Brads Motion to Dismiss

For summary judgment to be granted, the movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The appellate standard of review for reviewing summary judgment orders in this case is the de novo standard, as this is a decision regarding “mixed questions of law and fact”. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).

This is not an easy paragraph to satisfy. The showing that must be made before the motion will be granted under this provision is that the evidence is not only “newly-discovered”, but that it is evidence of such quality that it will “probably”, not merely “possibly”, change the result in the case. And the movant should also show why, with reasonable diligence, the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the trial, or at least in time to move for a new trial under CPLR 4404. (The time for the post-trial motion is tight. See CPLR 4405 and the Commentary on it.)

The United States Court of Appeals first determined that Brady doctrine did not apply because the Maddox defense team had not requested the information be disclosed. It was only after unsuccessfully pursuing his direct appeal did he bring up this post-conviction habeas corpus petition. In the United States v. Agurs the Court stated that such a failure to

The first Friday of New Year, Darrell didn't want to go to the supermarket parking lot to met Tyray because he didn't want to be scared of Tyray. He decided that he didn’t want pay to him again. At school, Tyray came and asked Darrell about his money, but the teacher came in so Tyray went away. When they went to eat lunch, Tyray and Darrell started fighting and then Tyray was crying because he broke his wrist. Finally, they were both sent to the principal office. At that time, Darrell told the principal what happened. In conclusion, Tyray got suspended and Darrell got a warning.

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

Johnson further maintains that the circuit court erred by admitting documents that were not properly authenticated. The State counters that “the appearance and contents of each of the documents contained sufficient information from which the factfinder could have reasonably concluded that the document was what the State purported it to be.” We hold that the documents admitted against Johnson were properly authenticated.

Background: Based on the given complaint, on the 28th of March in 2014 the Plaintiff, Linda D. Daugherty suffered an injury on the property of Rauleigh J. Ringer at 814 N. Liberty Street, Alexandria, IN. She is claiming her injury was a result of negligence spawning from the actions, or lack thereof, by Mr. Ringer and Casual Lifestyles Realty, Inc., in which the connection of these three parties has not been clarified with certainty within the claim. The Defendants, by counsel, Mark Maynard, and, pursuant to Rule 12(E) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, moved for a more definite statement of the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Mark Maynard argues if said Plaintiff could amend her complaint that is supposedly so vague and ambiguous, the newfound clarity would help the defense frame a response to said Plaintiff’s claim. No other information could be

The case of State of Oregon vs. Sandy Jones was brought to Spence’s attention after

7. Court’s Order: As a result of this holding the court has established sufficient law entitles P to have her case heard before trial court.

“He notes that in a case presenting facts more favorable to the complaining plaintiff than

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss is proper when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). In addition, a Claim for Relief must have a short and plain statement that shows how the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To overcome a 12(b)(6) motion the plaintiff must have “enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly., 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility on its face requires the plaintiff to plead enough factual content to “draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct it alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,668 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While a court is required to accept all the allegations in a complaint as true if the well-pleaded facts do not permit a court to conclude more than the “mere possibility of misconduct… it has not shown the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. [omitting internal

I have received the Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Interrogatories. Please note that on December 16, 2015, the Court ordered that the plaintiffs would need leave to serve additional interrogatories on the defendants. The defendants will respond to the supplemental interrogatories served on them on November 7, 2016, but by doing so do not waive their right to object to further discovery served on them in this

Md. Rule 2-402(b)(2). The merits of Respondents’ contentions are addressed in Parts I (B), infra. Nevertheless, the plethora of notice that 50NL has received regarding the grounds for Respondents’ objection is more than sufficient so as to permit this Court to reach the questions as to whether the requested discovery is unduly burdensome or costly, and whether 50NL’s need outweighs the burden and cost.

Before addressing the specific claims of this Comment, it is necessary to examine the statutory background of FACTA litigation, the realities of class action § 1681c(g) litigation, the case law establishing what constitutes “willfulness,” and the standards for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Sections I.A and I.B will examine FACTA and its underlying policies, as well as the reasons for the temporary safe harbor Congress later created for violations of the expiration date requirement. Next, Section I.C will explore the realities of § 1681c(g) litigation, particularly the massive liability that defendants face from the aggregation of statutory damages via class action suits. Third, because the recovery of statutory damages depends on showing that a defendant willfully violated FACTA, Section I.D will explore Safeco, the Supreme Court decision establishing the meaning of willfulness in FACTA cases. Finally, Section I.E will examine the “new” pleading standards established in Twombly and Iqbal in order to better inform the later discussion of pre- and post-Iqbal 1681c(g) case law.