Discuss Husserl’s criticism and appropriation of Brentano’s ‘psychic phenomenon’ in the Vth Logical Investigation.
It is in the Vth of Husserl’s Logical Investigations that he offers his own theory on what is necessary to overcomes the issues’ of the already existing ‘descriptive psychology’ which had been practised by his own mentor Brentano. Husserl did not aim to completely criticise Brentano’s work but instead wanted to take what he considered useful of Brentano’s work on the ‘psychic phenomenon’ and use it as necessary to work on his own account of phenomenology of the conscious mind and intentional acts. Husserl focused primarily on Brentano’s accounts of mental acts, primarily those of presentations and judgements. In this paper we will
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How Brentano deals with judgements and what Husserl takes from these studies, along with Brentano’s distinction between object and content and what Husserl took from this distinction.
Husserl’s main purpose with Brentano’s law on presentations was simply to find its correct explanation. It is in Husserl’s Vth Logical Investigation that he lays down the foundation regarding the nature of judgement and his own account of categorical intuition. In doing this Husserl begins to move away from the structure laid down by Brentano in these areas of study. Husserl arises by accepting Brentano’s notions regarding rational acts and the inner structure of intended experiences by questioning its reliability and conceptual sense. Husserl focuses chiefly here on an
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Husserl did not feel Brentano’s account of object and content was dealt with in a very organised manner and this led to much ontological dispute, primarily in his use of the term ‘inexistence’ when referring to an intentional object. Husserl dedicates an excessive amount of the Fifth Logical Investigation to a vigilant undoing of Brentano’s claims regarding different explanations of consciousness and especially takes this opportunity to focus on the Brentano’s law which states ‘no mental act which is not either presentation or based on a presentation.’ Husserl agreed loosely with Brentano’s law on presentation but believed the correct way to look at it was his own notion of ‘objectifying acts.’ Husserl also suggests a more broad division between act-quality and substance to take care of characteristics inaccurately gathered beneath the label of ‘content.’ The main issue Husserl had with Brentano was how he had ambitions to specify the sphere and the system of psychology in order to protect its place as a self-governing science. This sphere was a sphere of mental phenomenon, and its process was that of internal insight. Brentano began by distinguishing rational and physical phenomenon followed by his division of phenomena as a presence to consciousness and not
Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to
Many philosophers have considered the mystery of consciousness to be a “hard problem.” In “The Hornswoggle Problem,” Patricia Churchland rejects the characterization of consciousness as a uniquely hard problem, and asserts her belief that arguing the unknown nature of consciousness, absent any scientific evidence is an argument from ignorance. A proponent of the “hard problem” would instead argue that consciousness possesses a subjective aspect that makes it uniquely different from all other problems. In this paper, it is my contention that Churchland is correct to reject the ‘hard’ problem argument; and without any objective inquiry or research, this “hard problem” argument lacks needed intellectual vigor, and tends to further
In the Meditations, Descartes abandons his views about everything he knows in the world. During this he discusses the idea of senses relying on the mind rather than the body. The role of senses is shown through his demonstration of the wax example and the ever changing properties the wax entailed. “The perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination…but purely of mental scrutiny.” (Descartes 31) To Descartes, the senses were deceiving and could not be solely trusted in the understanding of a worldly object, in Meditation II he adequately defends this argument. Throughout this paper we will examine how this example was important to the entire argument that Descartes discusses in this paper, along with Descartes ultimate conclusion: “One cannot be deceived of their existence” and how these views may relate to other philosophers such as Locke and Berkeley.
Methods and Meditations on First Philosophy is a discourse by Rene Descartes, which largely focuses on the nature of humanity and divinity. This essay is a discussion of this discourse, and will summarize, explain and object to various parts of his work. The majority of this essay focuses on Descartes Sixth Meditation, which includes his argument that corporeal things do exist.
All reality is either consciousness or non-conscious being. However, this Cartesianism is qualified by a dialectic derived from Hegel and by Hegelian concepts and explicated through a phenomenological method influenced by Husserl. Yet the net effect of Sartre's picture of sexuality is surprisingly platonic; it is what Plato might be expected to say if he had published his position after World War II.
The following essay is a response to George Berkeley’s Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in which he argues that the Cartesian notion of substance is incoherent, that the word "matter" as Descartes uses it, does not mean anything.
As our scientific paradigm has shifted towards a materialist account of the world, many thinkers believe that appeals to the supernatural cannot provide truth. Consequently, beliefs that had once been considered adequate must now be reworked if not torn down entirely to fit this new world view. Daniel Dennett’s book Consciousness Explained attempts to provide an account of our internal experience (i.e. Consciousness) that is rooted in the materialist world view. Though he is not the first to undertake this project, he takes issue with what he perceives to be the popular materialist account of consciousness, and seeks promote his own theory. With this essay I aim to offer an informative summary of the book followed by an evaluative dialogue of its central claims.
Are opinions really owned by the people or are they formed by society as a way to control the populace? In M. Rickert’s “Evidence of Love in a Case of Abandonment”, the protagonist Lisle's perception of herself and the theocratic society she lives in is heavily molded by the bureaucratic authority governing her country. As strong minded as Lisle is, her opinions simply reflect the false-consciousness interpellated in her community and this demonstrates the power of a bureaucratic government upon the ideals of individuals. Lisle's comprehension of her beliefs, self-worth and identity are all instilled in her by the ruling class. Throughout the narrative, Lisle's personal righteous beliefs are displayed in her observations
In this paper I am addressing Jean Paul Sartre premise of the fundamental project. In my presentation I will first give a brief over view of Sartre's existentialism. Next Sartre's a notions of the spontaneous and reflective phases of consciousness will be my focus Upon discussing the reflective phase I will go into depth about the fundamental project, and why it is pursued, and I will give examples from No Exit. I will conclude by making a brief contrast and comparisson between Garcin, a character from No Exit, and myself.
An important claim of this paper is that recognition of discontinuous processes is essential to gain a deep grasp on reality — that Descartes' first recognition is better and deeper than his ensuing answers. This implies that reductivism (notably, in the present context, about mind and brain) is a defective attitude. It also implies that Post Modernism which both tends to deny the existence of hierarchies and to defer serious treatments of differences is also defective. (What is
In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes strives first and foremost to provide an infallibly justified foundation for the empirical sciences, and second to prove the existence of God. I will focus on the first and second meditations in my attempt to show that, in his skepticism of the sources of knowledge, he fails to follow the rules he has set out in the Discourse on Method. First I claim that Descartes fails to draw the distinction between pure sensation and inference, which make up what he calls sensation, and then consider the consequences of this failure to follow his method. Second, I will show that in his treatment of thinking Descartes fails to distinguish between active and passive thinking.
Henry Allison 's two aspect view differs profoundly from the two world view by introducing epistemic conditions. For Allison, the difference between appearances and things-in-themselves is epistemic rather than ontological. Rather than reflecting two separate realms, phenomena and noumena reflect the structure of the mind.21 The notable distinction here is that rather than the identification of the appearance with the representation, the appearance is associated with the thing-in-itself.22 Allison argues that Kant 's conditions of human knowledge should be taken as epistemic conditions rather than logical conditions.23 Allison defines an epistemic condition as a simply a condition that is necessary for an object or objective state of affairs.24 These epistemic then turn out to be space, time and the categories; it can be known a priori that every object is structured in terms of these conditions.25 By introducing epistemic conditions, Allison is capable of separating the two aspect view from the two world view.
The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in
In the stages leading up to self-consciousness, consciousness placed the locus of truth into that which it took to be other than itself. The particular and immediate being of the
Husserl calls the given in its immediate disclosure the "phenomenon". Derived from the Greek verb "phainomaf', it means to show visibility or to become visible. Phenomenon therefore suggests that which is disclosed, is shown, which is evident. The term Phenomenology was derived from this concept. Philosophy must broach the given or variable in its reality by means of Phenomenology.