Anaconda Command Structure

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

The mission of Operation Anaconda was to bring down the Taliban government and to destroy al Qaeda. Operation Anaconda followed other battles that stemmed from the September 11 attack on the US. The first step in the battle was to overpower key stronghold towns in Afghanistan, which proved to be successful. But, intelligence reports revealed some members of the Taliban government and al Qaeda were hiding in the eastern White Mountains. Osama Bin Laden and other top al Qaeda figures were assembling troops in the Tora Bora region.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda, as an "absolute and unqualified success," but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive the first contact with the enemy." (Kelly et al, 2014) Operation Anaconda offered many lessons learned from the operation's successes and failures through the planning process. Anaconda's "unqualified success" was due to the force's adaptability to the operational environment, joint forces support and overcoming lack of unity of command. Operation Anaconda O.E. Adaptability

Operation Anaconda took place as a part of the War in Afghanistan in early March of 2002. It happened in the Shahikot valley of eastern Afghanistan. The purpose of the operation was to take out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that were gathered in the area. U.S. forces built a complex plan to achieve this end state. They planned to use a “hammer and anvil” attack that used U.S. forces as well as friendly Afghani armed forces to quickly kill or capture the enemy. Intel told commanders that the enemy was likely to retreat as they have in the past when driven back by fierce opposition. They estimated would be a three day battle. While the end state of this battle was a United States victory, it wasn’t achieved by the

Analysis: There is no doubt that today’s military leadership cannot be match with that of approximately forty years ago. With that said and with constant change in leadership whether in the military or the arms of government, there is possibility for lapses. Since there is no perfect system and human beings are fallible. Therefore, factors that contributed to the failure of Operation

The largest U.S. coalition and joint operation of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Operation ANACONDA would take place in from 28 February 2002. However, due to weather constrictions did not commence until 02 March 2002 and ended on 16 March 2002. The objective for U.S and joint task forces combined with Army U.S. forces; Special Operation Forces (SOF), U.S. Air Force (USAF) and 6 other nations to kill or capture Al Qaeda forces taking a stronghold in the Shahi Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan. The operation ended as a success, however during the operation, we lost eight U.S. military personnel and more than 50 wounded. This extreme battle integrated joint and interagency infrastructure with little joint operation training. The training

In his memoirs, "American Soldier," former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda as an "absolute and unqualified success," but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy." General Franks' apt portrayal provides the framework for this case study of Operation Anaconda, which took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan during early March 2002. The goal of Operation Anaconda was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in the valley following their earlier defeats in the first 3 months of the war. To achieve this goal, U.S. commanders crafted a complex and sophisticated battle plan involving

Operation Anaconda was a key decisive battle that took place in Afghanistan during the early parts of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). It was also one of the military’s biggest Air Assault Missions to ever be conducted. During this battle there were many moving pieces as well as personnel that shaped the conflict which ultimately lead to the capture of key terrain during the operation some of which were Joint Special Operations Command, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Special Activities Division (SAD),160th (SOAR) Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment, and many other units throughout the U.S. Military as well as Coalition forces. With this there also many elements of this operation that