The riparian buffer discussed in the fact pattern describe leaving a 50-foot buffer zone of natural land between both sides of all streams. The plaintiff, Roberta Smith, owns a 100-acre farm which has a stream flowing through it. Under the new riparian buffer regulation four of her 100 acres will be lost because the regulation will prevent her from growing any crops on this four-acre plot of land. The plaintiff argues that a regulatory taking has occurred and that she is entitled to compensation for her lost land. It is important to understand the distinction between eminent domain and a regulatory taking before going further. In Kelo and Village of Euclid eminent domain refers to situations where the government explicitly condemns private land for public use and justify the taking under the 5th …show more content…
Lucas found that in these situations compensation is required if the categorical taking criteria is met. Because only four acres of the plaintiff’s 100-acre farm were taken by the riparian buffer regulation compensation under a Lucas taking is not appropriate. Penn Central presents an ad hoc line of reasoning when determining if compensation is appropriate. Because of the Landmark Designation Act, Penn Central was not allowed to develop Grand Central Terminal when facing bankruptcy. Despite this, the decision Penn Central found that compensation was not necessary because Penn Central was granted Transferable Devleopment Rights where they could develop up to 20% above New York zoning code elsewhere. The court found that this counted as compensation. In the case of Roberta Smith, a Transferable Development Right should be awarded for the four acres taken by the riparian buffer regulation. She is incorrect in demanding compensation because she is allowed to either develop four acres under electrical wires or sell the rights. Either way this is an example of just
Facts: The city of New London approved a new development plan to build a new hotel and marina in hopes of revitalizing its economy and infrastructure. New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity planned to use the state approved $5.35-million-dollar bond issue to purchase the land needed to build. With approval from the state the NLDC began purchasing properties from willing sellers and use eminent domain to acquire the rest of the properties. Condemnation proceedings later began and petitions argued that they were condemned because they were located in the development area. The Superior Court agreed and granted a permanent restraining
Furthermore, it was found that the prohibition of use was a deprivation of any reasonable use for the parcels and eliminated the unrestricted right of use resulting in the parcels being rendered valueless. Lastly, the court determined that the parcels had in fact been “taken” by the Act and ordered that Lucas be paid just compensation in the amount of just over $1.2 million. Required compensation encompasses that the property owner to suffer a physical “invasion” of his property as well as denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled that when regulations are in place to “prevent serious public harm”, id. at 383, 404 S.E.2d at 899, just compensation is not owed under the Takings Clause despite effect on property value. The court was unable to back the statue that construction of the two lots would threaten he public resource. Id. at 383, 404 S.E.2d at 898. The court reasoned that any regulations that deny a property owner of viable economic use of land constitutes regulatory deprivation requiring compensation. Due to Lucas having to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses for a common good and must leave the property useless then the owner had suffered a taking. It was argued that the owner’s view of deprivation of all economically beneficial use constitutes a deprivation in the
The plaintiff’s argument to why the third condition did not meet stated that on previous occasions Foster High School charged the public to hold events on the property. Therefore, the plaintiff states that because the school district has charged the public before to use the recreational space that it is not immune from the liability on the injury on the property.
obtaining land for public use, but was to prevent harm to the public. The Court
In this case, Mr. Brandt had filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government for "the right-of-way crossing" his land had extinguished after the cessation of the railroad activity in the corridor. The Government had argued that this right was created by the Federal General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 and should be valid on the gounds that the railroad line was affirmed to be abandoned. While reviewing this case, it must be determined whether or not that the Government, under this Act, had retained an interest in the abandoned railroad right-of-way.
Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005) the U.S. Supreme Court answered “yes” to the question of whether or not taking land for the sole purpose of economic improvement would fall into the realm of public use requirement set forth in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
The City of New London was in major economic debt and wanted to build buildings to provide attraction and get money. They used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The office facilities were going to give multiple jobs to people who were in need of it and increase money which would be given to the city. The office facility was planned to be built where Kelo resided. There would also be other facilities such as restaurants, shopping centers, and parks. Kelo would be given a compensation but she didn’t want anyone to destroy her precious home that she adored so much. Whether it had destroyed her home or not the Constitution says if the building is for the public then the it does not go against the Constitution’s 5th amendment.
The Court rebutted with the fact that economic development is a recognized public use, and that sometimes the greatest benefit for the public is to have the land developed by an agency other than a government agency (Kelo v. New London, 2005). The Petitioner's countered that without such a “bright-line” rule a government could take private land and transfer it to someone else who would put the property to more use and therefore increase the tax revenue of the property. The Court argued that may be true in cases where there was no clear development plan, but in this case the City had developed an integrated development plan (Kelo v. New London, 2005). Finally, the Petitioner’s argued that if a government was going to exercise eminent domain that the public should be guaranteed with some “reasonable certainty” that the proposed benefits would in fact come to pass. For this the Court refused to speculate to the effectiveness of the City’s plan, and argued that once the Court had determined if an economic development plan was a “public use” as laid out in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, that their job was complete (Kelo v. New London,
A majority of my fellow judges’ decisions paralleled my thoughts on the matter, and it was determined that New London was able to legally acquire through the process of eminent domain. Since the 2005 supreme court case, other instances of eminent domain controversy have arisen, and the people of the city of New London has not reaped any sort of tangible benefits. With these new cases, and the subsequent development, or lack thereof in New London my opinion on the matter has changed entirely. It is my belief now that potential and realized economic development does not constitute approval for eminent domain action.
Martin’s property has been seized by the government authorities for community development by exercising eminent domain. According to (Whitman, 1969), eminent domain is the right a state can exercise to seize private property for public use with payment of adequate compensation to the owner. Since the new business would create jobs and increase development opportunities in the city, it means the city authorities have the legal right through eminent domain to seize Martin’s property.
New York City 1978 and Kelo vs. City of New London. In the Penn Central vs. New York City 1978 Penn Central Transportation Company wanted to construct a very tall office tower above its already existing railroad station and smaller office building, known as Grand Central Terminal. The Commission ruled that Penn Central could not go through with the project because the new development would change the existing landmark way too much. Penn Central sued in court, saying that the city's regulation of landmarks amounted to an Eminent Domain Clause "taking" of their private property rights. They said if the city was allowed to regulate them in this way, they should be compensated according to the 5th Amendment Eminent Domain Clause. At the end The Supreme Court ruled against Penn Central. The Court said first of all that there is no set procedure for ruling when an economic loss. Another case that changed the eminent domain was Kelo vs. City of New London. In this case the Supreme Court ruled that a city could seize land, through the use of the Eminent Domain Clause, private homes that were in good condition, and transfer them to another private property developer, for a local economic development project. The home owners then sued the city, claiming that the only reason for taking their land was not for "public use," as required by the Eminent Domain Clause, but rather for private use
The increased diffused surface run off may flow into a natural watercourse or even over landowner’s property as long as the increase in diffused surface water flow does not harm the neighboring watercourses or lands (Dellapenna 306). Also added to the natural flow rule is the good husbandry exception (Dellapenna 305). The good husbandry exception gained acceptance slower than the acceleration exception due to its grand nature (Dellapenna 307). The good husbandry rule permitted landowners to add quatinties of water to drain or repel from negihbors land as long as the quanties were considered “good husbandry” of the soil (Dellapenna 307). This exception created then need to define what was amount of diffused water run off was “reasonable” to use, which led into the creation of the reasonable use rule (Dellapenna 307).
7. The Taylors bought an ocean front lot in Oregon. The next year, Staley bought an ocean front lot south of the Taylors and built a home on it. Over the years, Staley often expressed concern that when the Taylors built their house, they could block her view. They said they would not. When they began planning their home, they asked Staley to submit a letter in support of a setback variance they sought. She said she would as long as her view wasn’t blocked. They again told her it wouldn’t be blocked. When the house was built, it partially blocked her view. She sued for breach of an
Eminent domain is when the state uses private land for public use, this could include anything roadways, pipelines, and lakes. The State of Iowa can buy the land of citizens for little cost and use them for any needs of the state. This is an unpreventable occurrence that happens (Iowa Web).
This is where NIMBY is introduced. NIMBY, which stands for “not in my backyard” is used to 1. “Express opposition by local citizens to the locating in their neighborhood of a civic project.” Some examples of these “civic projects” are: a jail, garbage dump, drug rehabilitation center, or anything that the community considers unsightly, dangerous and likely to lead to property values decreasing. From this is how they derived the compensation and eminent domain laws.