Analytic Functionalism As A Philosophy Of The Mind

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Michael Lock
Professor Davis
PHIL 110000
28 April 2015
Analytic Functionalism as a Philosophy of the Mind
In an attempt to bridge the gaps between the philosophy of behaviorism and the identity theory, I have determined that functionalism presents us with the best solution. Although there are several concerns to the methodic explanation of mental states, I believe that analytic functionalism is a credible model that describes the mind. Analytic functionalism establishes an ontological method that provides more acceptable ways to describe and characterize the mind. I will contend my point by first explaining the evolution into functionalism, specifically analytic functionalism. I will then explain one of the most prominent objections, the “Chinese Room” argument by John Searle. Beyond this argument, I will offer my rebuttals for these assertions and stipulate reasoning for analytical functionalism’s rational reliability as a suitable philosophy of the mind.
With the decline of behaviorism, the identity theory, or type physicalism, gained popularity within the philosophic community. J.J.C. Smart, also aiming to work reductively to shrink mental states to an uncomplicated classification, introduced the stance that identity theorists began to agree with. This was the theory that physical brain states could be simply equated with mental states. For example, the mental state of pain could be associated with the firing of the localized c-fibers region of the brain. What this
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