The Ford Pinto Rear-Impact Defect

The moral issues about the Ford Pinto is that they take their profit is more important than human life. They also did not inform the consumer about the facts of the Pinto. Lastly, they also lobbied the safety of the car to lowest standard (Shaw, Barry & Sansbury 2009, pp 97-99).

The Ford automobile company began producing the Ford Pinto line up in 1968. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the time of the pinto production was Lee Iacocca. The reason for the decision to mass produce the pinto in a short amount of time is because American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports. Lee Iacocca wanted his engineers to design and manufacture a compact car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than 2,000 dollars. Because of this monumental task from Lee Iacocca, that meant the ford pinto automobile would have to be built within 25 months instead of the typical 43 months. There are many safety test that is mandated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration before a vehicle

In August of 1978 three teenage girls were driving a Ford Pinto and were struck from behind. The three girls died because the Ford Pinto’s fuel tank ruptured from the collision and burst into flames. There was a big debate about the safety of the Ford Pinto to its proneness to its fuel tank catching on fire in low-speed rear-end

There are many different cases where people have been critically injured or have died from burn-related injuries from the ruptured the Pino gas tank. This case study specifically discusses the 1978 untimely deaths of Lynn Marie Ulrich, Dana Ulrich, and Judy Ann. Between 1971 and 1978, the Pinto was responsible for a number of fire-related deaths. It was the death of these teenagers that lead brought the controversy of the Ford Pinto’s faulty gas tank placement to a climax resulting in criminal homicide charges for the automaker. Ford’s CEO Henry Ford II and Ford’s new president Lee Iacocca were responsible for the launch of the Ford Pinto. To stay ahead of the growing competition, The Pinto was not to weigh over 2,000 pounds and not costs not to exceed $2,000. Ford officials knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire issue when struck from the rear, but were desperate to expedite the vehicle’s release, the Pintos timing was set just under 25 months. Tooling has already been kicked off, so when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was too late for any design modifications. The tooling was well underway. Therefore, Ford’s president decided it would be too costly to make changes in the Pinto’s gas tank location pushing ahead with the original design which went unchanged for six years. Any changes to the low-cost Ford Pinto would result in an increased price, thus possibly making it less desirable by small car buyers. Iacocca understood that people shopping for compact cars were watching every dollar, One Ford engineer explained, “the process of elasticity on these subcompacts is extremely tight. You can price yourself right out of the market by adding $25 to the production cost of the model”.

Just moments after being given instructions to climb to a higher altitude “the captain stated, ‘Look at that crazy fuel flow indicator their on number four, see that?’” (TWA flight crash). Afterwards, in an investigation lead by the Nation Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) they concluded that the cause of the crash was due to the combustion of the mixture of air and fuel in the “center wing fuel tank” (TWA flight crash). It is no wonder why many people believe the cause of the crash was a fuel tank explosion. Later, the NTSB claimed that two worn down wires must have sparked in the fuel tank, exploding the whole plane (Cole 36). The NTSB also that the flammability in the central wing fuel tank, due to the hazardous mixture of air and fuel, was too high (TWA Flight 800). Based on the various tests and investigations of the crash, mechanical failure has remained one of the most accepted theories of the flight’s

There are a few concerns about harmful behavior of the FMC that should be discussed. A behavior is harmful when it wrongfully sets back the interest of others and has a high risk of harm. Obviously, the gravity of harm in this case is very high being that it is life threatening. Once a consumer has purchased the Pinto and drives it off the lot he is at risk to getting rear ended, and burned to death by a car fire or explosion. Since the weight of this harm is very severe, the low probability of the consumer having an accident doesn’t discount Ford’s unethical behavior. Indeed, driving a Ford Pinto would place a consumer’s life at risk. Also at stake are the interests of Pinto passengers and drivers of other vehicles who certainly are not willing to risk their lives so Ford can make an extra buck. Everyone has an interest in not getting injured or killed. Setting back the interest of consumers isn’t the only thing Ford Motor Company was responsible for.

Ford executives were under a great deal of pressure to produce a smaller, more gas efficient automobile. Japanese and German automobile sales were rapidly increasing. These competitive forces drove Ford’s executive team to respond by rushing the design process of the Ford Pinto. By 1973, the Pinto was well into production when engineers discovered a flaw in the gas tank, which was located just under the rear bumper. They discovered that if the vehicle suffered a rear-end collision over 20 mph, the gas tank could break and spill gasoline into the passenger compartment, potentially resulting in a fire. The remedy for the flaw was a part that cost $11.00 per vehicle. Executives at Ford knew the company had followed all safety standards and regulations. At that time, automobile safety standards only needed gas tanks to withstand a collision under 20 mph. An internal cost-benefit analysis revealed the costs would be substantially higher to fix the design flaw that the costs associated with any potential damages due to collisions and loss of life. The public remained unaware until Mother Jones journalist, Mark Dowie broke the story in 1977. Fueled by the media, what followed was a frenzy of public outcry and court trials.

The Grand Jury initiated a case against Ford after a tragic accident occurred on 10th August 1978 along U.S. Highway 33 near Goshen, involving a 1973 Ford Pinto car that was struck from the rear by a van. On board of the 1973 Ford Pinto there were two sisters (Judy and Lynn Ulrich) and their cousin Donna Ulrich who succumbed to burnt injuries after Pinto’s gas tank ruptured and got into flames in the process.

Personal evaluation of this case would take into consideration the fact; one engineer did offer a document indicating and estimate for the cost of value refitting which would prevent the Ford Pinto from bursting into flames should a rear end collision occur. A simple, $1, plastic gadget weighing one pound fitted over the gas tank bolts would have prevented the tank from being punctured. Conclusion was that "it was more economical to let people die and settle the suits afterward" (Newton and Ford, 2008). Put simply, the Ford corporate heads believed no project was worth manufacturing if the cost-benefit indicated a greater cost than the benefit. Further evaluation of the analysis indicated if the

After analyzing the cause of the crash, experts identified that there were significant design deficiencies of the Pinto made by Ford Motor Company and the company was knowledgeable of these deficiencies before launching it into the market for

Company in the early 1970s when the company decided not to recall the Pinto despite dangerous

In Canada, individual regulating bodies are in place to licence and regulate practitioners in their respective professions. It is in the public’s best interest that these professionals are knowledgeable and driven to progress society in a responsible manner. This includes acting in an ethical manner that aligns with the personal and corporate standards expected of members in a particular profession. The Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) is in place to regulate such behavior among engineers and protect the common interest of the Ontario community. At the end of this paper it will be evident that public welfare is paramount. This will be shown by how it ought to be enforced under the PEO, and how failure of the Ford Pinto was fueled by

I think Pinto case raised some serious issue of abusing human rights and not behaving ethically in the world of business. Any business/service should never ever put a value on human life and not take consideration of a known deadly danger. Ford had an option as well as the solution to design the car in a way that prevented cars from exploding; however they refused to implement it.   They thought that it was cost effective not to fix dangerous condition than to spend the money to save people in spite of the fact that the only added cost was $ 11 per vehicle.

Unfortunately, there is always risk when it comes to space flight. This makes it difficult to determine what constitutes an “Acceptable” risk. A space agency has many worries such as their reputation with the public and the world, the success of their missions, and most importantly the lives of their staff and astronauts. Engineers are usually technically gifted but lacking in organization. This spawns a need for non-technical managers to oversee the day to day operations of projects and companies. While the engineers worry about the functionality of the project (in this case, a space shuttle), the managers worry about the cost to the company and the infamous pick 2 triangle of good, cheap, fast. This causes a disconnect between the engineers and the management where pressure from anything whether it be the public or CEO, can cause concerns to be overlooked.

One of the biggest automotive news stories in the latter part of the 1970’s dealt with tales of exploding Ford Pintos and the considerable awards civil court juries were presenting to victims of accidents involving the cars.