Analytic Functionalism As A Philosophy Of The Mind

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

Theories have been composed and exposed by various philosophers to clarify their reasoning about the mind. Dualism, Behaviorism, and Identity Theory, are well-known theories supported by well-written explanations. A modern theory, Functionalism provides ample insight to the main problem philosophers deal with, the mind/body problem.

The mind-brain identity theory is an ontological perspective which centers around the idea that the mind can be closely associated with the brain to be considered the same. In other words, a person’s mind processes are coherent with their brain processes. It is a significant topic included in the philosophy of mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the identity theory of mind is “to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes”. In this

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

Identity theorists hold the view that the mental events are nothing more than neurological activity of the brain. This theory is a subtype of the materialist view because the human mind

The Identity theory maintains a monistic belief by considering states of mind as being indistinguishable to brain states. Mental experiences including feeling pain, and possessing mental images are not correlated with, but in fact are brain processes (Smart, 2007). When dealing with the question of whether the mind and brain are identical, identity theorists differentiate between two forms, Type Identity and Token Identity (Schneider). Token Identity theory considers that mental

The id, the ego and the superego are another prominent theory that acts off of the conscious and un-conscious mind. Freudian psychology initiates with a earth full of objects. Among them is a exceptional object, the organism. An extremely meaningful portion of the organism is the nervous system. At birth, the nervous system is a little many than of else animals, an “it”

Theories have been composed and exposed by various philosophers to explain their understanding about the mind. Dualism, Behaviorism and Identity Theory are well-known theories supported by well-written explanations. A modern theory, Functionalism has been proposed that provides great insight to the main problem philosophers deal with, the mind/body problem.

The understanding on the knowledge of other minds has provided a puzzle known as the inverted spectrum. This possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. Functionalism is committed to defining mental states in terms of their cause and effects . By identifying sensory events with casual roles, however, functionalism appears to be missing qualitative aspects all together. The topic of spectrum inversion has often been raised as a contradiction to functionalism, as well as other materialist theories about consciousness. These negates to functionalism show that even when all the relevant physical facts are held constant, the facts about qualia can still vary, hence that the phenomenal must be over

In Harman’s paper, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” he defends the concept of functionalism, which is the theory that mental states are identified by what they do as opposed to what they are made of. Harman defends functionalism by stating the three familiar arguments against functionalism and then refutes those arguments. Out of the three oppositions to functionalism, the inverted spectrum argument is the best.

As a resent graduate of sociology I am presenting the need to protect Lake Champlain West Bay, Grand Isle water quality, tourism capital, and maintain property taxes. The study would conclude in a stormwater system being put in place along both East and West Lake Shore Drive. Not approving this project will prove to be economically negative by lower tourism, lower property value, and increasing property taxes. There are a number of other negative effects like the environment and ecosystem (also mentioned in the presentation) but the focus is on the economic effect because the research is being done focuses on functionalist paradigm.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

In the philosophy of mind, there are many theories that try to resolve the mind-body problem. That is, how does the mental or consciousness interact with our physical body? Do they interact at all? Are they two separate entities or one in the same? Many theories try to answer these types of questions, but the one I will be focusing on is role functionalism. When mentioning functionalism throughout, I will be referring to role functionalism. Functionalism is a theory that says mental states can be defined by their function. So, we can identify mental states with their functional states. We can come to know the function of a mental state through examining its inputs, outputs, and relation to other mental states. I will show how this theory is correct by comparing it to the identity theory. I will begin by clarifying a few important terms in relation to functionalism, lay out the theory, and then present an objection. Lastly, I will present a possible functionalist reply to the objection and conclude.

The identity theory is not concerned to find neural correlations for mental states for brain states are everything that is meant by mental states. When I complain of a pain, then, whether or not I