Katrina was a crisis primarily because of its scale and the mixture of challenges that it posed, not least the failure of the levees in New Orleans. Because of the novelty of a crisis, predetermined emergency plans and response behavior that may function quite well in dealing with routine emergencies are frequently grossly inadequate or even counterproductive. That proved true in New Orleans, for example, in terms of evacuation planning, law enforcement, rescue activities, sheltering, and provisions for the elderly and inﬁrm.
In the Disaster in Franklin County simulation (Regents of the University of Minnesota [UMN], 2006), there were several key personnel in the incident command team. This concept is utilized in real disasters when the Public
The whole world observed as the administration responders appeared incapable to provide essential protection from the effects of nature. The deprived response results from a failure to accomplish a number of risk factors (Moynihan, 2009). The dangers of a major hurricane striking New Orleans had been measured, and there was sufficient warning of the threat of Katrina that announcements of emergency were made days in advance of landfall (Moynihan, 2009). Nonetheless, the responders were unsuccessful to change this information into a level of preparation suitable with the possibility of the approaching disaster. Federal responders failed to recognize the need to more actively engage (Moynihan, 2009). These improvements include improved ability to provide support to states and tribes ahead of a disaster; developed a national disaster recovery strategy to guide recovery efforts after major disasters and emergencies; and the Establishment of Incident Management Assistance Teams in which these full time, rapid response teams are able to deploy within two hours and arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander (FEMA,
The various local, state, and federal emergency management systems of the United States suffered a crude awakening in the decade of the 2000s. Systems expected to hold up were put to the test and failed to prepare for disaster, mitigate the damage, and, in some instances, actually hampered responses in life-or-death situations. Worse, all failings were highlighted in an age of global communication and mass media, on display first whether a man-made incident like September 11th attacks or natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina. The decade found the complacent government failing to maintain modern emergency management practices, stimulating began a series of doctrinal upgrades and training improvements. Yet, no matter the bureaucracy, writings, or money thrown at a problem, the first responder to the incident has and will continue to influence the outcome. While the individual responder stands as the most important part of
Hurricane Katrina caused a great deal of destruction, death, and human suffering. Research from this event brings to light the limitations of both the National Guard and active-duty forces response capabilities, and whether changes in the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard and active-duty forces during emergencies would enable them to respond better. It is likely that the primary responsibility for national disasters will continue to be handled by local and state officials. They have the best understanding of situations, have the capability to handle the case, and can respond quickly. Hurricane Katrina generated the need to examine the federal response and to make any changes that are needed for the preparation of National Guard and active-duty Army during major domestic emergencies. Both the National Guard and active duty Army are changing to smaller modular and interoperable combat and support brigades that can provide the foundation for an expedited force that can deploy units to threats quickly. The Army
Natural and man-made disasters have increased in the past decade, and due to these changes, Emergency Managers had to make drastic changes in order to improve the way first responders operate in a disaster area.
Two specific areas of concern are noted in the majority of studies conducted. The first area of concern was that there was not a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities or organizational leaders (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 322). Since this event this has been an area that has shown considerable improvement. This has been accomplished through the use of NIMS and collaborative efforts of first responder leaders to craft an all hazards model of response. By doing both of these things, partner agencies are better able to fold into the rescue
When an incident occurs within the United States, the Incident Command System (ICS) is brought into action. The ICS process serves as a management system designed to provide an effective incident management structure by way of combining facilities, personnel, equipment, operating procedures, communications and operational standards. The ICS is not a flawless system, however its flexible design allows for adaptation and change. During Hurricane Sandy, the ICS was implemented with mixed results. More than 28,000 personnel were utilized for the response and recovery efforts from that hurricane. It was the Incident Command System that served as coordinating guidance for facilitating the organizational structure for the hurricane Sandy response
As the Disaster Coordinator for the city I am responsible for ensuring the public safety and welfare of the citizens within the city's jurisdiction. This requires me to have a full understanding on my role and responsibilities for managing disaster response and employing resources in order to save lives, protect property, the environment. Additionally I’m tasked to preserve the less tangible but equally important social, economic and political structures. My first reaction was to alert the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force to prepare them for possible activation. Next it is vital to gain situational awareness and develop a Common Operating Picture (COP). This COP is the who, what, where, when and how as it relates to the incident. Situational awareness starts at the incident site and includes continuous monitoring of reporting channels to gain
Today, the Incident Command System (ICS) is a major component of NIMS and is widely used in emergency management response. However, this was not always the case. According to David A. McEntire and Gregg Dawson, authors of the article, “The intergovernmental Context,” ICS was originally developed by the fire service in 1970. Its purpose was to assist in the command of wildfire events. It was unique because it standardized operations, yet offered flexibility so that it could be used on any number of events, regardless of size or type (McEntire & Dawson, 2007, p. 63).
The burden of emergency management has grown great deal in the last few decades. We have seen an increase in natural disasters, a new threat of terrorism on our front door and an increase in manmade disasters. All of these have tested emergency management in a number of cities and towns across the nation. It is not always disasters that present problems for emergency managers. We have to look beyond our traditional view of emergency management of helping us during times of disasters and view what issues they consider may affect their emergency response. Issues that emergency management see that are moving into the critical area are issues of urbanization and hazard exposure, the rising costs of disaster recovery, and low priority of emergency management.
When a disaster has taken place, first responders who provide fire and medical services will not be equipped to meet the demands for many services. Several issues such as the number of victims, communication failures and road blockages will stop people from accessing emergency services they have come to expect at a moment 's notice through 911 emergency services. Individuals will have to rely on others for help in order to meet their immediate lifesaving and life sustaining needs. If access is blocked or the agency’s capacity is exceeded, it may be hours or days before trained help arrives. There is a four-phase model that organizes the events of emergency managers. This model is known as the “life cycle” which includes dour
Hurricane Katrina exposed huge issues in the United States disaster preparedness and response programs. In 2005, the structure for homeland security was unable to manage catastrophic events like Hurricane Katrina. Unified management of national response
This paper will discuss the differences between two different natural and man-made disasters. The disasters that will be discussed are Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Additionally, this paper will look into the specifics of what constitutes a natural and man-made disaster. Specifically, this paper will look into each disaster to include the events surrounding them; the risks; and the assessments. Furthermore, this paper will look at some of the details of each disaster and why there was so much devastation. Finally, this paper will look at a few similarities, but mainly the differences between the two, and how the effects of each still linger today.
On August 29, 2009, Hurricane Katrina struck the United States Gulf Coast. It was a Category 3 Hurricane, according to the Saffir Simpson Scale. Winds gusted to up to 140 miles per hour, and the hurricane was almost 400 miles wide . The storm itself did a tremendous amount of damage, but the storm’s aftermath was cataclysmic. Many claimed that the federal government was slow to meet the needs of the hundreds of thousands of people affected by the storm. This paper will examine the four elements of disaster management – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation – as well as an analysis on the data presented.