Mind and Machine: The Essay Technology has traditionally evolved as the result of human needs. Invention, when prized and rewarded, will invariably rise-up to meet the free market demands of society. It is in this realm that Artificial Intelligence research and the resultant expert systems have been forged. Much of the material that relates to the field of Artificial Intelligence deals with human psychology and the nature of consciousness. Exhaustive debate on consciousness and the possibilities of consciousnessness in machines has adequately, in my opinion, revealed that it is most unlikely that we will ever converse or interract with a machine of artificial consciousness. In John Searle's collection of lectures, Minds, Brains and …show more content…
Proposition four is where the ends will meet the means. It purports that when we are able to finally understand the brain, we will be able to duplicate its functions. Thus, if we replicate the computational power of the mind, we will then understand it. Through argument and experimentation, Searle is able to refute or severely diminish these propositions. Searle argues that machines may well be able to "understand" syntax, but not the semantics, or meaning communicated thereby. Esentially, he makes his point by citing the famous "Chinese Room Thought Experiment." It is here he demonstrates that a "computer" (a non-chinese speaker, a book of rules and the chinese symbols) can fool a native speaker, but have no idea what he is saying. By proving that entities don't have to understand what they are processing to appear as understanding refutes proposition one. Proposition two is refuted by the simple fact that there are no artificial minds or mind-like devices. Proposition two is thus a matter of science fiction rather than a plausible theory A good chess program, like my (as yet undefeated) Chessmaster 4000 Trubo refutes proposition three by passing a Turing test. It appears to be intelligent, but I know it beats me through number crunching and symbol manipulation. The Chessmaster 4000 example is also an adequate refutation of Professor Simon's fourth proposition: "you can understand a process if you can reproduce
The most prominent example of the concept of a machine being intelligent in the manner of this so
The purpose of this paper is to bring to light a fresh new perspective of Artificial Intelligence or simply (AI). There have been numerous endeavours to make artificial intelligence which is inclusive of frontiers such as neural network, evolution theory, and so forth, not forgetting that a number of current issues have found solutions in the application of these concepts, the case still remains that each theory only covers a certain isolated aspect of human intelligence. To date, he gap that stands between a human being and an artificial intelligence agent still remains unabridged. In this paper an extrapolated version of artificial intelligence shall be discussed which will be augmented by emotions and the plausibility of inheriting a neural architecture from one generation to the next in a bid to make artificial intelligence to compare to the natural behaviour and intelligence of human
Prinz publication “Is the mind really modular?” demonstrates a various examples and explanations, highlighting each and everyone one of the modular systems that Fodor created. The number of descriptions created for the modules is composed by individuals who share different points of view. This doesn’t prove that the theory is wrong, it will simply state that there is no certainty of being a hundred percent sure. My position on this essay will be in contradiction to the approach that Prinz argues to disapprove the “Modularity of the mind” theory.
Clark and Chalmers begin with a case to illustrate why the mind is extended whereby a person has the option to use their mind (a), use a physical computational aid (b), or a futuristic
8Searle, John R. "A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind." In Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
In what follows, I will argue why I disagree with Allen’s reasoning. I will also give my account on why I believe, it is not possible to create such a system that can adequately understand on its own. From my understanding of the Chinese Room Argument, John Searle uses an example of individuals and the Chinese language to undermine the Turing Test. The Turing Test states that two systems have the same intermediary causal program, if their input
They compare the human mind to being like computers. They have adopted the human metaphor for the mind. This helps create a better understanding of how the mind works as computers and the human mind have quite a few similarities. For example, both have inputs, outputs, limited capacity for the amount of information they can process at any one time and memory stores. Although this computer analogy is helpful in understanding the theory, it is criticised because humans are more complex than computers.
Throughout the history of philosophy, the mind-body problem has been an ever-present topic of debate. One aspect of note is the knowledge argument set up by Frank Jackson in The Qualia Problem, as well as his introduction of the Mary’s room example. However, as a response, many authors have formed a skepticism around the validity of the knowledge argument. Collectively, these authors provide arguments that lead to a view that the knowledge argument is not valid.
The argument called "Chinese room" was proposed by John Searle and later reproduced in his other works. This argument is directed against the position of the philosophy of mind called functionalism. Elaborating, it may be noted that the argument was directed against the machine functionalism, or, as Searle points out, against the strong version of artificial intelligence.
2. In the article taken from Why Can’t My Computer Understand Me? Gary Marcus suggests that AI are not advanced enough in communication to live up to their potential. He is relevant to this argument because he is a credible professor of psychology with a focus on linguistics. A mastery of linguistics is needed by him to make
Peter Hacker, a 20th century philosopher, argues that the current notions, held by neuroscientists and philosophers, regarding the brain and consciousness are illogical. Subsequently, he discusses, in his opinion, the current misconceptions we have today.
The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.
No matter how circuitous the author’s route, Gödel, Escher, and Bach are ultimately tools for understanding mathematical logic. The author has written so hard to produce a book that really only asks a single question, in the end “Is it possible for self-reference or recursion to become a shortcut for researching artificial intelligence, and even the sophisticated human brain?” And yet from beginning to end he was still unable to find an answer; he wrote hundreds of pages, and still no answer.
The History of Psychology plays a big role in the interest of Psychology and Philosophy today. Several theories have been developed and refined over the hundreds of years of history in Philosophy and Psychology. Included in this report will be the discussion of the realm of the mind and consciousness, the mind and consciousness in relation to the physical body, and the independence of physical functions of the body through the central nervous system.
This paper will make critiques of arguments made by Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa in their article The Bounds of Cognition, as well as Sean Allen-Hermanson’s Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition as the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat. The purpose of this paper will be to address a few of the attacks in defence of Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind theory (EMT) by critiquing each author’s respective arguments.