The Transformation Of War Book

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

In human history, war has killed countless people, spent untold amounts of money and destroyed the great cities to be ruined. During the Cold War both sides of superpower used their belief that war was extremely likely to warrant the manufacture and deployment of more and more nuclear weapons. Although the Cold War is now ended, old wars continue and new ones have been taken up in many parts of the world: many see waging war as an inevitable consequence of human nature. This attitude is not only dangerous in encouraging the view that war is the method of choice for settling disputes, it is also wrong. (Prof John Finney Chair, British Pugwash Group, 2014) Now a day it becomes clearer that people must choose either the “security” of a peaceful society or the “insecurity” of militarism. However, the long list of conflicts from ancient times to modern day, psychologists still say that “war is not inevitable”. (DeCapua, 2013)

In “War is a Racket” General Butler laments the use of propaganda in World War 1, and he notes

Set-up - Warfare is constantly changing, for the tools of war are always evolving, as do the societies that wage war. Between 1400 and 1918, western warfare went through four periods that saw such profound change that it can fairly be said that a "military revolution" occurred. According to historians MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, military revolutions "fundamentally change the framework of war" and "recast society and the state as well as military organizations." While all of the military revolutions studied in H100 were important in the evolution of warfare, one clearly stimulated greater change than the others.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

Wars are a critical, global issue, as it is more elusive than ever. Even a disjointed group can mobilize and launch an ideological battle against a perceived aggressor. With increased mobility, travel and technology, battles can surface virtually anywhere. Wars emerge not only between nations, but between non state actors, insurgency groups, and between groups and religions within nations, as well. Even within the United States, battles persist between the population and law enforcement, an ideological battle concerning race and government forces. Wars have evolved since the early days of civilization (Sernau, 2012). Wars generally served one or a few purposes in early humanity, mainly the need to protect one’s tribe or territory (Sernau 2012).

In Out of the Mountains, David Kilcullen (2013) identifies and analyzes four of the variables which he believes will shape the character of warfare and conflict in the future. His study of these trends structure a system of security studies that incorporate non-state and unknown actors, as well as unorganized groups and cultural influences into conflict examination. It also allows for the consideration of economic, historical, and developing information while studying warfare. Kilcullen (2013) coins this system of analysis as his “Theory of Competitive Control.” This theory moves beyond the tactical focus that his earlier works exhibited and takes a deeper look at how peace-keeping strategies will be required to evolve as time passes and

The post WWII era has been a period that generated several changes in how commanders have driven the war. The art of war has extend contributions of Carl Von Clausewitz. The long process of maturation of his theories took several years. During this period, Clausewitz wrote and re-wrote his ideas concerning war. Because the time since On War was written it seems Clausewitz’s theories are useless or invalid, however, conflicts since 1945 have validated most of Clausewitz’s theories, which are a school of thoughts that remain adequate for explaining warfare in the current century. The purpose of this paper is to explain how conflicts since 1945 have validated the theories of Carl Von Clausewitz. Finally, conclusions suggest the significance to today’s military profession.

Total war is a government’s mobilisation of all its resources to support the efforts of its own troops and undermine those of its opponents. The British empire was in a state of total war after the euphoric atmosphere of going to war to fight for King and Country had died down. This resulted in the Defence of the Realm Act, known as DORA where all civilians were expected to contribute to the war effort. A historians studying the impact of the war on the homefront, would find sources 12.10 and 12.14 of use, because these sources demonstrate how Britain was in a state of total war, how desperate the government was to keep the soldiers at the front lines and how WWI ultimately altered the lives of many civilians. Source 12.10 demonstrates total

The comprehension of the term ‘total war’ has had great significance towards the understanding as to how wars are fought, affect society and differ from other conflicts. The main issue that arises is conclusively defining total war and is continually differing between both historians and military combatants alike. Roger Chickering defines states “total war is distinguished by its intensity and extent. Theatres of operation span the globe; the scale of the battle is practically limitless” all the while adding “total war requires the mobilisation not only of armed forced but also of whole populations” This definition, while not quintessential is a good starting point for a definition due to its broadness and acceptance of the idea of the incapability to fully mobilise a society’s entire resource. David A. Bell states that it is often defined as ‘a war involving the complete mobilization of a society’s resources to achieve the absolute destruction of an enemy, with all distinction erased between combatants and non-combatants’ . However, he notes the limitations of such an idea including the inability for societies to meet such criterion, in particular, the ability for a society to completely utilise its resources towards the war effort. Ultimately, Jeremey black, while not giving a conclusive definition for the term, total war, does acknowledge different definitions by various individuals distilling many of their arguments and consequently outlining main characteristics of

The primary sources of the book cover the post-World War II era of military science publications ranging from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, when the main focus and debate is on Clausweitz’s famous work On War,

Mary Kaldor, a modern war theorist, is convinced that the 1980s and 1990s wars have undertaken a different dimension from what they used to be like. In particular, these Warfare’s have shown some advanced characteristics, which have emerged through the forces of globalization processes. Indeed, the "New Warfares" according to Kaldor, are worldwide systems which manifest a modern age phenomenon of the 21st century. In that, they have gradually changed the global organization, its political frameworks and its parameters. Indeed, these structures have consequently interfered and affected various political affairs internationally. It is through the electronic devices such as television, radio, newspapers and the Internet, etc., which have been

Sun Tzu understood the nature of war as “the province of life or death,” and a “matter of vital importance to the state.”1 I agree. In my own experience, war awakens your primordial instincts and strips you of your self-rationalizations. Sun Tzu defined the character of war when he wrote, “water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.”2 Accordingly, Sun Tzu’s principals of war offer a framework adequate to explain the nature and character of 21st century warfare, which I rationalize as a near-continuous battle of ideologies fought through asymmetric means to advance the values and interests of state and non-state actors.

Since time immemorial human beings have been fighting one another by means of more or less murderous wars. Conflicts have evolved with time, in their organization, form and goals. Actors are different, new weapons have been created, technology has enormously developed, states’ interests have changed and, most of all, a new international order have been established. Nowadays it is not possible to fight a war the same way it was done during the Antiquity, or even last century. There are now international treaties and conventions that aim to regulate the use of forces in conflicts, as well as to limit casualties, especially civilian ones. Nonetheless, even though the world seem to have evolved in a more democratic and humanitarian way, wars are still common. There is no magic bullet to win a war, and the Laws of Armed Conflict, although they are not really respected, have not made it easier. However, the best way today, if the aim is to win quickly, efficiently and with the less casualties and destructions as possible, could be to use the technology at disposal, that is to say drones, as well as the use of cyber-attacks, Secret Service Intelligence, disinformation and economic warfare. This essay will first focus on some past wars to understand how conflicts have evolved over time and with the development of new means. I will then discuss the issue of ‘just war’, and whether it can be applied without jeopardizing the success of the mission. Finally, a third part will be about