The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.
US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) lack of understanding the operational environment led to a poor definition of the problem. The key to understanding the operational environment is the ability to describe the current and desired operational environment. (JPiii8). CENTCOM’s planning did reflect a good understanding of the current operational environment. CENTCOM understood the influences Iraq’s current political structure
The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.
General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion
During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.
This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.
The command structure in United States Military is vital to the success of missions carried out in or outside the country. The Department of Defense is responsible for overseeing the establishment of command hierarchies that work for specific units. The commands, guidelines, and orders are passed from the highest-ranking personnel to lowest ranking officers who must perform the directive or pass it to subordinates with the same instructions. The principles that establish the command structure in the military evaluates the performance of each command and the officers involved in the various missions. The key principles that affected the execution of Operation Anaconda resulting in mission deficiencies are organizational structure, decision-making, and collaboration.
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
At the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US military ended with varied to questionable results. This is because US policymakers and military leaders did not adjust to the emergence of new conditions due to their dependence on medium structure problem framing. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is a tool military organizations should use in adaptive environments to develop solutions for complex problems. To understand why the ADM is a critical tool for military organizations, military professionals need to understand the impacts of ill-structured problems on planning and execution and the potential influence the ADM will have on their organization. Once military professionals understand the influence the ADM has on ill-structured problems, they can begin to consider how to integrate the ADM into planning.
In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.
The weaknesses with CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA involved the friction and the lack of the integration of the interagency in the planning of phases IV-V and the initial strategic assumptions that affected CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA. The first weakness was the failure of both CDRUSCENTCOM and interagency organizations to include the NSC, Departments of Defense/State, and the U.S. Agency of International Development to integrate and coordinate their strategic objectives into a comprehensive unified plan in support of OIF. This failure enabled the post regime change of Iraq to set the foundation for the insurgency that would start to grow in 2004.
Per Joint Publication 3-24, the operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect how the joint force commander uses available capabilities and makes decisions. It requires a holistic view of insurgent, neutral, and friendly political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems. Culture can be defined as a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. This essay will focus on the rich culture of Somalia and how the country has evolved from its humble beginnings. Moreover, the culture and history presented in Somalia, as well as the geography and military history, and understanding how the people of Somalia operate.
In late 2002, the United States began to deploy troops to the Gulf region as a result of Iraq’s refusal to comply with the United Nation’s (UN) mandates. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on 20 March of 2003. While much emphasis has been placed on the intelligence failures surrounding OIF, including utilizing fabricated intelligence as a means to invade Iraq, and the belief that Iraq had a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), there has been little to no reporting on the success of intelligence within the country. Scholars and war experts affirm that intelligence played a significant role in supporting the development of Iraq war plans. This contribution led to several successes during OIF, the most notable being the capture of the fifth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, who was eventually tried and executed. Other successes include the demise of al-Qa’ida’s leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, aiding in providing vital security information, the identification of the adversary’s military capacity, and supporting OIF’s planning stage.
The unexpected initial resistance by Iraqi forces, followed by later surrender, required flexible coalition operations. The vision of the use of chemical and biological weapons proved groundless. The efficiency of special operations will be one area for deeper revision. The media policy will need reviewing for future operations. At this stage, the article does no more than record the sequence of events, make broad judgements about the strategic and tactical approaches of both the Coalition and Iraqi forces, and highlights areas where further investigation may be useful to draw firmer conclusions.
The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.