Vs. Structural Obstacles Accession of new members from Eastern Europe into the union is possible only through good governance, effective institutions, and quality democracy. Good governance creates effective institutions. These institutions produce quality democracy. Established member states want a democratic sub-continent which will support expansion towards Eastern Europe. Next I evaluate the literature in order to establish whether EU institutions have the real power to impact the quality of democracy in Eastern European and Balkan members in order to support EU expansion. EU Institutions’ Ability to Influence Eastern Europe EU Institutions and Leverage and Linkage with the West First I examine how EU institutions promote linkage and leverage with the West with the newest members in Eastern Europe. In particular, I examine the role of EU policies and initiatives in promoting Western 1) linkage by guaranteeing security and 2) leverage through conflict resolution in Eastern Europe, since those are the two main issue areas that enabled Western presence and cooperation in the region. The predominant impression is that the majority of Europeans still favor defense from outside from structures like NATO; therefore, NATO is a significant source of linkage and leverage with the West in Eastern Europe. EU and Security of Eastern Europe Democratizing states tend to form peace alliances that provide an environment for democracy to develop (Gibler and Wolford 2006), so peaceful
When identifying the presence of a democratic deficit in the European Union, it is important to consider a range of factors, including international treaties and the effect they had on its structured governmental framework. One of the first official agreements established by the European Union (formerly
The European Union (EU) is fundamentally democratic and is evident through its institutions, however, the current democratic electoral structure is of great concern. The EU is a new type of political system, often referred to as a sui generis, implying its uniqueness as there exists and a non comparable political body. The EU can neither regarded as a ‘state’ nor as an ‘international institution’ as it combines supranational as well as intergovernmental characteristics (Hix, 1999, p7). In this regard it has developed its own understandings of what democracy is. It is evident that the development of and spread of democracy is a central concept and foundation to all politics within the EU, and remains focuses on makings its governing
3. The democratic peace theory indicates that a war will never happen between two democracies. There is some few strength in this theory. Firstly, the democratic is obligated to the people from that country, which means that the ruler needs to get permission from the citizens on a decision about war, they cannot act on their own. Of course, people don’t like to go war. Further, there is a shared value among democratic countries. For instance, the U.S and the United Kingdom don’t compete against the other, while the U.S and North Korean are in the different story. A country without democracy based shares a little common background with the other. Finally, democracy countries are wealthier than those who are not. The evidence shows that countries
Alternatives such as the European Union, which remains “…the most successful experiment in political institution-building since the Second World War.” Andrew Moravcsik goes on to say the EU cannot replace or aspire to the democratic status of nation states, yet their role remains embedded in monitoring accountability and extensive checks and balances upon its member states. Emerging actors such as the EU again demonstrate the changing environment and clearly indicate realist theories, must by reconsidered.
The literature on the Eastern expansion of the EU is dominated by studies seeking to identify the overall expectations of candidates and the motives for established states to approve or reject applicants. Consistent with the Copenhagen criteria, the predominant theoretical perception is that attitudes towards democracy and capitalism in candidate states determine EU membership and can reasonably be connected to a smoother and faster accession process (Christin 2005; Cichowski 2000; De Witte 2002; Delsoldato 2002; Fish 2005; Hellman 2004; Plumper, Schneider, and Troegerv 2006; Nissen 2003; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). The literature also links EU expansion to increase in tensions between established and
Peter A. Hall is Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies and the Director of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University. Daniel W. Gingerich is a Graduate Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a Ph. D. candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University. Peter A. Hall phall@fas.harvard.edu Daniel W. Gingerich gingeric@fas.harvard.edu
Legitimacy in the European Union”, JCMS, 40/4, 603-24. ] This concept of a “democratic deficit” first emerged in the draft treaty for the European Union which as we know led to the establishment of the Single European Act of 1986 whose main purpose was to “rectify the democratic deficit in the community decision making process”[ Zweifel, T, “Who without Sin Cast the First Stone: the EU”, p812-40, Democratic Deficit in Comparison.” 2002. Journal of European Public Policy]; already it is apparent the enormous debate around the European Union and a democratic deficit stretching as far back to 1986. Following the numerous unsuccessful attempts to harmonize the change in the Union’s structure, the democratic deficit argument really began to gain power and rumours of its collapse became more dominant than ever. This debate has deepened drastically over the past two or so decades, with scholarly commentators as well as members of the European public all in agreement that the European Union is in fact
The study also revealed a corollary finding. Chapter 1 divulged that the Western Civilization is displaying a bias for oppositional responses. Since Antiquity, the West seems to see strategy as competitive in nature and often consider that the military is an inescapable means to resolve international issues. This bias contributes to explaining the surprising proposition that neither the European Union nor NATO seems willing to acknowledge that it develops a grand strategy. One can advance that the EU and NATO do so because they project their biases onto other actors and, therefore, fear that opponents as well as partners might interpret such acknowledgment as a move towards power politics. This bias deserves further scrutiny and substantiation and presents a potential lead to elaborate on this study. It might also offer an opportunity for rejuvenating the field of strategy. Indeed, this bias is the occasion for strategists to broaden their analytical spectrum as well as the variety of tools at their disposal. In particular, they have to acknowledge that the use of force or the threat of it might not be the only ways to coerce a third party, be it with a design of deterring or compelling it. For instance, in an international regime favoring cooperative relations, the threat of diminishing economic cooperation or of diplomatic sanctions, which can range from minor actions to complete isolation, might procure similar effects. The works of Robert Axelrod are remarkably
When analysing the system of the EU on grounds of its democratic legitimacy it is important to define democracy itself. Democracy is a value-laden term that has various meanings and comes in different shapes (e.g. representative vs. direct democracy). As none of the member states in the EU practices direct democracy to a mentionable extent it would not be suitable to assess the EU on terms of direct democratic participation. A reasonable
European Union is the largest and most powerful economic alliance in the world. The European Union has succeeded to considerably expand its influence in the past 20 years. The three models of enlargement and the strengthening of the actual EU’s economic along with political presence throughout its neighborhood are among the most remarkable successes of its post-Cold War history. The European Union is probably the key facilitators of stability within the Western Balkans; it represents a good institutional and normative spine for Eastern Neighborhood countries and acts to be a partner for a new thriving economic partnership with most of the Mediterranean states. In the past
The European Union (EU) is not a typical international organization. The mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions makes the EU a unique, distinctive political, and economic system. As Europe has spiraled from one crisis to the next, difficult discussions haves arisen about how much more power should be delegated to Brussels. Even though the EU advocates for “ever closer union”, through increased integration, states are becoming hesitant to relinquish power to the EU. This is due to the fact that state sovereignty has become threatened; it is being compromised by a combination of the lack of effective democratic institutions and the loss of states have lost control of law-making to legislation power to EU institutions. Euroenthuthiasts argue that state sovereignty is enhanced, not threatened, by reallocating power to EU institutions. However, Eurosceptics dispute that too much control has seceded to the EU making is a threat to state sovereignty. My position aligns with Eurosceptics, for the EU has weakened state sovereignty do to increased centralization of power in EU institutions that lack legitimacy. The European Project has obtained a copious amount of jurisdiction from states and eroded a basic fundamental freedom of the modern state- sovereignty. Since the EU has with goals to deepen and widen integration it’s clear that forfeiting state sovereignty will only intensify. My essay will start with a brief history of the European Union and a short
The Eastern Enlargement was, and remains, a point of dispute when arguing the costs and benefits. It provided numerous opportunities for the EU, but with them came challenges, some of which could be argued were too much and too soon for the EU. This chapter will engage the major challenges and benefits in the way they were presented by dominant theories of EU enlargement and integration. To provide a clearer picture they will be divided into two broad headings; economic and political.
The establishment of the European Union (EU) solidified a united political, economic, and defensive front creating a Supranational Organization (Lucas, 1999, no page). With the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States, the EU has developed a comprehensive security strategy responsible for leading the coalition’s objectives for mutual solidarity, global stabilization, and defense. To address security threats both regionally and globally set forth by the European Security Strategy (ESS), considerations were developed which encompass both cultural domains of geography and development.
The European Union played a very important role in transforming post-communist countries into democratic states with functioning market economies and the rule of law. The massive transfer of institutional and legal know-how from member
But in Asia, who is the most important partner of the EU? Except for China and Japan, ASEAN is playing an increasingly important role in regional geopolitics and is proving to be a force for