Political And Economic Development Of Russia 's Oil

As stated earlier, Russia’s economy is largely based on oil. Further, throughout Russia’s existence, its political institutions have strongly remained stable do to their performance legitimacy. Therefore, the rise of oil and therefore competitive authoritarianism are not mutually exclusive. Since Putin’s election, economic growth has averaged 6.7%, however, much of this growth is directly due to rising oil prices since 1998 that have topped over 100 dollars a barrel. Rising oil prices has allowed Russia to eradicate foreign debt, establish massive reserves of hard currency, and create budget surpluses. This has in turn allowed Putin to accumulate massive amounts of wealth as well as improving his performance legitimacy. Arguably, this is a false performance legitimacy. To many in Russia, this is the best the economy has ever been, and it has allowed for Putin to easily consolidate power. Yet, with oil on the decline, Russia has effectively created an economy that can not last into the near future, and only time will tell how far they will end up

The valuation process firms undergo when looking to acquire a company is very complex, but when a company, especially a foreign one, makes the conscious decision to enter another foreign market is even more complex and tricky. In this case three western oil firms the neophyte Philbro; the legacy Mobil; and, the middle weight Conoco all have to determine if and how they want to enter the newly open Russian Oil market. The Russian oil market is characterized as high risk for potentially high rewards. High risks include but are not limited to obsolete and poor infrastructure; murky and opaque governmental (and subsequently economic) policies; unreliable Russian geologic surveys; and, etc. Furthermore, Russian inflation is soaring and the

One country is comparable to the United States of America in terms of world power and prominence. Russia makes their name known beginning in World War 2 (WW2), later in the Korean War, Cold War, and today’s proxy war in the Syria. Russia’s culture, environment, politics, military, and economy do not just make Russia a regional powerhouse, but slowly becoming a region of influential power to surrounding countries with the end state of a global superpower. All the factors that make Russia the powerhouse that it is slowly becoming, highlights the impressive trend that supersedes the previous Soviet Union and past leaders.

Russia has built a strong, but stagnating economy on several natural resources to include the refinery and export of natural gas and oil. According to the Jim Picht (2014) exportation of natural gas and oil to Eastern Europe account for 70 percent of Russia’s exports and 53 percent of the government’s revenue. Along with exporting oil to Eastern Europe, Russia also exports too many countries to include China and Belarus. Europe fueled majority by Russian supplied natural gas and oil, the dependency of Europe’s need for this natural resource is the reason Russia’s economy is so strong. In 2014, when Russia decided to invade the neighboring country of Ukraine has led Europe to begin searching for other suppliers of their natural resources. If Europe finds other countries to supply the natural resources

The Russian state has been characterized by its strong heritage of powerful, autocratic leadership. This domination by small ruling elite has been seen throughout Russia's history and has transferred into its economic history. Throughout the Russian czarist period, to the legacy of seventy years of communism; Russia has been a country marked by strong central state planning, a strict command economy and an overall weak market infrastructure (Goldman, 2003). Self-interest, manipulation and corruption have all been present in the Russian economy, and have greatly helped the few as opposed to the many. To this day, Russia still struggles with creating a competitive and fair market.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and President Vladimir Putin’s ascendency in the early 2000s, he and his government have been hell-bent on reclaiming Russia’s old title of a world superpower. In conjunction with his administration, Putin has commandeered Russia’s identity to the narrative of being an energy superpower by using the nation’s most effective weapon: the country’s energy resources. Peter Behr’s article for the Congressional Quarter Global Researcher titled “Energy Nationalism,” seeks to demonstrate and explain why and how Russia—in addition to other countries such as China and Venezuela—became so nationalistic and protective of its energy resources. Furthermore, “Since the oil age began more than a century ago, governments in the developing world—on both the right and left—have promised their people a fair share of the wealth…Instead, ‘black gold’ has spawned corruption, economic hardship, vast class differences and civil war” (Behr 2007). When politically creating a nation’s identity on the world’s stage, leaders incorporate the benefits and effects of human, material, and natural resources. Since these are constantly evolving variables, a country’s identity, particularly relating to natural resources, is constantly evolving as well. Nevertheless, Putin is reminiscing and effectively reenacting Russia’s energy production days in order to shape the narrative of being a geopolitical and energy superpower. However, prior to understanding and examining

In Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, Karen Dawisha relates Russian President Vladmir Putin’s rise to power. She overarchingly claims that Putin is an authoritarian leader who has obstructed and even reverted Russia’s path of democratization, citing, amongst many factors that enabled his ascension, his “interlocking web of personal connections in which he was the linchpin” (100), money-laundering to tax havens and personal projects, and the complicity of the West. With copious research, journalistic interviews, legal documents, and even sporadic informational diagrams, it is evident why her book is so popular amongst scholars and history enthusiasts. Unfortunately however, in spite of the grand yet oftentimes substantiated claims she generates, a more subtle yet noteworthy assumption is made: that the state is a protector, as Olson proffered. She employs this theoretical underpinning from the beginning, though is not representative of Putin’s actual authoritarian regime.

Oligarchy as it is known in Aristotle’s politics; is a government run by a small group of people, ‘elites’. However, the oligarchy which this essay addresses is currently referred to in Russia as “a very wealthy and politically well-connected businessman...one who is the main owner of a conglomerate of enterprises and has close ties with the president” (Aslund and Dabrowski, 2007; 144). In the 1990s Russia’s economic reforms are said to have created the rise of a small group of oligarchs who gained an overwhelming amount of power and control. By 1997, this small group of previously unknown businessmen and bankers, often with gangster ties, had acquired control of many of the key parts of the Russian economy. Why did they emerge? It is argued by David Satter that three processes facilitated the emergence of the oligarchs. The first was hyperinflation and the social, economic and political consequences. The second was the process of privatisation, and finally the third was criminalisation (Satter, 2003). However, were these powerful oligarchs just a phase during the transition from Soviet to Post-Soviet Russia? Even with Putin’s efforts and declaration to distance the oligarchs from politics and power, and start a war against them exemplified by the Khodorkovsky affair, are oligarchs still significantly powerful in contemporary Russia? What is the role they play in Russia? It seems that the power of those original oligarchs of the 1990s has decreased or been concealed in

Russia’s legislature approved the forced transfer of certain fields to government-controlled firms. In 2006, Shell was forced to transfer an expansion project to Gazprom. That same year, concern over the possible revocation of the license to the Kovykta gas field and Gazprom’s ability to block construction of a pipeline to China, forced TNK-BP to sell its stake in the field. Gazprom purchased the stake for less than a third of its real value. The Russian government had also been known to both privatize or nationalize firms and rig auctions in order to favor government-controlled corporations.

Russia's new strength is also based on its vast reserves of oil and natural gas, which as the price of crude exceeds $ 120 per barrel, give the country tremendous bargaining power, not only in its relations with countries directly dependent on its supplies as Ukraine, Germany and Hungary, but, in general, by the capacity of influence that give

Another significant issue plaguing our Baltic NATO allies is the stranglehold Russia has on their oil economies, a nightmare which interferes with democratization efforts and the economic success of these Eastern European nations with Western dreams. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 25, 2016 that Russia uses its oil reserves as a way to exert influence over former satellite states. There have been distinctly dangerous impacts of Russian monopolization of Baltic oil markets as explained by Natalia Slobodian, a National Centre for Strategic Studies energy expert in May of 2016. In cases of dissent against Russian aggression in Baltic nations, the Kremlin has retaliated with “punishment actions” including blocking their gas supply, provoking social unrest and energy crises. In 2017, Eastern Europe should not be left in the dark. In 2017, children shouldn’t freeze in their beds overnight. The United States

The oil industry is one of great power that countries are invest in. Russia is one of the leading contenders in producing oil and exports the goods to various countries. With great resources comes great strength. Oil is of the utmost important to every country therefore, Russia has an upper hand in some respects. Moreover, the history behind the oil pipelines and how Russia connects to different countries allows for insight into the power they withhold politically and economically, and on the improvements that need to be made to continue growth in this industry.

Finally, I will explain the oil refinery operations and processes, the how the oil becomes raw martials.

Russia’s Return as a Superpower. There are concerns that Russia may once again “reassert itself militarily” (Wood 7). After the original fall of communism in 1991, Russia seemed to be on a path to democracy. Currently the notion of a democratic Russia seems to be fading as Russia “has been centralizing more and more power in the Kremlin” (Putin 2). Regional governors, who were once elected by the people, are now being appointed by Moscow.

The world concerned problem today the energy problem. Among other reasons of its country is growing thirst for oil and gas made thus a matter of strategic energy security. Oil is the stratagem industry of the development of economy and society. With the development phase of Kazakhstan’s oil resources is speeding, the world big powers seek the benefits here, Kazakhstan becomes the new focus of the world political and economic competition. From this essay firstly introduction of Kazakhstan’s oil industry, then examines the impact between the oil industry in government invitation and the oil market, finally compare the pros and cons in government invitation then give the reason for government invitation should be continued. Understandably, government invitation is concerned that economy market is a fair indication of an economic policy. One of special interest is the role anxiety plays in relation to economic theories.