Compare And Contrast Kennan And Nitze

Both the ideologies of the United States and the Soviets were unchanging and unwilling to compromise. Given the Soviets recent advances like obtaining “the bomb” and Mao Tse-tung’s victory for communist china, Americans were beginning to conclude that something had to be done. Victory was the only option. This belief can be echoed by the fact that neither President Truman or Secretary Acheson were willing to give in to appeasement. Acheson announced that the U.S would not “pull down the blinds and sit in the parlor with a loaded shotgun, waiting.”

Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show.

As the Soviet Union continued to spread communism throughout the eastern part of the globe, the United States was determined to contain the economic ideology and prevent it from reaching the States by any means possible. The American’s fear of communism prompted changes in domestic policy, most notably with the attempt to remove power from anyone with communist ties and the platform to influence others. Document one, a passage from one of President Truman’s executive order signed in

Americans feared Communism would propagate during the Cold War, although Ike addressed these fears during a press conference, he merely fueled their fear claiming, “Makes us act almost hysterically, and you will find hysterical reactions” (doc. A). Three months later, Ike’s Secretary of State confronts Americans fears by claiming if Communism were to capture America, a new front has been established in order to “increase danger to the entire free

Propaganda used to induce terror included posters, political statements, and comics. One such comic was Is This Tomorrow?, a popular dramatization of the Soviets and of communism(Document 7). By depicting the Soviets in such a violent, authoritarian light, it spread anti-communist feeling among Americans, and attempted to prevent any Soviet sympathizers. In the Soviet Union, a secret speech made by Nikita Khrushchev to the closed session of the Twentieth Party of Congress denounces capitalism and fights against the anti-communist campaign(Document 6). The Secret Speech was a counter to recently made anti-communist organizations, and reinforced the Soviet Union’s own ideals, while countering the US’s arguments for capitalism. Through the use of past faults and militaristic policies, Khrushchev argues that the US’s attempts at peace were false, and only a front for their true intentions. This effectively promoted terror and anti-capitalist feeling among Soviet Congress. It gave strong reasoning to fight back against Americans, as it instilled fears of a capitalist overtake, and the need for preservation of the

Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are - this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up” (Document C). This quote set the precedent for containment and gives understanding as to why America reverted from its original policy of isolationism into an alternate strategy of preventing the spread of communist expansion. Moreover, George E. Kennan’s Long Telegram, or Document D, sketched “the roots of Soviet policy” and contained “warning of serious difficulties with the Soviet Union in the years ahead”. Kennan’s telegram portrayed the Soviets as aggressive and intent on world domination, suggesting that they would only respond to force and not

Characterized by the ideological divergence of Communism and Capitalism as well as the intense economic rivalry when World War II came to an end, the political tension between the only two world’s superpowers, United States and Soviet Union, was inevitable. While both of these two nations were motivated by the ambition to expand their worldwide influence, Soviet Union carries more responsibility for instigating the Cold War and exacerbating its discord with United States. While critics argued that America initiated the war by carrying out the Marshall plan when there was no solid evidence about the threat of Communism posed on the United States, it is unassailable that Soviet’s aggression and expansionism prior to the Cold War led to America’s mindset about the nature and potential danger of Communism. The Telegram from Moscow clarified the

George Kennan's containment plan is a radical shift in the U.S foreign policy when the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union prior, and during the World War II is considered. The containment policy marks the shift of American foreign policy towards the Soviets from alliance to deterrence. Kennan's states in the Long Telegram, "USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." (Citation needed) only two years after the end of World War II, a war both the U.S and the Soviet Union fought side by side for a common ambition. If the aspect of radical shift in the U.S foreign policy is seen from a post-Cold War perspective, another radical change can

When one can truly understand and uncover the meaning behind these articles and how they fit into one or more of the ‘boxes’ we call paradigms and perspectives. In order to dissect and analyze the case of the Cold War, especially its origins, one must not only skim through the text and uncover main ideas, but also must also relate the readings to these paradigms and establish one’s own ideals and opinions regarding the study of international relations. Personally, I believe the articles associated with the origins of the Cold War along with Professor Katzenstein’s lecture on the topic provide strong arguments for the use of a ‘middle fish’ perspective and a ‘big fish’ paradigm: domestic politics and realism, respectively. Through George Kennan’s personal accounts, experience and analysis at both the time of the Cold War’s inception and forty-plus years later after the fall of the Soviet Union, a point is made regarding the nature of Soviet expansion as an offensive maneuver, which he believed must be contained by a defensive strategy. This point of conflicting strategies by the U.S. and (especially) the Soviet Union provides the reader with a realist argument and perspective. Also, in his second piece, which details remarks made to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1994, Kennan explains that instead of whole-heartedly adopting

George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,

Soviet leaders probably did not enjoy reading George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram,” abbreviated LT for short. A 1946 State Department cable sent from the American embassy in Moscow to Washington, D.C., the LT provided the intellectual foundations for the U.S. policy of containment. Although containment did not necessarily advise officials to eradicate communism’s existing footholds, the policy did make the Cold War “hot” in many countries in an attempt to stop communism’s spread – Vietnam (1965 – 1973), Korea (1950 – 1953), and Greece (1946 – 1949), to name a few. Somewhat less importantly from a policy standpoint (but arguably more so for the individual kingpins within Russia), the LT attacked the USSR’s leaders on a personal level, calling

This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.

In conclusion, Truman was constantly ready with very strong charges against communism, but they were all misleading and misinforming. Truth, justice, international understanding, and peace – goals of decent people everywhere – are not served by dividing the world into "good guys" and "bad guys," into saints and devils, into "free peoples" and followers of an

During the Cold War, the Soviets were trying to spread communism throughout Europe and Asia by exalting its achievements, and undermining democracy. Part of their approach was by launching ‘Hate-America’ propaganda. “As the Cold War intensified, the Truman administration launched an aggressive “Campaign of Truth” […] to counter the Soviet Union propaganda machine (Ubah, 2012).” The Campaign of Truth was created to help convince the world that the United States has “no purpose of going to war, except in the defense of freedom. (Vaccaro, 1950)” Truman encouraged the media to show the world that the United States was ‘wholly dedicated to the cause of peace (Vaccaro,

In The Sources of Soviet Conduct, George F. Kennan explained “Containment was the central post-war concept of the United States and its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union”. To contain communism, the United Stated strategy was to have a strong