Riparian Buffer Case Summary

Facts: The city of New London approved a new development plan to build a new hotel and marina in hopes of revitalizing its economy and infrastructure. New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity planned to use the state approved $5.35-million-dollar bond issue to purchase the land needed to build. With approval from the state the NLDC began purchasing properties from willing sellers and use eminent domain to acquire the rest of the properties. Condemnation proceedings later began and petitions argued that they were condemned because they were located in the development area. The Superior Court agreed and granted a permanent restraining

The Plaintiff contests that orders to restrain the Plaintiff’s land use [8] by Pain J in the Land and Environment Court of NSW in 2005 constituted the ‘violation of correct legal procedures’ [14] and hence professional negligence, because the case was previously dismissed by Lloyd J [5].

obtaining land for public use, but was to prevent harm to the public. The Court

In this case, Mr. Brandt had filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government for "the right-of-way crossing" his land had extinguished after the cessation of the railroad activity in the corridor. The Government had argued that this right was created by the Federal General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 and should be valid on the gounds that the railroad line was affirmed to be abandoned. While reviewing this case, it must be determined whether or not that the Government, under this Act, had retained an interest in the abandoned railroad right-of-way.

Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005) the U.S. Supreme Court answered “yes” to the question of whether or not taking land for the sole purpose of economic improvement would fall into the realm of public use requirement set forth in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.

The Court rebutted with the fact that economic development is a recognized public use, and that sometimes the greatest benefit for the public is to have the land developed by an agency other than a government agency (Kelo v. New London, 2005). The Petitioner's countered that without such a “bright-line” rule a government could take private land and transfer it to someone else who would put the property to more use and therefore increase the tax revenue of the property. The Court argued that may be true in cases where there was no clear development plan, but in this case the City had developed an integrated development plan (Kelo v. New London, 2005). Finally, the Petitioner’s argued that if a government was going to exercise eminent domain that the public should be guaranteed with some “reasonable certainty” that the proposed benefits would in fact come to pass. For this the Court refused to speculate to the effectiveness of the City’s plan, and argued that once the Court had determined if an economic development plan was a “public use” as laid out in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, that their job was complete (Kelo v. New London,

A majority of my fellow judges’ decisions paralleled my thoughts on the matter, and it was determined that New London was able to legally acquire through the process of eminent domain. Since the 2005 supreme court case, other instances of eminent domain controversy have arisen, and the people of the city of New London has not reaped any sort of tangible benefits. With these new cases, and the subsequent development, or lack thereof in New London my opinion on the matter has changed entirely. It is my belief now that potential and realized economic development does not constitute approval for eminent domain action.

Martin’s property has been seized by the government authorities for community development by exercising eminent domain. According to (Whitman, 1969), eminent domain is the right a state can exercise to seize private property for public use with payment of adequate compensation to the owner. Since the new business would create jobs and increase development opportunities in the city, it means the city authorities have the legal right through eminent domain to seize Martin’s property.

A forum applies its own choice of law approach. So here North Montana will apply the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Laws as the state follows that approach. Under the Second Restatement, three main steps need to be considered: 1) whether the conflict is procedural or substantive, 2) whether a choice of law provision in a contract should be applied, and 3) the application of a choice of law rule. Here, it appears that the choice of law provision selecting Old York should be applied because none of the exceptions to the general rule apply.

New York City 1978 and Kelo vs. City of New London. In the Penn Central vs. New York City 1978 Penn Central Transportation Company wanted to construct a very tall office tower above its already existing railroad station and smaller office building, known as Grand Central Terminal. The Commission ruled that Penn Central could not go through with the project because the new development would change the existing landmark way too much. Penn Central sued in court, saying that the city's regulation of landmarks amounted to an Eminent Domain Clause "taking" of their private property rights. They said if the city was allowed to regulate them in this way, they should be compensated according to the 5th Amendment Eminent Domain Clause. At the end The Supreme Court ruled against Penn Central. The Court said first of all that there is no set procedure for ruling when an economic loss. Another case that changed the eminent domain was Kelo vs. City of New London. In this case the Supreme Court ruled that a city could seize land, through the use of the Eminent Domain Clause, private homes that were in good condition, and transfer them to another private property developer, for a local economic development project. The home owners then sued the city, claiming that the only reason for taking their land was not for "public use," as required by the Eminent Domain Clause, but rather for private use

The increased diffused surface run off may flow into a natural watercourse or even over landowner’s property as long as the increase in diffused surface water flow does not harm the neighboring watercourses or lands (Dellapenna 306). Also added to the natural flow rule is the good husbandry exception (Dellapenna 305). The good husbandry exception gained acceptance slower than the acceleration exception due to its grand nature (Dellapenna 307). The good husbandry rule permitted landowners to add quatinties of water to drain or repel from negihbors land as long as the quanties were considered “good husbandry” of the soil (Dellapenna 307). This exception created then need to define what was amount of diffused water run off was “reasonable” to use, which led into the creation of the reasonable use rule (Dellapenna 307).

7. The Taylors bought an ocean front lot in Oregon. The next year, Staley bought an ocean front lot south of the Taylors and built a home on it. Over the years, Staley often expressed concern that when the Taylors built their house, they could block her view. They said they would not. When they began planning their home, they asked Staley to submit a letter in support of a setback variance they sought. She said she would as long as her view wasn’t blocked. They again told her it wouldn’t be blocked. When the house was built, it partially blocked her view. She sued for breach of an

Eminent domain is when the state uses private land for public use, this could include anything roadways, pipelines, and lakes. The State of Iowa can buy the land of citizens for little cost and use them for any needs of the state. This is an unpreventable occurrence that happens (Iowa Web).

This is where NIMBY is introduced. NIMBY, which stands for “not in my backyard” is used to 1. “Express opposition by local citizens to the locating in their neighborhood of a civic project.” Some examples of these “civic projects” are: a jail, garbage dump, drug rehabilitation center, or anything that the community considers unsightly, dangerous and likely to lead to property values decreasing. From this is how they derived the compensation and eminent domain laws.

Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is a “legal bar preventing a (first) party from denying another (second) party's right in first party's property where the second party has incurred costs in that property to its detriment”. Proprietary estoppel, like other types of estoppel, is not a remedy in itself but a tool to raise “estoppel equity”, on the basis of which the court is able to decide on the type of remedy that this equity will satisfy. Similarly to the need for the element of common intention for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust, there is a need for the establishment of an active or passive assurance on the part of the defendant that leads to some form of consequential detriment on the part of the claimant when acting in reliance on that assurance. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the actions undertaken by the claimant and the initial assurance on the part of the defendant. The extent and the nature of the detriment suffered by the claimant, however, appears to be substantially more flexible than that necessary to find the existence of a constructive trust. For example, in Inwards v Baker [1965], such detriment amounted to the improvement of the defendant’s land, while in Gillett v Holt [2001] it was manifested in both financial and personal detriment. Yet unlike in most cases involving common intention constructive trusts, in neither of