Essay on National Security

Well, to me it sounds like the Central Intelligence Agency really does not deal with the problems that arise. I say this because in Kent Pekel’s article titled, “Integrity, Ethics, and the CIA” he tries to bring up that the Central Intelligence Agency really does not deal with ethical problems that arise; he interviews many different people and we get to know their side of what it is like working at the Central Intelligence Agency and what happens when ethical problems happen and how they are usually told to handle them. According to Pekel (2011), “They argued that when people fear they will be blamed for anything short of an optimal outcome, pressure is created to do whatever it takes to achieve that outcome, including cutting ethical corners and covering up mistakes” (p. 1). Sometimes when people who make unethical choices in a situation only do so because they feel pressure to get the job done. A point was raised about how the Central Intelligence Agency can attempt to weed out the rotten ones from the association while giving a couple of necessary ethics instructional meetings to remind other people to be ethical; however, this can be considered shallow and it is bound to fall flat (Pekel, 2011, p. 1). It is interesting to see that this would fall flat if they tried to do this, but it makes sense because it is hard to weed out the

Ranking first in my class, publishing a note on law review, and the numerous other academic accolades in my resume demonstrate my intellectual, analytical, and functional capacity and qualifications for a position with the CIA. My respect and appreciation for what it means to be a public servant as well as my integrity, however, are what distinguishes me from the plethora of qualified candidates that are undoubtedly applying for this position. The gravity of my experiences ranging from the consideration of compassionate release motions with the Bureau of Prisons to intimate discussions with litigants at the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, amongst many other experiences, have sculpted the ethical standards I bind myself

Members of the military services should be aware of any insider threat indicators presented by others to ensure the proper steps are implemented in the early stages and safeguard classified information. At this point, we should understand desperate people in desperate situations mainly derive espionage cases. Following this, it is essential for all soldiers recognize any form of threats to our nation’s national security and report these incidents immediately before they can harm our country. In addition to Martin’s espionage case, we can further understand the importance of securing classified information because it can seriously destroy relationships between countries. As a result, Martin deserved the punishment given to him because he knew the consequences of betraying his country. This case clearly indicates the reasons why we should have good communications at work and recognize individuals that may have issues that could possibly become an insider threat. Finally, we must be the change we wish to see among others, because every single person in this world can make the slightest perfection in another person’s

With this process, is where one can start to see the issue and conflict of interest. Human error is an issue that has always been a factor in the intelligence field and will continue to be a problem until there are no longer humans doing the jobs of the CIA and NCS. An example of human error are described in Richard Betts’, “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed”. He goes on to say “doubts of certainty between leaders of intelligence and policymakers which can cause demands for more research and cancellation of declared

After World War II American intelligence had the need to be transformed. The inexperience along with bureaucracy and poor coordination among American intelligence officers obligated the United States intelligence community to change dramatically in order to confront the new challenges that emerged after the end of WWII. From Early America through WWI the intelligence system of the United States of America was involved in operations in which they had to construct intelligence systems virtually from scratch (Andrew 1995). Human intelligence was already developed, but with certain limitations and other intelligence disciplines were underdeveloped and very seldom sophisticated. After WWI America recessed and settled in a period of peace. The

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The 9/11 attacks opened the avenue for a scrutiny of the performance and ability of the intelligence community to detect any threats to the safety of the United States. The media, politicians, reformists and other interested parties would not comprehend how such an attack would happen without the knowledge of the intelligence community. However, it is important to consider the fact that the attack was one of its kind and could not be approached with the resources and expertise used in other initiative such as the cold war. Therefore, the need to restructure the intelligence community arose from the view that it was still operating in the mindset and spirit of the cold war even in the modern era that had seen a revolutionary change of warfare

Since 9/11, the intelligence community has improved greatly. It is not that they have been reconstructed from the ground up, or that their mission has completely changed, it is, in the community’s eye anyway, that they now all share information, no matter how important or how small. This information sharing now even includes all the way down to local and tribal authorities. The reasoning is that, even if it might be small or seem insignificant to you at your level, it may be the piece someone somewhere else in the country needs.

The Central Intelligence Agency, hereafter referred to as the CIA, is one of the most well-known and fascinating intelligence agencies throughout the world. For the most part, when the CIA comes up in the news, it is to report that the agency failed in doing something. This paper will analyze different successes and failures of well-known operations of the CIA. The successes that will be analyzed are Operation Argo and the killing of Osama Bin Ladin. Operation Argo has recently become well known due to a movie being released about the operation. The killing of Osama Bin Ladin is probably the most popular case that the CIA had completed due to its significance in a time when the United States was quite vulnerable. This paper will review these two successes of the agency and analyze how these missions were successful and why. The two failures that will be discussed are the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 are crucial to the American people and to the Intelligence Community. It is important to analyze these attacks in order to figure out what, if anything, could have been done differently that may have prevented these attacks from occurring. The Bay of Pigs Invasion is an infamous failure of the United States as well as the CIA in which many mistakes were made. The CIA plays an essential role in the safety of the United States and its people. Due to its high importance, it is crucial to

The term “Covert Action” brings with it a connotation of shadowy figures wrapped in secrecy and intrigue. It also brings with it a substantial amount of moral questions as to “what is right.” The use of covert action has been widely publicized since the early seventies, but trying to find out the truth to these events has been difficult to say the least. What is even more difficult, is historically recording these events into categories of successes or failures. These operations are difficult to dissect because of their secrecy and although events have been recorded, some facts simply aren’t apparent. This paper will seek to identify the complex issues associated with covert operations.

The United States has the most capable intelligence apparatus of any country in the world. The information produced by various agencies gives the United States a substantial advantage when it comes to understanding world events, predicting and preparing for unsettled times, fielding military forces, and making a host of other political and economic decisions. From an ethical perspective, it means that the United States Intelligences information can create the risk of security for the United

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

Abstract: In this analysis, it is shown throughout the many different agencies how the intelligence cycle is interpreted. Within each of the different agencies everyone has their own way of obtaining information and different policies that they follow, within the constriction of the US constitution. The intelligence cycle states the many different steps taken to obtain intelligence from domestic to foreign information.

Central to threat assessment is intelligence to help develop our own targets to deter or punish state sponsors.  In this regard, the development of long-term human source intelligence [HUMINT] is often cited as a vital component in building our ability to preempt attacks. Critical to threat assessment is the need to get smarter, not just in protecting against the threat from outsiders, but smarter about the threat posed by people with legitimate access.  This includes acts of carelessness by insiders.  A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  We need to continue our efforts to enhance our vigilance to minimize any potential threats posed by third country nationals- for example, threats posed by outsiders working at U.S. embassies and military installations overseas.

Counterintelligence (CI) involves actions aimed at protecting the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services (Lowenthal, 2014). Three main components of Counterintelligence include collection, defensive and offensive. The collection is the ability to gather intelligence information about rivalry capabilities against own nation; defensive part of CI involves measures to prevent and thwart other nations ' attempts to penetrate into own nation 's intelligence system; while an offensive aspect deal with running double agents to penetrate, manipulate, exploit, and control targeted adversaries. CI is said to be the most essential aspect of the intelligence disciplines, in the sense that it helps in collecting vast quantities of secret information and produce an excellent analysis of intelligence, although, ineffective counterintelligence measures may diminish confidence in the final results (Van Cleave, 2013).