The after taking 25 years to develop the F22 Raptor from conception to operational certification the United States Air Force (USAF) produced the world’s first 5th Generation air superiority fighter. (site) This revolutionary fighter plane leveraged its very low observable stealth (VLO) and thrust-vectoring and digital fly by wire technology, to produce an extremely fast, agile and deadly air to air combatant. (GEO P 2) However, in 2009 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, (SECDEF) convinced the President (POTUS) and Congress to truncate the F22 program, leaving the USAF with less than 187 operational F22 Raptors, this number was well short of the 381 the USAF estimated they needed to meet their mission requirements. (AWC 1/ site) Gates made his controversial decision based on three factors. This essay will explore these factors and explain how the 2009 U.S strategic environment, the overall cost of the F22 and Secretary Gates’ desire to change the Department of Defense (DOD) all lead to the decision to limit the production of the F22 Raptor at 187 aircraft. Robert Gates pushed for the termination of the F22 production because of its low return on investments (ROI) for the U.S. taxpayer caused by the …show more content…
operational risk in near term irregular and COIN fights. The U.S. Strategic Environment made the F22’s opportunity cost too high. With this shift in orientation, Gates assumed greater risk for the most dangerous scenario, a war with a near peer competitor. It is important to note, he did not completely ignore the possibility of a future near-peer fight. He does invest heavily in the F35, joint strike fighter, which may indicate the core reason he ended the production of the F22 was not strategic or security environments, but the F22 ROI and procurement
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examines “the national defense strategy and priorities”, and “sets a long-term course for the DoD”. The QDR "assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces, while seeking to re-balance DoD‘s strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today‘s conflicts and tomorrow's threats." The QDR is required by Congress every four years and is produced by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The three pillars that the 2014 QDR rests on are: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively. One of the ways that the US armed forces support the QDR is through the application of airpower. Airpower is “the ability to project military power or influence through the
“General Motors, the country’s leader in defense contracts, is firmly fixed in the public mind with the manufacture of automobiles… 35 percent of its total business is non-automotive. This diversification… gives General Motors an enormous advantage... But little of this helps Michigan now, since G.M. no longer concentrates its military work in this area” (Widick, 1959, Pg. 1).
Robert McNamara directed a disastrous, failed war that was very costly. He visioned an “active management” approcah. He wanted a Pentagon where the secretary would have his own large staff that would provide civilian advice. This advice would only allow the secretary to be the only one able to assess alternatives. This would also allow him to be the only one making choices when it comes to defining budgets, foreign policy, military strategy, and integrating forces and weapons. Budgets in the 50s were done by services instead of missions and used estimates that had an unclear validity. There was no way that duplication nor functional gaps could be identified. Concerns arose from discrepancies about the defense posture on whether it had rational basis for the allocation of resources. McNamara also proposed a system analysis that calculated the defense needs, but it had its limits. The military was caught off guard with this and programs that he did not agree with were seen as not to be cost-effective. McNamara’s agenda also included acquisition reforms. This
The third issue that was discussed in these articles is a strong disconnect between what is being planned vs reality. Following 9/11, Pentagon budget went up significantly to justify the ongoing fight against global terrorism. However, if we look carefully, it is obvious that a higher percentage of the defense budget is going to fund Cold war era programs and may reduce readiness for Asymmetric warfare we are currently experiencing or may experience more in future. Additionally, unreliable information coming from DOD’s accounting system makes it extremely difficult to generate future force projections and cost estimates based on past and present status of expenditures. Overall, it creates an unrealistic ballooning defense budget that is not economically sustainable.
To be sure, a surprise strategic Chinese attack is a valuable worst-case scenario to study, but protracted multi-dimensional U.S.-China competition for Pacific influence—akin to the contemporary era—is arguably more likely and, thus, a more sensible scenario against which to wargame. Also, despite its plausible portrayal of a localized insurgency, the novel stops short of depicting mass civil unrest elsewhere and social stability considerations that would almost certainly accompany a future world war. Nonetheless, Ghost Fleet’s technical narrative provides ample realistic content for today’s security and defense officials to balance and refine tomorrow’s warfare strategies. Singer and Cole’s near-future depiction of U.S. technological vulnerability in warfare should spur those officials to enable American innovation and adaptation in warfighting solutions well before the onset of strategic
The art and science of warfighting is an amazingly broad and deep subject with complexities that bridge the technical aspects of war and the social interactions that win them. Whether we discuss tactical intricacies of the battlefield or bureaucratic complexities at the Pentagon, multi-faceted problem sets bombard our branch. The government directed Budget Control Act of 2011 in concert with sequestration, the Holistic Aviation Assessment Task Force, the Aviation Restructure Initiative, and a significant operational transition from counterinsurgency to decisive action are just some of the complex, ill-structured, or so-called "wicked problems" that exist. The second and third order effects of these programs and the consequences of decisions
The military industrial complex was a term coined by President Eisenhower describing the growing relationship between the military and the government, mostly regarding the massive increase in military spending. Since the Cold War, the United States has continually expanded military spending, particularly the Department of Defense, which is currently 21 times more expensive than the State Department. The most common effect this has on members of Congress is the pressure that is put on them to appropriate funds for the DOD in the best way possible. The consequences of not being able appropriate the proper funds could result in job loss missed economic opportunities and ultimately not being reelected. Congress deals with funding projects such as the expensive F-35 which has yet to be made. Lockheed and Martin, the F-35s designers, applied a method called political engineering in order to get bipartisan support. This method includes using the 133,000 jobs across 45 states as leverage in order for state politicians to continue their support. Another deal congress has had to deal with is the Base Realignment and Closing Commissions (BRACs) which essentially
The introduction of aircraft had begun a new era in warfare. No longer were military powers limited to the boundaries of vehicles that were restricted to land. The evolution of aircraft technology helped pioneer a new type of combat strategy that played a significant role in determining the outcome of a battle. Air combat also influenced the economies of the participating countries. The whole cycle of airplanes from the assembly line to the pilot became factors that added up to become an advantage or disadvantage.
In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.
With Trump’s election this year, his rhetoric of “Making America Great Again” and therefore revitalizing our military will soon become a reality. Trump has formally requested a reappropriation of funds; around $54 Billion, towards the US military. Part of Trump’s campaign promises had to do with making the military more robust; ensuring America’s title of militarily strongest in the world. In order to achieve this goal. Trump’s federal government has the option of many different aspects of the military to focus on. Of these, funding weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, and further military research and development prove themselves as most relevant in the contemporary military.
The F-35 JSF will be an excellent addition to the current fleet of conventional fighters. However, it is not worth the current investment to replace the entire fleet with fifth gen aircraft. As seen with the F-22 oxygen system failures in 2011, a simple problem has the capability to ground an entire fleet of aircraft.9 In the case of the F-35, a grounding problem at operational volume has the potential to ground the Air Force’s entire fleet of fighter aircraft, essentially leaving the United States powerless in the air. Leaders are taught to always have backup plans if one should fail, the United States is placing all hopes into one multi-purpose airframe. Although cheap, the F-35 is a jack of all trades, but a master of
The United States has lead the way in transforming technology and changing the conduct of war over the past sixty-five years; working to create a safer, more stable and prosperous world for America, our allies, and partners abroad. However, “modern warfare is evolving rapidly, leading to increasingly contested battlespace in the air, sea, and space domains – as well as cyberspace – in which our forces enjoyed dominance in our most recent conflicts.” Changes in warfare and the world’s political climate forced the United States to change their strategic focus and redefine their outlook for the future; “based on new technologies, new centers of power, and a world that is growing more volatile, more unpredictable, and in some instances more threatening to the United States.”
The war on terror is a never-ending battle. The United States has been in many wars since the day our country was founded. There has been an estimated 651,008 deaths in war battle, 1.2 million deaths during war. An estimated 42 million service men and women have joined the armed forces in protecting our country (Science Line). Every day our state and policy makers are finding new ways to protect the 42 million service men and women. In the early 1990s’ the U.S created the Predator Program (Woods). This program allows air force men and women to fly unoccupied aircrafts in remote locations for intelligence gathering as well as executing high profile terrorist networks. This program protects thousands of service
should adjust its priorities and spending to address the changing nature of threats in the world: What all these potential adversaries—from terrorist cells to rogue nations to rising powers—have in common is that they have learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on conventional military terms. The United States cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance's persistence. But it is also important to keep some perspective. As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined—and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners." (Staff,
Observers do not need to look far for the signs of a military-industrial complex that has become too powerful and involved in politics. The Army has repeatedly attempted to halt the production and spending on new tanks. The Air Force has spent almost $400 billion on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, nearly double the initial estimate. If the relationship between civilian and military leaders is to be mended, leadership decisions must not be influenced by the military-industrial