Assisting and Defending Azerbaijan: Analysis of a Multinational Coalition

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

Major military units and headquarters include NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, U.S. Joint Forces. Command, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

1. ISSUE. Provide the USEUCOM Commander an overview of Azerbaijan’s approach to the situation in the Caucasus Region.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the real world consequences of when Army leaders become complacent dealing with foreign national soldiers, and the day to day operations while in a combat theatre. To gather lessons learned from the example discussed in order to lower the probability of a reoccurrence among the force. Through the example demonstrate the need for Army leaders to constantly fight against complacency, and the extreme importance that leaders know their soldiers, and place their soldiers’ needs before their own. The scenario discussed was a real incident that took place in Iraq in 2009, at a Coalition Outpost (COP) approximately 30 kilometers south of Mosul, in a city called Hammam al-Alil.

Much of the international news right now seems to relate to the crisis situation created by the civil war in Syria. The topic is on the minds of politicians, especially regarding the Syrian refugees hoping to escape the dangers of the war. Syrian rebels are attempting to overthrow the existing government. Some of these rebels have the support of the United States while others, such as those who are connected to ISIS, do not. Russia has intervened on the side of the Syrian government. The reasoning for their intervention is perceived differently depending on the political theory followed in the explanation. The three major theories in international relations are realism, liberalism, and constructivism -- each of which will be discussed in terms of how they would explain the Russian intervention in Syria.

a. Coalition Legitimacy: Empowering, strategic utilization, and promoting of coalition forces (and regional population) while minimizing overt U.S. presence.

While analyzing the North Africa conflict, a combination of service capabilities would be required to achieve the desired end state of deterring and if necessary, the defeat of Algerian guerilla aggression to prevent regional and global destabilization. Taking into account the current military landscape that exists today, a joint task force (JTF) would be the ideal military response of the United States and collation partner’s while utilizing the regional military assets. Intelligence suggests guerilla forces are capable of a full scale offensive into Morocco in less than 36 hour notice, bringing the factors of time, force and space into consideration.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

It is copied across from the NATO ST-SC meeting minute, April 2015 (Action item “8” from the “Action List” at the last page of the minute due on 25th Sep 2015). The copy of the minute is attached for reference purpose only.

Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

Turkey’s role in NATO and the U.N. will be crucial in the next few years in regards to national defense strategy. An understanding of Turkish culture and an analysis of their military capabilities will help the United States tailor its relations with this country. This paper will; overall explain Turkish culture, lay out Turkish military structure, and analyze Turkish foreign policy.

NATO starts the year 2000 with the issue of concern. The European Allies' defense capability, stabilization efforts in the Balkans, and relations with Russia are at the top of a highly charged agenda.

The establishment of the European Union (EU) solidified a united political, economic, and defensive front creating a Supranational Organization (Lucas, 1999, no page). With the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States, the EU has developed a comprehensive security strategy responsible for leading the coalition’s objectives for mutual solidarity, global stabilization, and defense. To address security threats both regionally and globally set forth by the European Security Strategy (ESS), considerations were developed which encompass both cultural domains of geography and development.