September 11th Attacks Launched the United States' Global War on Terrorism

The terrorist attacks of September 11, altered American 's perceptions of the role in the world by strongly supporting the increased spending on national security and counterterrorism. Also, Americans have become more aware of how and where to engage in the world. As a result of the attacks, the US now has a defense that totals to nearly half the global total and has military dominance over scene, air, and space. The US also has the capability to dispatch massive military power anywhere in the world making them the system shaper. You may ask yourself just have a bad or do you check on September 11, 2001 was that led to this chaos and security becoming abnormally tight you may ask yourself just have a bad do you check on September 11, 2001

The study of George Tenet’s actions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan leaves little doubt about the dysfunction within our government from the appointment of officials to the decision making process itself. Tenet was appointed by President Clinton as Director of the Intelligence (DCI) in 1997, just 19 months after becoming deputy to DCI. It was noted that Tenet had never managed a large organization, worked as an intelligence officer or serviced in the military, all of which would have provided the experience and expertise needed

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

Throughout American history and still today these conspiracy theories always come up about any major tragedies. Some have been true but until someone within our own government comes out and says that these theories are true, they will continue to be all make believe. 9/11 is one of the biggest attacks on American soil and it also has a lot of conspiracies surrounding it. What really hit the towers? Where they commercial jet liners? How does a 747 leave that small of a hole in the Pentagon? These are some of the questions surrounding it. What it all comes down to though is what makes these theories so fascinating to Americans. What makes these so believable and to think that our own government would do this to us is just crazy, or is it?

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

While under Major General David Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division initially deployed, ready to engage insurgent forces. However, after arriving in Mosul, Iraq the division became heavily involved in a vital reconstruction effort. General Petraeus understood through his previous experiences that in war, reconstruction efforts are inevitable. His critical thinking and problem solving led to a three-pronged strategy to provide a secure environment, to restore basic life services and to facilitate a return to normalcy for the citizens of Mosul. In this paper, I will summarize how General Petraeus used critical thinking, problem solving and the “Screaming Eagles” to earn the hearts and minds of throughout Iraq.

Taking the field in 2003, the U.S Army, the most dominate fighting force in the world seized the initiative in Iraq. This paper outlines the staging of one command, the 101st Airborne Division, their commander Major General Petraeus, and the challenges of shifting rolls from combat to nation building and the effective transfer of power. Additionally, this paper will detail the Mission Command philosophy, specifically the describe action with the four step process of commander’s intent, planning guidance, critical information and friendly information as pertains to developing the commander’s intent during the initial occupation of Mosul, Iraq. While little was known about the current

The reframing led to the new priority from the transition approach to “protecting the Iraqi people”. The new objective would be to protect the Iraqi people while reducing ethnosectarian violence and defeating al-Qaeda. General Petraeus was selected to take command of the U.S. forces in Iraq leading the new strategy. Part of this change was President Bush’s approval of the surge forces, providing an additional five more brigades. General Petraeus went right to work implementing the new strategy of getting U.S. troops moved out of

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

In 2002 during OIF initial planning President George W Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld severely limited Franks’ opportunity to conduct effective operation design by failing to synchronize and clarifying the strategic objectives for the Iraq Invasion. In mid August, 2002, Bush issued a top secret guidance titled “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy” this document provided clear National Strategic Ends, and one of his objective describe

Originally George W. Bush was briefed not to “expect divisions within Iraq, non-conventional warfare, and a nationalism-fueled resistance” (Battle & Byrne, 2013). Additionally a memo, known as the Downing Street memo has surfaced and stated that "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy"(Rycroft, 2002). The last item that shows how flawed and incorrect our assumptions heading into Iraq were is a briefing that is known as the POLO STEP. The assumptions presented in the POLO STEP briefing were as follows. The provisional government would be in place by ‘D-Day’. Iraqi soldiers and civil servants would be reliable and have the fortitude to maintain their post. As well as the concept that post war operations would be over by December, 2006(Blaton & Battle, 2007). As illustrated above failure to perform proper planning, basing decisions on unfounded and erroneous assumptions about the operational environment, the duration of operations and the fortitude of the host nation citizens directly contributed to our failure to stop counter propaganda.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

Most see Iraq coming out of the war as more powerful in absolute power terms but not in relation to the rising power of its neighbours (Parasiliti, 2003, p. 160). According to Parasilati (2003) Iraq's reliance on its economic "strategic rents" - the billions of loans and grants given by the West and other Arab Gulf states - undercut its power relative to its neighbours. Even though it may seem like Iraq hadn't lost territorially, its bid for power failed and dropped it deeper into debt. In addition, the only positive aspect of the war was the slight increase in the national pride amongst Iraqis but none of the important geopolitical issues were addressed.