The Importance Of The Paradoxical Trinity Of War

“For war, as a grave act of killing, needs to be justified.” These words were written by Murray N. Rothbard, dean of the Austrian School and founder of modern libertarianism, who spent much of his academic career trying to determine what, exactly, defined a “just war”. In fact, for as long as humans have been fighting wars, there have been quotations referring to the justification and moralities of wars and how warfare can be considered fair and acceptable to each society’s individual standards. While the time and place of each war differs, the reality of the devastation of battle may be found warranted by those fighting using these just war standards to vindicate their actions.

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

One of Clausewitz’s many famous theories is that ‘war is merely a continuation of policy by other means.’ This theory is proven correct once again

War is a dangerous game, many people would likely agree to this, however, very few have ever seen a battlefront. The truth is that war, no matter how awful we can imagine it, is always exponentially worse. In Timothy Findley’s The Wars, Robert Ross, the protagonist,­ faces a situation that he finds difficult to come to terms with, and when faced with a similar situation later on in the novel, he must take drastic measures to reconcile the uncertainties of the past situation. Timothy Findley suggests, through the life of Robert Ross, that one’s need to reconcile the uncertainties of past experiences dominate our actions when such situations come up again in our lives. In the words of Hiram Johnson, a US Senator during the First World War,

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

The stalemate of World War I’s Western Front resulted from a situation where leaders experienced and educated in 19th Century tactics and strategy could not reconcile this “predisposition” with the changes to war brought on by technological advances and not due to a mindless adherence to time-honored theories of military thinkers such as Clausewitz. The irony is that the tactical and strategic impasse aside, the various elements of World War I such as economy, political, and nationalism more closely reflected Clausewitz’s supposition of war (“clash of interests”) than the pre-war operational plans penned the generals.

The history of America, as a nation is connected through the wars it has entered and how these wars have irreversibly changed the country. “The Civil War made modern America… [and] we remain connected to this war” (Suri, Lecture 1). This is because the Civil War was an establishment of our nation’s beliefs and freedoms; fought to preserve the Union, this war shaped what America was and would become. The Civil War changed the notion of what liberty was, the transition from negative freedom to positive freedom is an influential aspect of American idealism. The ideal of liberty that emerged from the Civil War, was that the liberty came from the power of freedom (McPherson, 1991). Future wars were fought on the notion of protecting and expanding American interpretation of freedom; and each of these wars brought about change that would otherwise not have transpired. These wars came in three waves: the building of American presence, making the world safe for democracy as well as fighting oppressive regimes, and exporting democracy.

Most national assets were focused on contributing to the conflict, but some of the public and political opinions of certain individuals in the government prevented these wars from being coined as “absolute.” During World War II, industrial productivity increased, men were drafted into the armed forces, and all types of jobs in the country were focused towards winning the war. There also was a clear and hard objective that was being fought for, and the purpose of the war was widely known. In the 21st century, countries fight much more limited wars, with fewer resources, less people, and a smaller amount of emphasis of the objective of the fight. For example, take the Gulf War. The intention behind the fight was to change Suddam Hussein’s behavior, or even overthrow his government.2 The military objective was completed swiftly, but the overall goal of changing the government did not happen. The condition that was being imposed upon Hussein’s regime was not being fulfilled. General Rupert Smith commented that this was not satisfied because the military had no strategic goals after occupying the state. The initiative is transferred to the people once military occupation is present, and it is up to them to determine their future society. This new fighting style differs from traditional “total war” fighting styles, in that, these limited wars may not have support of the people, one vital part of Clausewitz’s trinity. Although all wars have

Nature of war which usually remains unchanged irrespective of changes in environment or war. Four elements of nature of war are; ‘greater political nature’, ‘human dimension’, ‘uncertainty’, and final one is ‘contest of wills.’ The trinity of war, Clausewitz 's famous theory, comprises three basic elements of warfare are ‘people; the second commander and his army; and the third the government, ' essential basis for successful military operations. He describes these three tendencies are must be balanced to

On War is not just a manuscript on of how to understand war; it also provides insight into what Clausewitz thought about the dynamics of human thinking. Similar to what Claxton outlined in Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Clausewitz believed that, “knowledge must be absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” (Clausewitz, p147). In other words, Clausewitz believed knowledge

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.

The previously accepted nature of war stemmed from the Clausewitzian trinity: war is emotional, an experience wrought with passion, violence, and enmity; uncertainty, chance, and friction pervade the medium of war; however, because war is not an end in itself, and because, as a means, it is subordinate to its political aims, war must be subject to reason (Clausewitz, 89). With the first employment of nuclear weapons, however, strategists and military theorists began to question Clausewitz’s foundational ideas (Winkler, 58). Similarly, Allan Winkler, in agreeing with Bernard Brodie’s thesis, opines that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Winkler’s assertion stems from his argument that such a nuclear duel would yield a post-war environment incapable of recovery for any parties involved (62). He further describes Brodie’s realization that “[t]he atomic bomb is not just another and more destructive weapon to be added to an already long list. It is something which threatens to make the rest of the list relatively unimportant.” (62) Ultimately, Winkler abridges Brodie’s assessment in stating that “the United States was caught in the paradox of having to prepare for a war it did not plan to fight.” (63)