solved very quickly.
They are extensively used as a piece of analysis. Nevertheless, analysis of just parts does not give any critical reaction to the structure understanding. In this way it is urgent to enhance usage of complete quality for system understanding. Both the investigative parts are profitable in their own benefit (Weinberg, 1975).
Probably, if other people were involved in checking the system, it could have been possible to point out the problem. Just like any of the scientific experiments that are done, there are chances that a mistake can be made, particularly if one person was involved in conducting the investigation. However, for the case of the Mariner 1, it was evident that the software was not checked a second time. Failure to do so resulted in the failure of the spacecraft to accomplish its mission, since it was eventually blown down by the range safety officer who was in charge. The failure could have been avoided further by taking the necessary precautionary measures before allowing the spacecraft to launch (Lieberman & Fry, 2001). The officials in charge of conducting the safety assessments should have taken appropriate steps including going through the entire spacecraft system to ascertain that all was in good condition to prevent the possible
Do you think what happens to the ring should depend on the reason why and who called the engagement off? Some states use the fault-based method, meaning if the person who gave the ring broke the engagements the receiver would keep the ring and vice versa if the person who received the ring called off the wedding then the ring would go back to the giver ("What Happens to the Engagement Ring in a Broken Engagement? - FindLaw," n.d.). The trend is now moving for the court systems to go with the no-fault approach by not getting involved because it’s a private matter and regardless of the situation the ring is always given back to the giver ("What Happens to the Engagement Ring in a Broken Engagement? - FindLaw,"
The most proper way to determine the causes is an experimental study, despite it is not a cost effective and time consuming way. With the all other test methods like positioning, loading and calibration etc., crash tests are the most significant ones. After the real time collision tests, widely known experimental approach on the crash-worthiness researches is the sled test [2], [3], [5], [6]. The sled tests are more under-control when it is compared with the other methods. But again, the financial hassle is beyond the limits of the most companies and
In Object-orientated approach methodology, a system is viewed as an object (Govardhan & Munassa: 71). This approach intergrades data and processes into objects. It emphasizes the construction and testing of object models. This technique uses UML diagrams such as Communication Diagrams, which show the relationship between objects, Development Diagrams which show how a complete system will be deployed on one or more machines, the Class Diagram and Sequence Diagram.
Modern computers are very reliable and have low failure rate. Long gone are the days of expensive maintenance costs and unreliable computers. This is because every electronic component in the computer system have