The Silent Crisis Summary

On January 17, 1961 President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his farewell address to the nation, his final public speech as President of the United States. As such it was his last opportunity to address the nation, on any subject of his choice, with the authority, prestige and preeminence that comes with the office of President of the United States. His choice, what he termed the Military Industrial Complex, was perhaps something that at the time did not register in the mind of the average American as a priority when placed along the topics of the Communism, the Cold War and nuclear war. Yet, as it turns out the issue regarding the Military Industrial Complex and Eisenhower's warnings about it have outlasted the fears of the mid 20th century.

By slow stages, large and sustained military expenditures produced an enduring Military-Industrial Complex with the self-serving consequences suggested by the World War II economy and, more seriously, with the potential for perpetuating the forces of modern warfare which had provided for the initial growth of such a complex (90).

The core issue is over policy and operational activities but often disguised as legal issues. At the strategic level, committees in congress debate over oversight. At the operational level, military commanders and interagency leaders debate authorities and permissions. At the tactical level, individuals debate operations.

In Eisenhower's Farewell Address, his final public speech to America, he wanted to leave them with some advice and wise words of wisdom from there soon to be ex president. He emphasized his point to not use the potential influence of the military. He stated that “Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.” He said that we “must avoid the impulse to live only for today” which he is meaning that we need to look into the future and realize the importance to keep our nation safe. To keep the economy safe for our following generations. In this speech he coined the phrase Military-industrial complex, which became a huge thing

While written as a fictional book, William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick wrote Ugly American with the goal to stimulate thought and possible action. They wanted to illustrate fatal flaws in American policy and the actions of American representatives throughout the world. Written in 1958 the book’s examples remain relevant. SOF must understand they are representatives of the United States whenever deployed. Often American representatives believe money is the only motivation of the countries we support. Many of the people representing the United States overseas are incredibly intelligent but they match that intelligence with an unprecedented level of arrogance. United States SOF provides a unique capability to American leadership. The

The meaning of the “term military-industrial complex” MIC is not quite clear for the most of military and civilians, even though they often read about in newspapers or hear from politicians. The term military-industrial complex did not exist in the past, it has appeared recently. The first use of this term was on January 17, 1961, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed his farewell to the nation . After more than two decades on the launch of this term ,R. Buckminster Fuller revisited Eisenhower’s address in his book “A Grunch of Giants” to find out the extent of the influence of the owners of military industries, . Not only R. Buckminster Fuller who addressed what president Eisenhower said about the military-industrial complex , but

The F-35 Program meets this criteria and it is one of the reasons that it enjoys bipartisan support of its continuance. Many congress members are reluctant to suggest cancelling the program, despite its underwhelming performance, because of its widespread economic impact. Political engineering has resulted in an iron triangle among Congress, Lockheed Martin lobbyists, and Department of Defense bureaucrats whom seek to prioritize their interests ahead of the nation’s interest. This has led to a lack of fiscal and program accountability within the F-35 program.

Strategists will argue that civilians have control of the military. This is in line with Clausewitz notion that war must be subordinate to policy. One will hope for a healthy relationship between both entities; in a sense, while there is no clear line of defined responsibility, both parties should have overlapping knowledge and understanding. As easy as this concept may appear, its applicability can often create discordance among stakeholders. This in turn will create a lack of coordination and participation, all of which are detrimental to the effective integration of

The comparison of the military to industry is easy to do, and even easier to conclude that the military lags behind. However I’m not sure how equal of a comparison it is. I do agree with you in that they differ in their bottom line, but that is not the end of it. The military has both advantages and disadvantages over industry. The political process and politicians force decisions on military planners that detract from efficiency. Some of these such as oversight are built in to help save taxpayer money, but others needlessly siphon money to pork type projects. Anyone need a bunch of new M1 tanks? No? Build them anyway. Politicians have their own agenda and use the military as a catalyst for their own gain. This pulls resources that could be better used to fight the current or prepare for the future fight.

Recognizing the demand for a military but the undoubted need for control so as not to allow for it to become too powerful, the Founders responded with the creation and notion of political civilian control of the military. Civilian control leaves strategic decision making in the hands of political leadership as opposed to military officers maintaining balance. As in todays era we find President Barack Obama, a political figurehead, and his orders for military engagements impacting various

Arguably, civil-military dialogue is the most critical component of strategic art as it serves to build trust and create shared understanding. High levels of trust and understanding facilitate the matching of strategy to policy while forming the guiding logic that underpins the chosen theory of victory. Furthermore, candid and continuous dialogue facilitates reassessment and redirection when prewar plans fail to meet wartime realities. Without candid and iterative discourse, the result is nothing less than friction on one hand, and the unanticipated consequences of ill-conceived objectives on the other. Indeed, limited war is difficult, and as such, it places a heavy strain on civil-military relations. The root cause of this friction, centers on the military’s preference for overwhelming victories and a professional education that is less than adequate to negotiate the demands of the strategic environment. The discussion begins with a theoretical underpinning of civil-military relations in limited war before turning to the root causes of friction, and the ways to best manage them.

These three factors are associated with the people, the military, and the government and it is the interaction of these three factors that come to define the nature of war. Clausewitz believes that all wars are the same in nature as a tool of politics, their internal composition rarely being the same; “Wars vary with the nature of their political motives and situations which give rise to them” (p.88). War understood as an extension of politics suggests that the nature of war will be reflective of the political context and its given objectives. It is for this reason that it is so important that military leaders and political leaders have a solid understanding about how wars about to be fought may differ from previous wars. If this understanding is not developed, the likelihood that poor predictions will be made is high and this will contribute to inadequate strategies that are unlikely to be effective in the waging of actual

“We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower). This was Eisenhower’s warning against the military-industrial complex in his farewell address as president. Even so, our military and government have gotten out of control with the amount of money the goes to defense spending every year. This is precisely why our government needs to adopt some form of corporate social responsibility to, at some level, be able to regulate themselves. There are just too many examples of wasteful spending spawning from bad policies and dependency to ignore the source of the problem any longer.

I wondered: how can governments make credible commitments to security and governance when the landscape of violence remains fragmented? What I saw on the ground rarely corroborated with the broader narratives I read in newspapers, the military’s anodyne policy briefs, or academic literature on conflict. Those sources held ideas that made sense to me as applicable to wars between states, but not to the kinds of conflict that we now seemed to face. From my ground-level perspective, it puzzled me to see how some non-state armed actors implemented strategies that appeared counterproductive to their short and long-term objectives. Again I wondered: did it appear that way because they knew something we did not, or was it because we truly understand so little?

The major inconsistencies in Policymaking exist between the military regimes and the democratic governments. Military regimes followed a more “mono-faceted approach” that relied exclusively on the use of force.