Analytic Functionalism As A Philosophy Of The Mind

In Harman’s paper, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” he defends the concept of functionalism, which is the theory that mental states are identified by what they do as opposed to what they are made of. Harman defends functionalism by stating the three familiar arguments against functionalism and then refutes those arguments. Out of the three oppositions to functionalism, the inverted spectrum argument is the best.

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

Derek Parfit's views on personal identity and the Ego and Bundle Theory are all summarized in his article “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons”. In his article, Parfit explains the distinction between Ego theory and Bundle theory and provides several arguments against Ego Theory. Although it proves to be very difficult to believe the Bundle Theory, Parfit’s critique is convincing and well thought out.

The understanding on the knowledge of other minds has provided a puzzle known as the inverted spectrum. This possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. Functionalism is committed to defining mental states in terms of their cause and effects . By identifying sensory events with casual roles, however, functionalism appears to be missing qualitative aspects all together. The topic of spectrum inversion has often been raised as a contradiction to functionalism, as well as other materialist theories about consciousness. These negates to functionalism show that even when all the relevant physical facts are held constant, the facts about qualia can still vary, hence that the phenomenal must be over

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

Ned Block, in his article “Trouble with Functionalism”, creates a thought experiment to serves as a counterexample to functionalism. Functionalism states that the mind and its mental states are only comprised of the functional role they serve, and not of the physical medium it occurs in. Block’s thought experiment, while intriguing, is ultimately a flawed comparison that wrongly applies human-centric prejudice to the definition of a mental state, and thus, cannot be applied to our mental life.

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

Theories have been composed and exposed by various philosophers to explain their understanding about the mind. Dualism, Behaviorism and Identity Theory are well-known theories supported by well-written explanations. A modern theory, Functionalism has been proposed that provides great insight to the main problem philosophers deal with, the mind/body problem.

The identity theory is not concerned to find neural correlations for mental states for brain states are everything that is meant by mental states. When I complain of a pain, then, whether or not I

In the philosophy of mind, there are many theories that try to resolve the mind-body problem. That is, how does the mental or consciousness interact with our physical body? Do they interact at all? Are they two separate entities or one in the same? Many theories try to answer these types of questions, but the one I will be focusing on is role functionalism. When mentioning functionalism throughout, I will be referring to role functionalism. Functionalism is a theory that says mental states can be defined by their function. So, we can identify mental states with their functional states. We can come to know the function of a mental state through examining its inputs, outputs, and relation to other mental states. I will show how this theory is correct by comparing it to the identity theory. I will begin by clarifying a few important terms in relation to functionalism, lay out the theory, and then present an objection. Lastly, I will present a possible functionalist reply to the objection and conclude.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

Theories have been composed and exposed by various philosophers to clarify their reasoning about the mind. Dualism, Behaviorism, and Identity Theory, are well-known theories supported by well-written explanations. A modern theory, Functionalism provides ample insight to the main problem philosophers deal with, the mind/body problem.

In the twentieth century, two schools of physicalism emerged as psychologists attempted to integrate the study of the mind with the study of the brain. These were behaviourism and identity theory. According to the behaviourist school, mental states could be reduced to behavioural dispositions (Ryle, 1947; Wittgenstein, 1953). In other words, behaviour was sufficient to knowing a person’s mental state.