Significance Of The Actions For Operation Ivory Coast

In 1961 President Kennedy sent a group who’s mission was to report on conditions in the South and assess if the United States should continue to deploy troops to Vietnam -Brigham, 1. In 1962 there was a massive increase of United States troops in Vietnam –MacDonald, 626. The numbers grew so large that they almost tripled. This led for the South Vietnamese to be instructed by advisors, who were attachments in the field -MacDonald, 627. Army recruits in the Special Forces were brought in to train the tribesman in the highlands. They also assisted the South Vietnamese in some of the more remote regions of the country -MacDonald, 627. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups accompanied the Special Forces advisors, and they were able to disrupt the flow of the North Vietnamese from the country of Laos into South Vietnam -MacDonald, 627. These men were in charge of most parts of the operation, in a country where leadership had never been encouraged -MacDonald, 628. The United States troops also had many problems directing the civilians because of the language barrier. At the same time the Special Force troops were frustrated in directing their tactics -MacDonald, 628.

troops on a hopeless humanitarian mission pulled out of Mogadishu, Somalia. A few Americans realize that during this mission, U.S. troops had the most continuous and gruesome battle fought by American’s since the Vietnam War. The afternoon of October 3rd, 1993, soldiers of Task Force Ranger, and Delta Force were sent to capture two lieutenants of a rebel Somalian warlord and return to base. This mission was supposed to take 30 min, but instead, the soldiers were pinned down in the middle of Mogadishu market and in a desperate effort of kill or be killed. For about 20 hours, U.S. soldiers created a bloody firefight that resulted in 19 American fatalities and the death of 1000 Somali fighters. Black Hawk Down tells the story of that desperate battle, from all angles of the war.

Asses the significance of the conflict in North Africa to allied victory in the European war.

Since the initiation of the Tet Offensive, the 48th Battalion of the National Front of the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF –

When fighting the Vietnam War many did not think it possible for the United States to loose. Those fighting underestimated the power of the Viet Cong. With a foreign land and foreign customs Marines struggled to get accustomed to the way the war was fought. Philip Caputo addresses these learned lessons in A Rumor of War. Lessons that were learned in Vietnam also have relevance to the current war in Afghanistan. The men in both wars fought against an enemy that blends in with the locals. Philip Caputo’s first hand account of the Vietnam War shows the mistakes that were made and how those lessons taught the United States not to make the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

This paper will examine the Battle of Fredericksburg through the research of analytical papers, historical articles and technical reports by conducting the four steps of battle analysis. It will analyze the effects of the use and dismissal of intelligence assets and disciplines when applied to the planning of a territorial battle campaign. Using terrain analysis it will discuss how the choice of advantageous terrain can sway the outcome of a battle. It will also discuss how timing and momentum can be critical to our overall military planning. Finally, it will present an alternative outcome to the battle by establishing the utilization of intelligence assets available to both commanding generals and how altering critical decision points would have presented a significantly different result.

elements of the battalion moved toward the Laotian border and Dong Ap Bia, they made initial

The plan was to have the mission function like a “hammer and anvil.” The very outer cordon area would consist of mainly US SOF and numerous other nations. Task Force Rakkasans (10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions) would be air assaulted in by Chinooks helicopters on the eastern side of the valley to set up blocking positions. The valley floor

The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.

Also called operation Ivory coast, the mission of this operation was to rescue the 61 US prisoners of war thought to be held in Son Tay prison during the Vietnam war. Headed by Air force brigadier general Leroy J. Manor and army colonel Arthur D. ‘Bull” Simon this was a joint operation. 56 special force commandos were selected for this operation. Although a tactical success with very less casualties this mission failed as there were no prisoners. They had been moved to another location before the raid.

This analysis covers the multiple problems the team faced in planning, coordinating and executing. I will point out some of the issues such as power struggles that had no place in a mission that should have been focused on the rescue of a US Service member. One primary source was referenced, Vietnam Helicopter Pilot Association (VHPA) A secondary source was also used, Maj. John L. Plaster USA (ret) SOG, The Secret War of America’s Commandos in

With intelligence gathered by the Defense Military Intelligence department “in May 1970 based on imagery” (Amidon, 2005) Operation Ivory Coast was conceived. The imagery showed strong potential for American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam near Hanoi. The mission was to raid a prisoner of war camp near the Son Tay Citadel and rescue approximately 70 personnel held captive by the North Vietnamese deep in North Vietnamese territory. A mission at this scale will be the first of its kind. The mission was to include crash landing a HH-3H into the main compound holding prisoners of war. The mission was

As the Vietnam War progressed, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) generals led by General Giap reassessed and adapted their strategy to fit the circumstances. This enabled the VC revolutionaries, supported by North Vietnamese regular forces, to achieve success without ever defeating US forces on the battlefield. For instance, the Tet Offensive in 1968 represented an operational failure in Stage Three of the Dau Tranh strategy but was considered a success for the North since it weakened American public support for the war. As a result the defeat on the battlefield, Giap adapted Dau Tranh to avoid concentration of forces and the effects of superior US firepower by transitioning back to Stage Two. The return to guerilla operations ensured sustained US casualties and the continued erosion of public support between 1968 and 1971. At the same time, main force units that were decimated during Tet could withdrawal and reconstitute. (Pike, 229)

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle utilizing the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. Furthermore, this paper will relate the causes and effects of essential elements critical to the tactical success and mission failure of Operation Ivory Coast. Ultimately, all contributing factors will coalesce into lessons learned from the operation that are still applicable to this day.

The three sources that have been analysed all contribute to a broader understanding of the nature of warfare during the Vietnam War. This is due to each source’s distinct point of view, and the sources’ varying levels of reliability.