The General Army And The Secretary Of The Army

The subsequent sections will propose how smaller and better-combined joint forces maintain lethality, mobility, and survivability. In spite of some associated risks, force adjustment is an opportunity to form an aggregate joint force. Nevertheless, these contractions will not mirror equally among the services. The result will be a lean joint force that maintains the ability to defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in all domains. Discussed in this order, Air Force, Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Navy general structure will revolve around the integration of skills and capabilities. Next, discussion of the four categories of risk involved in the transition to Joint Force 2020 include operational risk, force management

The Secretary of Defense outlined three strategic pillars in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): defending the homeland; building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. All three pillars are nested within the objectives of the NSS and arguably, the second pillar establishes a strategic to operational bridge through security cooperation operations (SCO). The assessment of SCO as a bridge between strategic guidance and operational objectives is supported by Joint Publication 3-0 which states that Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence are “ongoing activities (that) establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.”

Most military members agree that being a leader means being “in charge” regardless of the situation. While this axiom may hold true during the joint operation phases of “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate”, it is not the case for steady state operations with the IA. This axiom has become a caricature of the DoD mindset in the minds of many civilian leaders. If military service members are to become more effective with IA coordination, they must understand and appreciate three dynamics to steady state operations. First, the value that our partners bring to the fight . Second, that in the steady state, DoD is not the lead agency. Third, with the overabundant emphasis of the topic in joint doctrine, most leaders

The transformation in military thought towards employment of forces across multi-domain operations battlespace is based on the current threats

In a speech at George Washington University in November of 2015, the United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter also addressed challenges facing the United States, stating that the security of the US depends on a force better than it is today. This force not only includes the military services, but also extends to the civilian workforce of the combat support agencies, upon which this paper focuses. The vision of the future force is one that can quickly adapt and achieve success in a sophisticated, highly-technical and rapidly changing environment; maximize the benefits of commercial technology development; and address global military competition to defend the nation and make the world a better place.

a. The United States Army faces many challenges since the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century. Many of these challenges are due to long, repeated deployments in different countries where the struggle of stability operations is ongoing. Army Doctrine has been adjusting doctrinal terms and operational priorities, as the result of strategies used overtime to accurately achieve dominance in the battlefield.

The plan to align brigades with each global combatant command is a great strategy. The benefits of regional aligned forces are shown in improved operations, planning, and execution of missions. It also provides a greater partnership as the result of cultural proficiency and reduced cost of security operations in foreign countries.

Proper training provides any organization with the fundamental base for successful operations. The importance of training is even more crucial when teams are expected to deploy in small elements and provide commanders with operational and strategic options for the conduct of UW. The modern Jedburghs provide Joint Force Commanders with the capability to conduct the most difficult aspects of UW campaigns by understanding, influencing, and shaping the operational environment, deterring adversary forces, and when necessary, defeating threats to U.S. national security. The operational tempo that 4th BN’s face today obstructs from the operator’s ability to receive advanced unconventional warfare training, military training directly related to the

Ensuring that future Army forces are prepared to win in a complex world requires a focused, sustained, and collaborative effort across the institutional Army, the operating force, the joint community, industry, academia, and other interorganizational and multinational partners. Future force development must also cooperate and integrate efforts across doctrine development, organizational design, training, materiel development, leader development and education, personnel management, and investments in facilities.

In response to the September 11th attacks, the United States launched the Global War on Terrorism, invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite these wars and the necessity for post-conflict stability operations, military leadership, including the Secretary of Defense, had neither desired nor trained its personnel to effectively conduct stability operations, which require effective interagency collaboration. Failing to effectively leverage interagency capabilities during the early phases of the 2003 Iraq War at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels prolonged the achievement of the U.S. military’s objective—transferring power to the Iraqis.

The transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment we face today requires strategic direction and guidance from the President (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to allow the Combatant Commander (CCDR) of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to employ his Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) across the conflict continuum. In the following paragraphs, the above statement will be supported by the USEUCOM CCDR’s operational approach of developing broad strategic and operational concepts into specific mission tasks to show his TCP is linked to and supports U.S. national interests. To do so, examples of U.S. strategic guidance documents incorporated within the linkage will be presented. Lastly, a current engagement activity that is linked to a U.S. national interest in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (GAAT) will be discussed to express the range of military operations USEUCOM faces.

The Army’s mission is to build forces capable of Unified Land Operations, able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the range of military operations to provide capable and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies, while sustaining and maintaining the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. (United States, 2014)

1. The purpose of this background paper is to provide a possible solution to maximize coalition partnerships to provide to the AFSNCOA Commandant and other Strategic Leaders from across the force. The problem we will tackle is that “the Air Force does not do enough to get feedback on multinational operations from the field.” To accomplish this mission, we will bolster the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) in order to create a feedback loop for leaders in the field to apply cultural best practices and avoid friction points during ongoing coalition missions. We used the first six steps of the 8 Step Problem Solving Model as the primary tool to build the framework for our proposal.

Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) is another organization that has enjoyed the beneficial ebrace of “Stability Operations.” Since its establishment in 1993 as the Peacekeeping Institue, it has bolted-on the “Stability Operations” moniker and “grown in both size and outreach.” Unlike DASD SHA, however, PKSOI has refrained from direct involvement in military operations or planning, other than conducting assessments and lessons learned. As a positive example, PKSOI has focused their energies up-and-out by promoting “collaborative development and integration of peace and stability capabilities across the U.S. government and the international community in order to enable the success of future peace and stability activities and mission.” Although PKSOI has enjoyed organizational growth because of the embrace of “Stability Operations,” they have formed it into a center of excellence designed to share knowledge, develop external relationships, and facilitate coordination across services, departments, agencies, and governments. Despite the title, PKSOI refrains from treating stability as an

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of