September 11th Attacks Launched the United States' Global War on Terrorism

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

The study of George Tenet’s actions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan leaves little doubt about the dysfunction within our government from the appointment of officials to the decision making process itself. Tenet was appointed by President Clinton as Director of the Intelligence (DCI) in 1997, just 19 months after becoming deputy to DCI. It was noted that Tenet had never managed a large organization, worked as an intelligence officer or serviced in the military, all of which would have provided the experience and expertise needed

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

While under Major General David Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division initially deployed, ready to engage insurgent forces. However, after arriving in Mosul, Iraq the division became heavily involved in a vital reconstruction effort. General Petraeus understood through his previous experiences that in war, reconstruction efforts are inevitable. His critical thinking and problem solving led to a three-pronged strategy to provide a secure environment, to restore basic life services and to facilitate a return to normalcy for the citizens of Mosul. In this paper, I will summarize how General Petraeus used critical thinking, problem solving and the “Screaming Eagles” to earn the hearts and minds of throughout Iraq.

Much like The Vale Kingdom in Game of Thrones, which experienced a power vacuum following the death of Jon Arryn, Iraq has been plagued by a power vacuum following the death of its previous leader. Before the US invasion in 2003, Iraq was a fairly successful country. While they did indeed have problems, their monarch-esque government was stable and the economy was flourishing in the 80’s. While the Iraq-Iran war and invasion took a heavy toll on the Iraq, things started to look better again in the 90’s (Wael). But alas, in 2003, the United States of America (backed the British) invaded Iraqi soil. Victor Hanson of The National Review, discusses how “The invasion of Iraq was a perfect storm predicated on [many] suppositions”, many of which could have been avoided, he says. The two most pushed reasons for the invasion were the war on “terrorism” and the removal of Saddam Hussein (Hanson). Hussein was the seen as the epitome of corruption and therefore had to be removed. Senators from both parties and numerous world leader agreed with this reasoning. While many had other interests in the region, the “war on terror” was the international cover-up they all used (Henke 122). Whether or not this decision was a mistake is up for debate, but the real mistake the US made, was winning the

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

General Casey also followed the original guidance to reduce the footprint in Iraq which increased U.S. casualties. The transition approach to stabilization was abandoned as it was wrong and simply did not work.

Taking the field in 2003, the U.S Army, the most dominate fighting force in the world seized the initiative in Iraq. This paper outlines the staging of one command, the 101st Airborne Division, their commander Major General Petraeus, and the challenges of shifting rolls from combat to nation building and the effective transfer of power. Additionally, this paper will detail the Mission Command philosophy, specifically the describe action with the four step process of commander’s intent, planning guidance, critical information and friendly information as pertains to developing the commander’s intent during the initial occupation of Mosul, Iraq. While little was known about the current

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Throughout American history and still today these conspiracy theories always come up about any major tragedies. Some have been true but until someone within our own government comes out and says that these theories are true, they will continue to be all make believe. 9/11 is one of the biggest attacks on American soil and it also has a lot of conspiracies surrounding it. What really hit the towers? Where they commercial jet liners? How does a 747 leave that small of a hole in the Pentagon? These are some of the questions surrounding it. What it all comes down to though is what makes these theories so fascinating to Americans. What makes these so believable and to think that our own government would do this to us is just crazy, or is it?

The terrorist attacks of September 11, altered American 's perceptions of the role in the world by strongly supporting the increased spending on national security and counterterrorism. Also, Americans have become more aware of how and where to engage in the world. As a result of the attacks, the US now has a defense that totals to nearly half the global total and has military dominance over scene, air, and space. The US also has the capability to dispatch massive military power anywhere in the world making them the system shaper. You may ask yourself just have a bad or do you check on September 11, 2001 was that led to this chaos and security becoming abnormally tight you may ask yourself just have a bad do you check on September 11, 2001

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

Most see Iraq coming out of the war as more powerful in absolute power terms but not in relation to the rising power of its neighbours (Parasiliti, 2003, p. 160). According to Parasilati (2003) Iraq's reliance on its economic "strategic rents" - the billions of loans and grants given by the West and other Arab Gulf states - undercut its power relative to its neighbours. Even though it may seem like Iraq hadn't lost territorially, its bid for power failed and dropped it deeper into debt. In addition, the only positive aspect of the war was the slight increase in the national pride amongst Iraqis but none of the important geopolitical issues were addressed.