Characteristics Of Guerrilla Warfare

In 1961 President Kennedy sent a group who’s mission was to report on conditions in the South and assess if the United States should continue to deploy troops to Vietnam -Brigham, 1. In 1962 there was a massive increase of United States troops in Vietnam –MacDonald, 626. The numbers grew so large that they almost tripled. This led for the South Vietnamese to be instructed by advisors, who were attachments in the field -MacDonald, 627. Army recruits in the Special Forces were brought in to train the tribesman in the highlands. They also assisted the South Vietnamese in some of the more remote regions of the country -MacDonald, 627. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups accompanied the Special Forces advisors, and they were able to disrupt the flow of the North Vietnamese from the country of Laos into South Vietnam -MacDonald, 627. These men were in charge of most parts of the operation, in a country where leadership had never been encouraged -MacDonald, 628. The United States troops also had many problems directing the civilians because of the language barrier. At the same time the Special Force troops were frustrated in directing their tactics -MacDonald, 628.

The United States battle tactics did not fare well against an unseen enemy, who rarely presented himself in a full-scale battle, but rather picked at units one by one. A conversation between a colonel in the U.S. army and a colonel in the Vietnamese communist army summed up the guerilla warfare tactics used: "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American Colonel. The North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this remark for a moment. "That may be so," he replied, " but that is also irrelevant." The revolutionaries in Vietnam used hit and run attacks. They would assault small groups of soldiers, by sneaking up on them. This worked well, because it allowed the Viet Minh to avoid bigger battles, which they were not trained for. They knew that the U.S. soldiers were unfamiliar with the battlegrounds and jungles, so they used this weakness to their advantage, by being able to move more quickly and stealthily than the U.S. troops. They also knew how to

Joes, A. J. (1996). Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, biographical, and bibliographical sourcebook. [ebrary]. Retrieved from http/:www.ebrary.com

The concept of maneuver warfare has very little to do with where the fight happens or how forces arrive to that fight, but how we attack the enemy system and establish a tempo that drives the enemy into a “deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (MCDP 1, page 73). The key to creating the conditions for that deteriorating situation is to orient on the enemy understanding the enemy’s strength, weakness, and disposition by orienting ourselves to the enemy and “turning the map around” to exploit that established enemy system. Whether the enemy is on a fortified high ground or is a littoral nation, our goal is the same take the enemy system and destroy it. MCDP 1 gives several examples of what orienting on the enemy means to the various warfighters; a pilot examining the integrated air defenses that must be penetrated or the rifle

According to Tim O 'Brien, the Viet Cong 's and United States ' fighting tactics were a waste of people 's lives. The Viet Cong used guerrilla warfare tactics which resulted in Americans being killed and in turn caused innocent civilians to die. The Viet Cong planted mines along the paths and in the jungles to injure American soldiers. The Viet Cong were never out in the open and had the sympathy of the Vietnamese living there. Many young Vietnamese children and women planted mines, spied, and killed American soldiers. The American soldiers could not tell the difference between the enemy and the innocent, so the soldiers indiscriminately killed everybody. The American strategy was to find the Viet Cong and kill them. The American soldiers walked from village to village in search of the Viet Cong. As they went from place to place, soldiers would

“You could never tell who was the enemy was … therefore you treated everyone with suspicion”- Thomas Giltner, US Soldier “Contested Spaces”The foreign US soldiers had no knowledge of the geography of Vietnam (jungles, mountains, rainforests, and climate) but the VC did, and used it to their advantage. The US, by engaging in massive firepower, killing many non-combatants, destroyed the US credibility in the minds of the people. The VC sympathised with the people’s hardships and this was effective as they won the people over. The VC had extensive knowledge of guerrilla warfare, it was their war, and the US fought tractional conventional warfare which did have some effected, but eventually the US ran out of will. The military operations were

The Vietnam War and the war against terrorism are highly unpopular and controversial wars amongst American citizens. The United States went to war in Vietnam to keep their sphere of influence and to stop the spread of communism, and they went to war against ISIS to stop terrorism. Even though these wars don’t provide any direct benefits to us, the government deemed them to be necessary. However, many American citizens believe that these wars did not need to happen in the first place. Despite differentiating opinions, the Vietnam War and the war against terrorism are very comparable because of their similarities, but also their differences.

There is no doubt that guerrilla warfare played a significant part in the American victory over

The USA was extremely vain when going to war in Vietnam. They had extreme firepower. With a few weeks notice at the time, had the power to turn Vietnam into a region of radioactive glass. The US’s strategy of search and destroy conflicted directly with the Vietnamese’s strategy of hanging onto their belts (caplan,2012). Unlike previous American victories against

2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is considered a form of dissent and is implemented by public employees who are dissatisfied with the organization, programs, or people; in efforts to bring about change within an organization. Guerrilla’s work towards change strategically and secretly (O’Leary, 2014, pg. ).

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle and apply the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. The operation took place during 1971 in Northern Vietnam by United States Special Forces operators. The

As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229)

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle utilizing the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. Furthermore, this paper will relate the causes and effects of essential elements critical to the tactical success and mission failure of Operation Ivory Coast. Ultimately, all contributing factors will coalesce into lessons learned from the operation that are still applicable to this day.

The comprehension of the term ‘total war’ has had great significance towards the understanding as to how wars are fought, affect society and differ from other conflicts. The main issue that arises is conclusively defining total war and is continually differing between both historians and military combatants alike. Roger Chickering defines states “total war is distinguished by its intensity and extent. Theatres of operation span the globe; the scale of the battle is practically limitless” all the while adding “total war requires the mobilisation not only of armed forced but also of whole populations” This definition, while not quintessential is a good starting point for a definition due to its broadness and acceptance of the idea of the incapability to fully mobilise a society’s entire resource. David A. Bell states that it is often defined as ‘a war involving the complete mobilization of a society’s resources to achieve the absolute destruction of an enemy, with all distinction erased between combatants and non-combatants’ . However, he notes the limitations of such an idea including the inability for societies to meet such criterion, in particular, the ability for a society to completely utilise its resources towards the war effort. Ultimately, Jeremey black, while not giving a conclusive definition for the term, total war, does acknowledge different definitions by various individuals distilling many of their arguments and consequently outlining main characteristics of