The main issue addressed in this exposition is if “reliabilism is true, could we ever know whether we know anything? (If not, how big a problem would that be?)” According to the following evidence that will be presented, it is suggested that there is no way of knowing whether we know anything, when using the reliabilist form of justification as a way to reach truth. To begin, reliabilism is a form of justification where we do not need to account for the exact sources our beliefs come from because it “is externalist in character” (Handout 10). Moreover, a belief is justified if it was formed by an unconditionally reliable process, or by a conditionally reliable process that receives input from other conditional reliable processes that are …show more content…
An example of this is the Fake Barn County case. Henry is with his father and passes through a place full of barns, however he doesn’t know that all of these barns that he is seeing are fake barn façades people on this County have put as a decoration. Still, without knowing anything about the environment he is in, he points at the only barn that is actually not fake. Thus, his belief about that barn being a barn is true, but it is not justified because Henry knows this out of sheer luck (Nagel 52, 53). Meaning that if a belief is justified out of luck Henry doesn’t know that this is a barn. To account for this gap between justification and knowledge reliabilism steps in, and explains that in this case Henry’s belief is not properly justified because he is not using an appropriate belief-forming mechanism for the environment he is in (Nagel 53). This means, that depending on the environment we are at we have to switch between different belief-forming mechanisms in order to be able to justify our beliefs. Thus, if Henry kept using his old belief-forming mechanism, to identify barns in a new environment like Fake Barn County, he would most of the time fall into error, proving that his method of belief-formation is not truth conducive thus unreliable (Nagel 53).
Until now, it seems like reliabilism does a reasonable job at “[tying] justification and truth together” (Handout 10). Additionally, emphasizing the importance of external factors such as
that we could use reason to find certain truth if we used it correctly, while
Many times we have been in a dilemma whether to believe or not someone who tries to persuade us for something and very often by listening his arguments and by having enough evidence we finally manage to get out of the dilemma. Nevertheless sometimes we cannot be sure about an event because although there is enough evidence, our minds cannot be persuaded. An example to justify that is the existence of the Loch Ness monster, or as it is widely known “Nessie”.
Epistemological Foundationalism essentially claims that some empirical beliefs carry justification that does not require, or depend, on the justification of other empirical beliefs. In this essay, I intend to introduce the reading, “Can Empirical knowledge Have A foundation?” Written by Laurence Bonjour, to give a detailed summary of his arguments - as well as those who object to his - and ultimately to assert my belief that there is currently no example of an empirical belief that of which can be justified in an epistemic sense without avoiding reference to other empirical beliefs, which would then have to be justified themselves, not solving the regress problem.
that we could use reason to find certain truth if we used it correctly, while
Jonathan Vogel wrote Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation as a solution to accept the real world hypothesis over any skeptical hypothesis. Vogel presents a compelling argument for a definitive reason to accept that the world we are experiencing is in fact the real world. I believe that Vogel’s argument falls short of proving a reason for accepting the real world hypothesis over a skeptical one. In this paper I will clearly explain Vogels argument, explain some important concepts to understand, and attempt to refute the argument.
Edmund Gettier’s argument that justified true belief is not a sufficient definition for knowledge is correct. There are many scenarios in which the conditions for justified true belief are met but cannot be said to qualify as knowledge; therefore justified true belief is not a sufficient definition for knowledge.
“Ways of knowing are a check on our instinctive judgments.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? Often times, when people can’t form a logical reason for certain things they did, their justification is “because I had a gut feeling”. Indeed, people sometimes make judgments based on their gut feelings, or intuition. It is a very subjective and interesting way to gain knowledge. Our intuition can trick us into traps in which we never thought we would fall; it can also lead us to bold, unconventional decisions which bring us truth and knowledge. Our instinctive judgments often become more justifiable when they are “checked”, or verified, by other ways of knowing. Before I answer the
David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion provide conflicting arguments about the nature of the universe, what humans can know about it, and how their knowledge can affect their religious beliefs. The most compelling situation relates to philosophical skepticism and religion; the empiricist character, Cleanthes, strongly defends his position that skepticism is beneficial to religious belief. Under fire from an agnostic skeptic and a rationalist, the empiricist view on skepticism and religion is strongest in it’s defense. This debate is a fundamental part of the study of philosophy: readers must choose their basic understanding of the universe and it’s creator, upon which all other assumptions about the universe will be made.
Clifford (1879) is a strong proponent of proof-based beliefs and of the continuous criticism of beliefs held backed by loose evidence. In order to advance as a fair and just society, our beliefs must be evaluated and supported by evidence which is fair and just, and not by apparent truisms which satisfy our personal power struggles, insecurities, and lack of interest.
This paper will address the problem of skepticism. My focus will be exclusively on Global Skepticism as it is more controversial than Local Skepticism. The stance I am seeking to persuade you to take is one regarding the question of whether or not Global Skepticism is justified. In this paper I will discuss and analyze what other philosophers have said about the topic, my argument, how my opponents might object to my arguments, and how I respond to those objections. My hope is the conclusion to my argument will convince you that Global Skepticism is not justified and we can, in fact, come to ‘know’ things about our reality and obtain knowledge.
In this counterexample of the traditional view of knowledge that Gettier illustrates, a true justified belief evolved from a false justified belief. What the Gettier problem shows us is that in order for a true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must satisfy two conditions; it must not be a lucky guess (that is, it must be justified), and it must not be a lucky truth. A true belief that isn't a lucky guess, it may still be a lucky truth, and thus fall short of being knowledge. So where must knowledge come from?
It is logical to say that things happen for a reason. A ball, kicked by a child in a playground, flies through the air and eventually comes down to the ground. The child has kicked the ball enough times to expect that once the ball reaches its highest point, it will fall. Through experience of kicking the ball and it coming back to the ground, the child will develop expectations of this action. This thought process seems sound, yet a question of certainty arises. Can we be certain that future events will be like past events? Can we be certain that the ball will fall once it has been kicked? This concept was one of David Hume’s most famous philosophical arguments: the Problem of Induction. This paper will outline Hume’s standpoint, as well give criticism for his argument.
Epistemology is purposed with discovering and studying what knowledge is and how we can classify what we know, how we know it, and provide some type of framework for how we arrived at this conclusion. In the journey to identify what knowledge is the certainty principle was one of the first concepts that I learned that explained how we, as humans, consider ourselves to know something. The certainty concept suggests that knowledge requires evidence that is sufficient to rule out the possibility of error. This concept is exemplified in cases like The Gettier problem in the instance that we suppose (S) someone to know (P) a particular proposition. As Gettier established the Justified True Belief as a conceptual formula for knowledge, certainty
‘The Ultimate protection against research error and bias is supposed to come from the way scientists constantly test and retest each others results’ – To What extent would you agree with this claim in the natural and human sciences.
The production of knowledge is a process that occurs through a sequence of related actions, these series of actions allows for the Ways of Knowing to interact in a way that works to develop the knowledge that is being produced. From the prescribed title we can claim that while the Ways of Knowing may appear to be acting in isolation when forming knowledge, they are actually working in a variety of different ways in the construction and formation. In some cases, the Ways of Knowing are interacting so closely together that it is often hard to differentiate between them, for example emotion and reason, or imagination and memory. Given the right circumstances faith can be isolated to a point where it can be acting by itself to produce knowledge. However, this knowledge is often deemed as unreliable, due to faith being seen as one of the more “subjective” ways of knowing. This inability to differentiate the ways of knowing from each other during the production of knowledge, raises the questions “Can any knowledge in any Area of Knowledge be produced by a single Way of Knowing?” and “Is it possible to distinguish between Ways of Knowing if they are working together?”. While reason is used in almost all production of knowledge, it is the other Ways of Knowing used that can determine whether the knowledge is reliable or not, as some Ways of Knowing are more subjective than others. This essay will attempt to