OPERATION EAGLE CLAW: WHAT WENT WRONG
SSG Jeremy G. Michael
Iran took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The resulting failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, was an international embarrassment for the United States. No single event or decision resulted in the mission’s failure; instead, the failure resulted from a chain of poor decisions. This single operation highlighted the need for a dedicated special operations aviation unit dedicated to the rescue of American citizens and their repatriation. This paper discusses the global situation and some of the poor decisions that were made throughout the entirety of the mission from planning through the crash at Desert One. The …show more content…
Due to the sensitivity of the mission, the Department of Defense chose to bypass already established Joint Task Forces (JTF) that existed. Instead, an ad-hoc JTF was created specifically for Operation Eagle Claw. The newly created JTF encountered problems defining areas of responsibility and areas of focus. The JTF included three branches of the military in the operation the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The operation rehearsed for five months prior to its execution. The JTF never conducted a rehearsal during the five months. All elements conducted individual rehearsals only joining on the night of execution. Problems that were encountered on the night of Operation Eagle Claw were never identified prior which ultimately contributed to the failure of the mission. Due to OPSEC considerations, the rotary-wing aircraft chosen for Operation Eagle Claw was the RH-53. The RH-53, chosen solely because it looked “correct” on a United States Navy ship. The decision to choose the RH-53 significantly contributed to the mission failure at the desert-landing zone known as Desert One. The RH-53 was a poor choice for several reasons. First, the pilots chosen to fly the mission were United States Air Force pilots who were unfamiliar with the aircraft and its characteristics. Second, the RH-53 historically had a poor Operational Readiness (OR) rate as it suffered from significant maintenance issues making it unreliable. Third, the RH-53 had no inflight refueling
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The United States attacked Iraq on March 19, 2003. The question of whether this action is a case of justified anticipatory self-defense or not is answered by clearly understanding the definition of “anticipatory self-defense”. Anticipatory self-defense basically says that if you have a good reason to believe that someone is going to harm you in a particular way, you can act first. The proper definition would have two conditions; “There is clear and convincing evidence that the proposed target has the ability to strike a devastating blow” and “There is clear and convincing evidence that the proposed target has the inclination to strike a devastating blow”. That being said, the decision to go to war with Iraq was a decision based upon dishonesty and a one-sided perspective. Therefore, U.S does not qualify to call it a case of justified anticipatory self-defense so; it was not a last resort as it had other less violent options.
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President Carter accepted the permission for the Shah to come the the United States to obtain treatment for cancer. The College students charged the palace quite quickly, with the takeover happening within a matter of hours. The CIA has tried to intervene the situation, but failed. Another report says that the capture of America’s Embassy and its diplomatic staff was a hugely symbolic victory over “The Great Satan.” “The Great Satan” as being America, because America is known to be hated by most Iranians. The hostages are still being kept captive with little food and water. There are supposed " mock executions" happening at the Embassy. Another source says that this is a way to raise the intra and international profile of the revolution leader, the anti-american cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. There was a hostage rescue attempt called “Operation Eagle Claw” it was a United States Armed Forces operation ordered by US President Jimmy Carter to attempt to end the Iran hostage crisis by rescuing 52 embassy staff held captive at the Embassy of the United States in Tehran on 24 April 1980. When they tried to rescue the 52 American hostages held in Tehran it ended with eight U.S. servicemen dead and no hostages