Constructive Eviction Claim

Decent Essays

Plaintiffs Ignore the Plain Language of Section 2-603(b) In an attempt to justify impermissibly combining an anticipatory repudiation claim and a constructive eviction claim—two theories of relief that require different elements to be proved—into a single count, Plaintiffs rely on stale case law that is at least sixty five years old. Although they acknowledge that section 2-603(b) requires a separate cause of action to be alleged in a different count, they offer no justification for ignoring the provision’s unambiguous directive. As discussed above, proper pleadings are vital to the effective and efficient administration of justice. Neither this Court nor Defendants should be required to decipher a count that jumbles together two separate …show more content…

Plaintiffs Waived their Constructive Eviction Claim In a constructive eviction claim, the tenant has the burden of showing that the premises was abandoned within a reasonable time. Dell’Armi v. Johnston, 172 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149 (1st Dist. 1980). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs (a) continued to live in the premises for fifteen months after first complaining about the condition of the property, and (b) renewed the lease term. Even if Nenn’s status as a single mother warranted additional time to locate a new residence, it surely does not excuse waiting more than a year to vacate the premises and renewing the lease term. Plaintiffs’ argument that any waiver of a prior alleged breach did not result in waiver of their constructive eviction claim for each subsequent breach also falls short. As Plaintiffs recognize, the lease obligated Defendants to make repairs within 60 days of receiving notice. See Apartment Lease, ¶¶ 6.B, G.D, and 14.B. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ allegations, in early January 2014, Plaintiffs informed Defendants of conditions of alleged disrepair in the premises. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-39.) As a result, Plaintiffs had until early March 2014 to make the necessary repairs. Instead of vacating the premises within a reasonable time of that date, Plaintiffs renewed the lease term and remained in the premsespremises for an additional seven months. Thereafter, Plaintiffs did not notify Defendants of any other conditions of disrepair until August 23, 2014, when they allegedly advised Defendants of a mold issue. Plaintiffs then vacated the premises on October 3, 2014, which was only 41 days later. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47,

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